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2ABSTRACT
Health policy and medical research: hepatitis B in the UK
since the 1940s
This thesis explores the way changing constructions of
hepatitis B have mediated between science and policy during
the past fifty years. Research-based 'facts' were filtered in
the policy arena according to social, political and economic
pressures. Central policy processes depended heavily on
expert advisers, who emerged from networks of researchers.
This account draws on scientific, clinical and epidemiological
research, central policy documents, and interviews with people
working with or suffering from the disease.
Though epidemiologically close to AIDS, hepatitis B has rarely
attracted public attention: there are an estimated 100,000
carriers in the UK, but few deaths due to the acute form. The
disease was a major problem in the blood supply, and featured
as a hospital infection, with notable outbreaks from 1965 in
renal dialysis units. It was seen as an occupational hazard
for laboratory workers, doctors, nurses and dentists.
The introduction of a test for hepatitis B around 1970 opened
up opportunities for epidemiological research. Hepatitis B
was increasingly recognized as a sexually transmitted disease,
widespread among gay men; also, because of needle sharing,
prevalent among drug users. Another outcome of research in
the 1970s was the development of a vaccine.
However, availability of a vaccine in the UK from 1982
afforded no immediate resolution of public health issues
raised by hepatitis B. The legacy of a restricted screening
policy from the 1970s, emphasizing prevention via hygiene
precautions among health care workers, facilitated a limited
vaccine policy throughout the 1980s.
While discussing negotiations over hepatitis B in the past
five decades, this thesis aims to contribute to a broader
analysis of interactions between science and policy, between
centre and regions, and between interest groups.
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5PREFACE
The preparation of this thesis would not have been possible
without a wide range of support. The research originally
arose from a proposal put forward to the Wellcome Trust by Dr
Phil Strong and Dr Virginia Berridge, entitled 'The history of
hepatitis B policy in the United Kingdom 1960s - l980s'. The
Trust provided funding for three years (Grant no: 031287), for
my post as a Research Fellow attached to the AIDS Social
History Programme, in the Health Policy Unit at the London
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM). During this
time, Oct 1990 - Sept 1993, I was a Research Associate at the
Weilcome Unit for the History of Medicine, Oxford: I am most
grateful for their provision of office accommodation. The
Health Policy Unit at LSHTM kindly underwrote my salary for
three months, Oct - Dec 1993.
These institutional attachments offered rich and varied
intellectual environments, further enhanced by opportunities
to give papers as my research progressed in a variety of
outside groups, notably the Weilcome Twentieth Century History
of Medicine Group, the Science Museum, and a conference at
Annecy organised by 1'Institut Louis Jeantet de 1'Histoire de
Medicine.
Among the many individuals who have given me information and
advice, or practical help - all of whom I thank - I would like
to mention in particular: Profesor Baruch Blumberg, for
patiently explaining the basics when I began, and agreeing to
further interviews later; Dr David Dane, for a sustained
correspondence answering awkward questions that occurred to me
as I wrote; Dr John Barbara, for his explanation of the
mathematics of testing; Miss Deborah Torrance, archivist at
the Medical Research Council, for exhuming files that were
about to be transferred to the Public Records Office; and Ms
Janet Foster, archivist to the AIDS Social History Programme,
for passing on leads of relevance to hepatitis B. I am
grateful to Dr Dorothy Porter and Dr Martin McKee for sitting
on the upgrading committee in May 1992. Above all I wish to
thank my colleague and supervisor Dr Virginia Berridge, for
consistent encouragement, feedback and academic support.
None of these thanks indicates that anyone other than myself
is responsible for what is written here, including errors; or
for any omissions.
Note: Before 1992, I was known and published under the name
'Beinart' and thereafter under the name 'Stanton'.
6ABBREVIATIONS
AGH
AIDS
ASTMS
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BTC
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DHSS
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FPC
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7CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the historical
understanding of health policy formation in relation to
advances in scientific medicine. This has remained an
insufficiently explored area, although many historians of
medicine have embraced the research-policy axis in some form.1
Especially for the postwar period, Berridge has identified a
'need to establish work relating medicine to its policy
context'. 2 Writing of social, rather than biomedical, science
in relation to policy, Berridge and Thom set an agenda:
This is the central problem, to understand the process by
which knowledge is generated and used by different groups
and the social, political and economic forces which help
to shape the selection and interpretation of information
at different periods of time.3
The present study aims to make a modest contribution to this
large and ambitious programme, by focussing on the postwar
history of research and policy around hepatitis B. The
periodisation is determined less by a tendency to see the
Second World War as a 'watershed' for medicine, a tendency
persuasively countered by Lawrence, 4 than by the history of
See, for example: C. Webster (ed.), Biology , medicine and
society 1840-1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1981) and literature on medical innovations outlined below.
2 v• Berridge, 'Health and medicine in the twentieth century:
contemporary history and health policy', Social Histor y of
Medicine 5,2 (August 1992), pp. 307-16; p. 311.
V. Berridge and B. Thom, 'The relationship between research
and policy: case studies from the post war history of drugs
and alcohol', paper for International Congress on Social
History of Alcohol, London Ontario, May 1993, to be published
in Contemporary Dru g Problems (forthcoming); typescript, p. 7.
C. Lawrence, Medicine in the makin g of modern Britain, 1700-
1920 (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 2; but see
opening section of Chapter 3, below.
8recognition of the disease itself.
Why study the history of one particular disease? Such a
project might appear constricting to those familiar with
histories of medical professions, of developments in technique
and technologies, medical institutions, and health services;
set in the framework of twentieth century changes in provision
of health care, influenced by two world wars, recession,
changing relations of production and colonial power. 5 Why,
with all this wealth of material, limit oneself to the study
of one disease: would that not be terribly narrow? Of course
there has been work on epidemic diseases with obvious social
impact like cholera.' Work on other, more endemic diseases
has spoken on social policy, on public attitudes, on power and
prejudice in organization of treatment - for example
tuberculosis and venereal diseases have provided rich
minefields for social historians. 7 But these are illnesses
with broad social ramifications. What can be made of a
' Other subject areas could be mentioned; those selected here
reflect the author's own previous work, listed under 'Beinart'
in the Bibliography.
6 R. J. Morris, Cholera 1832: The social response to an
epidemic (London: Croom Helm, 1976); M. Pelling, Cholera,
fever and English medicine 1825-1865 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1978); M. Durey, The return of the plague:
British society and the cholera 1831-2 (Dublin: Gill and
Macmillan, 1979). See also: T. 0. Ranger and P. Slack (eds),
Epidemics and ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1992); C. E. Rosenberg, Explaining epidemics and other studies
in the history of medicine (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992)
See for example: L. Bryder, Below the ma gic mountain: a
social history of tuberculosis in twentieth-centur y Britain
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); A. M. Brandt, No maqç
bullet: a social history of venereal disease in the United
States since 1880 With a new chapter on AIDS (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1987)
9disease which lacks its own distinct identity, distinguished
from other diseases sharing the same name only by a letter of
the alphabet?
Nomenclature apart, hepatitis B in fact does have a very
distinctive identity; moreover, any disease, from the common
cold to AIDS, may be studied in as narrow or broad a context
as one may choose. Two things have to be said at this point.
First, the nature of the disease shapes the agenda to some
extent: we are talking here of an infectious disease - like
syphilis, say - not an hereditary disease like diabetes or a
disease like cervical cancer, with complex etiology perhaps
involving environmental factors. There are public health
implications common to infectious diseases: for example, when
the route of infection is traced, prevention by separating
carriers from others or by behaviour change may be on the
agenda; and when an agent is identified, there may be hope of
developing a cure (in the case of bacterial agents), or a
vaccine, with further preventive possibilities. In this case,
we are dealing with a viral disease with no cure, but with a
vaccine becoming available in the 1980s.
Second, hepatitis B is very close, epidemiologically, to HIV.
This has many ramifications, but most immediately important
for shaping the present study is its origin in a proposal from
the AIDS Social History Programme, which provided a model of a
broad, social history approach with an emphasis on policy
10
issues. 8 The closeness of hepatitis B to HIV suggests that
there will be an audience looking for lessons from the history
of hepatitis B to enlighten the AIDS story, and perhaps to
inform current AIDS policy, but that is not the chief purpose
of the present study. Historians working in a wide variety of
fields other than AIDS may find something relevant here - for
hepatitis B, like AIDS, touches on an enormous range of issues
and activities, too many to cover thoroughly in a single
account. General issues with resonances for AIDS history
cluster around the general theme of the thesis, that is, the
way that the nature of the disease is socially constructed,
with the apparently firm facts emerging from research
selectively adapted to policy formation by various interest
groups.
Specific issues appear at certain points. These were not
always those written into the original plan, but arose from
the material: the ethics of hunian experimentation (Ch.2); how
researchers link informally and provide expert input into
policy making (Chs 3 and 6);° the crucial role of a nationwide
public health laboratory service (Ch.4); whether government
reluctance to spend on the UK blood products laboratory cost
lives (Ch.5); Britain's underestimated research contribution
(Chs 3 and 6); individual rights of health workers to
• See Preface; for outcome of the AIDS project in terms of
history, see: V. Berridge, The history of the present (Oxford:
Oxf rod University Press, forthcoming), plus interim papers.
' See also: J. Stanton, 'Blood brotherhood: techniques,
expertise and sharing in hepatitis B research in the l970s',
in G. Lawrence (ed.), Technolo gies of modern medicine (London:
Science Museum, 1994), pp. 120-33.
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confidentiality, and to avoid testing, versus the public
health interest (Chs 7 and 8); how vaccine policy is
formulated (Ch.8);'° the role of expert groups (Chs 2, 8 and
passim). 1' Together these discussions shed light, if
obliquely, on funding and organization in the health services,
especially the infrastructure of diagnostic laboratories and
the blood supply; also on relations between publicly funded
medical research, in academic or clinical laboratories, and
privately funded research in pharmaceutical laboratories.
More research is needed, however, on these issues. The
conclusions reached here on ways that health policy
interrelates with medical research will be in the nature of
hypotheses requiring further testing.
Literature review
(a) Scientific medicine
(i) General contextualization
Science is not set apart from other sorts of productive
activity but its special character is explored in the growing
field of sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). Recently,
awareness has grown of the complexity and messiness of
10 And: J. Stanton, 'What makes vaccine policy? The case of
hepatitis B in the UK', Social History of Medicine, 7,3
(December 1994), 427-46.
" Most clearly formulated in: 3. Stanton, 'A jaundiced view:
medical experts and hepatitis committees, 1943-1993', paper
for 'Doctors and the state' seminar, Weilcome Institute for
the History of Medicine, London, 21 Jan 1994.
12
scientific research, of the need to look at the daily
activities taking place around the laboratory bench, or
conversations at the drinking-water fountain as well as phone
calls to journal editors - anthropological rather than
biographical perspectives. For example, Latour and Woolgar
examined the whole configuration of 'inscription devices' -
equipment and materials laid out around the laboratory - which
led to the definition of a new scientific 'f act'.' 2 Studer
and Chubin's study of cancer research concentrated on the way
scientists used each others' written work, using a highly
sophisticated technique of 'citation analysis'.' 3 A broader
analysis of networking is provided in Fujimara's study of how
cancer researchers devise a feasible research project, taking
into account not only what is technically possible but what
will appeal to funding bodies.'4
To some extent this blossoming of SSK is reflected in
corresponding studies in history of science and medicine,
although few historians have spent lengthy periods observing
activities in laboratories: only the very recent past can be
accessed that way. Rather, we have seen the development of
12 B. Latour and S. Woolgar, Laboratory life: the social
construction of scientific facts (Beverly Hills and London:
Sage Publications, 1979); see also B. Latour, Science in
Action (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1987)
13 K. E. Studer and D. E. Chubin, The cancer mission: the
social context of biomedical research (Beverly Hills and
London: Sage Publications, 1980)
14 • Fujimura, 'Constructing do-able" problems on cancer
research: articulating alignments', Social Studies in Science,
17 (1987), 257-93. See also: Mel Bartley, 'Do we need a
strong programme in medical sociology?', Sociolocw of Health
and Illness, 12 (1990), 371-90.
13
equally imaginative approaches to problems of historical
understanding that were previously described in non-
analytical, unilinear modes - particularly medical innovations
and biomedical research. 15 Recent work, informed by SSK but
with more emphasis on biography, has shown the value of
considering the social and economic relations of medical
scientists and doctors. As Lowy says: 'The historiographers
of biomedical laboratories follow actors and practices, not
"discoveries" or the "progress of science"', which may result
in a more complicated, even confusing picture than the
traditional 'temple of science' account." Such a picture
may, however, provide a more fitting counterpart to the world
of political pressures involved in health policy making.
While there is a growing body of literature on specialization
in medicine, showing how edifices of professional interests
are built and defended,' 7 there seems to be a lack of a
parallel literature on professionalization of medical research
- that is, the institutional rather than the productive
aspects of medical research. Whole-institution or macro-
studies, such as that of the state-funded Medical Research
15 j • V. Pickstone (ed.), Medical innovations in historical
perspective (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992); I. Lowy (ed.),
Medicine and change: historical and sociological studies of
medical innovation (London: John Libbey, 1993)
" I. Lowy, 'Recent historiography of biomedical research', in
G. Lawrence (ed.), Technologies of modern medicine (London,
Science Museum, 1994), pp. 99-110, esp. p. 106.
17 For example: G. V. Larkin, Occupational monopol y and modern
medicine (London: Tavistock, 1983); or for a more sociological
approach: M. Stacey, M. Reid, C. Heath and R. Dingwall (eds),
Health and the division of labour (London: Croom Helm; New
York: Prodist, 1977)
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Council,'8 have so far failed to satisfy the need for
contextualization; perhaps, as with studies of innovation,
case studies will yield more fruitful results. Breadth or
sharpness of focus are not in themselves defining criteria for
useful work, however. Two influential monographs on relations
between industry and medicine vary in this respect: Liebenau
addresses a broad issue - the development of the
pharmaceutical industry in America - while Blume selects
certain diagnostic imaging technologies, but both provide
context, analysis, and insights with useful comparative
implications.'9
The recently burgeoning 'pre-history of AIDS' has produced
valuable insights on historical cases which illuminate
hepatitis B as well as AIDS, such as Lowy's paper on changing
views of the efficacy of the Wasserman test for syphilis.20
Less historical but still relevant has been work on expensive
medical technologies, for instance Stocking's comparative
study of the application of lithotropy and other innovative
techniques in several European countries. 2' Finally, of
18	 Austoker and L. Bryder (eds), Historical perspectives on
the role of the MRC (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989)
19 j • Liebenau, Medical science and medical industr y : the
formation of the American pharmaceutical industry
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987); S. Blume, Insi ght and
industry. On the dynamics of technological change in medicine
(Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1991; London, 1992)
20 
• Lowy, 'Testing for a sexually transmissable disease,
1907-1970: the history of the Wasserman reaction', in V.
Berridge and P. Strong (eds), AIDS and contemporary history
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 74-92.
21 B. Stocking, 'Factors affecting the diffusion of three kinds
of medical technology in EC countries and Sweden', in S.
Kirchberger, P. Durieux and B. Stocking, The diffusion of two
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especial interest to this history, involving another type of
research - epidemiology - are studies on occupational health,
notably Weindling's collection. 22 This field is particularly
relevant because a strong, somewhat unexpected theme which
emerges from the present study is the construction at policy
level of hepatitis B as an occupational hazard for health
workers.
(ii) Work relating specifically to hepatitis B
As viral hepatitis became the subject of more intensive
scientific investigation, an international scientific
community grew up which by the 1970s reached the critical mass
needed to launch major symposia; and the proceedings of these
sometimes contain historical reviews. 23 Other, similar
articles appeared in the journals. 24 Whilst these are useful
technologies for renal stone treatments across Europe (London:
King's Fund Centre, 1991), pp. 97-136; see also: B. Stocking
(ed.), Expensive health technologies: regulatory and
administrative mechanisms in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1988)
22 P. Weindling (ed.), The social history of occupational
health (London: Croom Helm, 1985)
23 S. Krugman, 'Perspectives on viral hepatitis infection:
past, present and future', in G. Vyas, S. N. Cohen and R.
Schmid (eds), Viral hepatitis: etiology, epidemiology,
pathogenesis and prevention (Philadelphia: Franklin Institute
Press, 1978; Tunbridge Wells: Abacus Press, 1979), pp. 3-10;
R. H. Purcell, 'The hepatitis viruses: an overview and
historical perspective', in W. Szmuness, H. J. Alter and J. E.
Maynard (eds), Viral hepatitis: an international symposium
(Philadelphia: Franklin Institute Press, 1982), pp. 3-12.
24 S. Krugman, 'Viral hepatitis, overview and historical
perspectives', Yale Journal of Biolo gy and Medicine, 49
(1976), 199-203; R. H. Purcell, 'Hepatitis B: a scientific
success story (almost)', Pro gress in Clinical and Biological
Research, 182 (1985), 11-43.
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for providing the bare outlines of the scientific advances
made in the field, they provide minimal contextualization and
little historical analysis. We learn from them that jaundice
has been recognised since records began, that the viral nature
of some hepatitis was speculated in the twentieth century,
that during and after the Second World War two types of viral
hepatitis were distinguished from one another - those now
known as hepatitis A and B. A flurry of investigation
following Bluniberg's mid-l960s discovery of the 'Australia
antigen' (which turned out to be part of the virus of
hepatitis B) resulted in great strides in understanding the
structure of the virus and the natural history of the disease.
Relatively soon, a vaccine was developed.
All accounts emphasize the importance of the failure to grow
the virus in a tissue culture, leading to the use of human
volunteers for several early investigations. There has been
controversy over this, but the literature does not make it
clear who the attackers were. Later, primates and other
animals were found to serve as experimental subjects. Genetic
engineering facilitated further advances in experimentation
and vaccine production.25
A useful and coherent account, though limited to a part of the
scientific history, is provided by Baruch Blumberg, a key
25 p Tiollais and M.-A. Buendia, 'Hepatitis B virus',
Scientific American, 264, 4 (April 1991), 48-54.
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participant. 26 He discusses some of the problems of gaining
acceptance for testing blood donated to blood banks in the US,
and the use of 'epidemiologic control alone' to control
hepatitis in renal dialysis units. Here and in a joint
paper, 27 he describes investigations which established sex
differences in responses to hepatitis B, and the link between
the virus and primary liver cancer. Worldwide mortality for
primary cancer of the liver is estimated as several hundred
thousand a year, making this the major international health
problem associated with hepatitis B.
In the UK, outstanding hepatitis B investigator Arie Zuckerman
has dominated the scene. His compilation of abstracts and
summaries, the majority made by himself, gives a comprehensive
view of scientific developments in the 1970s, and therefore
deserves to be mentioned here although its contents are rather
in the nature of primary sources. 28 What is clear from this
book, as well as the two volumes Zuckerman has produced on
viral hepatitis, 29 is that scientific papers and textbooks
often fail to reflect policy concerns, even when the author is
26 B. S. Blumberg, 'The Australia antigen story' (Keynote
Address) in I. Miliman, T. K. Eisenstein and B. S. Bluniberg
(eds), Hepatitis B. The virus, the disease, the vaccine (New
York: Plenum Publishing Corporation, 1984), pp. 5-31.
27 W. T. London and B. S. Blumberg, 'Comments on the role of
epidemiology in the investigation of hepatitis B virus',
Epidemiologic Reviews, 7 (1985), 59-79.
28 A. J. Zuckerman (ed.), A Decade of Viral Hepatitis
(Amsterdam, New York, Oxford: Elsevier/North Holland
Biomedical Press, 1980)
29 A. J. Zuckerman and C. R. Howard, Hepatitis viruses of man
(London, New York, etc: Academic Press, 1979); A. J. Zuckerman
(ed.), Viral hepatitis and liver disease (New York: Alna R.
Lise, 1988)
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directly involved in policy formation as Zuckerman has been.
(b) Health policy
'Health policy' is a loose term, but writers such as Ham have
clarified the processes by which health policy is formed,
employing concepts which are broader than the history of the
National Health Service (NHS) or the politics of health
care. 3° Ham is concerned with the overall pattern of health
service provision, with the dynamics of decision-making and
implementation - or equally important, lack of decision or
action. A central notion is the multiplicity of policy:
policy may involve a web of decisions rather than one
decision ... the actors who make decisions are rarely the
same people as those responsible for implementation. A
decision network, often of considerable complexity, may
therefore be involved in producing action, and a web of
decisions may form part of the network.3'
Such a definition resonates with that offered in an analysis
of health policy in Britain since the 1970s, which finds 'a
complex web of mutual dependencies supporting a shifting
assembly of pacts and bargains, both formally negotiated and
tacitly understood' •32 These open definitions, allowing for
complexity, fit the broad scope aimed for in the present
study. Unlike some more static definitions emerging from
policy science, they emphasize the dynamic nature of the
policy process, and the way that policies inevitably change
30 c• Ham, Health policy in Britain (Basirigstoke: Macmillan,
2nd edition, 1985)
31 Ibid, pp. 77-8.
32 S. Harrison, D. J. Hunter and C. Pollitt, The dynamics of
British health policy (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), p. 2.
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over time.
Ham employs the concept of 'policy community' first put
forward by Richardson and Jordan to Indicate the combination
of that section of the central policy-making machinery
responsible for a given issue, and the outside Interests
including pressure groups concerned with the same Issue. 33 If
we include in a putative hepatitis B 'policy community' the
central agencies, regional health authorities, public health
physicians, expert groups, and groups affected by hepatitis
B - including gay men and a variety of health professions -
there could be a veritable policy bedlam. In fact there has
been comparatively little noise over hepatitis B, in the
policy arena, and less in the press or public perception.
This is a notable distinction from AIDS.
The hotly debated, much chronicled history of the National
Health Service is generally concerned with the larger
questions of health service organization and funding, rather
than health policy making within the NHS on particular Issues
such as those discussed here. 34 But there are elements of
Ham, Health policy, p. 95, citing J. J. Richardson and A. G.
Jordan, Governing under pressure (London: Martin Robertson,
1979)
For a recent clash, see: Review and rejoinder: D. M. Fox,
'Anti-intellectual history?...', and C. Webster, '...Official
history?', Social History of Medicine, 3,1 (April 1990), 101-
05. This gives references to several histories of the NHS
including the protagonists' own work: D. N. Fox, Health
policies, health politics: the British and American
experience, 1911-1965 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1986); C. Webster, Problems of health care: the
National Health Service before 1957, Volume I of The health
services since the war (London: Her Majesty's Stationery
Office, 1988)
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understanding provided by some of these histories that perhaps
form a 'collective unconscious' background to the present
study: the power of the organized medical profession; the view
of successive governments that health was an illimitably
expensive need which must somehow be rationed; the use of
hierarchies and devolved responsibility to limit spending.
Interestingly, although Klein introduces his study of the
politics of the NHS with the assertion that 'this book is In
no sense a history of the NHS', a historical approach is
inherent in his analysis. 35 On the changing structures of the
NHS, often confusing for the observer, Levitt's clarification
of successive reorganizations is a helpful aid.36
The evolution of the welfare state - a broader subject than
the NHS, with a longer history - is essential background to
understanding postwar social policy including health policy;
both Thane and Digby provide accessible texts, with Thane
giving weight to political and economic factors and Digby
bringing the story into the post-Beveridge era. 37 Lowe gives
a detailed history of the postwar welfare state, with a brief
history of the NHS among other sectors of welfare provison,
and also provides a review of theoretical insights into the
R. Klein, The politics of the National Health Service
(London and New York: Longman, 1983, 1989), p. vi.
' R. Levitt, The reor ganised National Health Service (London:
Croom Helm, 3rd edn. 1979); there is a more recent joint-
authored edition covering further reorganization.
P. Thane, The foundations of the welfare state (London and
New York: Longman, 1982); A. Digby, British welfare policy:
workhouse to workfare (London and Boston: Faber and Faber,
1989)
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nature of policymaking. 38 Covering the whole period from the
Victorian heyday of sanitary reform to the notion of local
adviser and manager, Lewis shows the changing role of the
public health doctor. 39 Community health physicians, or
public health doctors, have been involved in dealing with
hepatitis B 'in the community' because of their responsibility
for infectious diseases.
The productive interplay between history and sociology of
health is well reflected in Stacey's textbook, with its
comparative perspective and generous bibliography. 40 A more
anthropological analysis of lay concepts of disease, with the
emphasis on the contemporary, is given in Currer and Stacey's
collected volume. 41 Experiences of illness and of the health
services are particularly well illuminated in Cornwell's
study, based on interviews with families in the East End of
London. 42 Problems of interviewing will be discussed
presently in the section on sources; one of my regrets has
been that my work did not involve more of Cornwell's 'ordinary
people'.
38 R. Lowe, The welfare state in Britain since 1945
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993), esp. pp. 39-61.
J. Lewis, 'The origins and development of public health in
the UK', in W. Holland, R. Detels and G. Knox (eds), The
Oxford textbook of public health, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1991), pp. 23-33.
40 M. Stacey, The sociology of health and healin g (London and
New York: Routledge, 1993; reprint of Unwin, 1988)
41 c Currer and M. Stacey (eds), Concepts of health, illness
and disease (Leamington Spa, Hamburg and New York: Berg, 1986)
42 j • Cornwell, Hard-earned lives: accounts of health and
illness from east London (London and New York: Tavistock,
1984)
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The wide ranging policy issues thrown up by hepatitis B in the
UK have been scarcely discussed in the literature, in marked
contrast with AIDS. A chronological outline of some policy
issues was provided at an early stage by looking at official
reports and circulars from the DHSS dealing with hepatitis B;
these of course are primary sources for this study. More
specific secondary sources are needed on areas of health
policy relevant to hepatitis B: the blood supply, health
workers in renal units, laboratories and other hepatitis-
hazard settings, drugs, sexually transmitted diseases, gay
health, the prison medical service and mental handicap
institutions. Ideally, there would be a history of each of
these with a clear exposition of policy changes over the past
two decades, and plenty of references to hepatitis B in the
index, but there is nothing like this available for any of the
topics mentioned.
For the blood supply, there appears no recent study to rival
Titmuss's 1970 policy study. 43 On drugs, MacGregor's
collection refers to the 1980s but includes an historical
paper, 44 while a paper by Robertson in a collection on AIDS
and drugs refers to hepatitis B. 45 Sim's history of the
R. Titmuss, The gift relationshi p : from human blood to
social policy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1970)
V. Berridge, 'Drugs: historical issues', in S. MacGregor
(ed.), Drugs and British society: responses to a social
problem in the 1980s (London and New York: Routledge, 1989),
pp . 20-35.
R. Robertson, 'The Edinburgh epidemic: a case study', in J.
Strang and G. V. Stimson (eds), AIDS and dru g misuse: the
challenge for policy and practice in the l990s (London:
Routledge, 1990), pp. 95-107.
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prison medical services provides a useful overview of a long
timespan concluding with the present; although concentrating
on the iniquities of the system, Sim misses the telling point
that hepatitis B (like AIDS more recently) was prevalent in
prisons. 46 Smith's study of the current crisis in the prison
system links the high rate of drug taking by prisoners, both
before entering prison and while incarcerated, with a supposed
high incidence of hepatitis B (and AIDS): figures are hard to
come by. 47 Mental retardation has received far less attention
from historians of medicine than has mental illness; recent
contributions stop short with the Second World War. 48 There
is thus no secondary source which catalogues or explains the
high incidence of hepatitis B in institutions for the mentally
handicapped, a pattern noted by investigators from the Second
World War onwards.
Despite the inclusion of 'sex' in the titles of many recent
historical studies, there is really no British equivalent of
Brandt's social history of venereal disease in the USA.49
However, the wave of literature on AIDS has thrown up many
studies which address such issues as attitudes to carriers,
46 j • Sim, Medical power in prisons: the prison medical service
in England 1774-1989 (Milton Keynes and Philadelphia: Open
University Press, 1990)
R. Smith, Prison health care (London: British Medical
Association, 1984)
N. Thomson, 'The problem of mental deficiency in England and
Wales, c. 1913-1946', D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford,
1992; see also: J. W. Trent, Inventing the feeble mind. A
history of mental retardation in the United States (Berkeley,
Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1994)
Brandt, No magic bullet.
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segregation versus co-operation, testing and confidentiality,
and health education - of relevance to hepatitis B as a
sexually transmitted disease. 5° A review of some of this
literature, placing It in Its own historical context - of
different phases in the response to AIDS during the first
decade - is provided by Berridge and Strong.5'
(c) The relationshi p between research and policy
As remarked earlier, the SSK literature on the production of
scientific 'facts' is not generally concerned with policy.
Historians have looked at ways in which science changed
medicine from the mid-nineteenth century on: for instance, the
contested ground of what constituted medical knowledge, to be
included in a medical curriculum. 52 The incorporation of
research into medical knowledge-formation can be compared with
experimentalism in a wide range of scientific disciplines.53
These sorts of studies help to locate medical research as part
of the professional strategy of doctors, and to explain the
° E. Fee and D. M. Fox (eds), AIDS: the burdens of history
(Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California
Press, 1988); V. Berridge and P. Strong (eds), AIDS and
contemporary history (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1993)
" V. Berridge and P. Strong, Review Article: 'AIDS and the
relevance of history', Social History of Medicine, 4 (1991),
129-38.
52 C. Lawrence, 'Incommunicable knowledge: science, technology
and the clinical art In Britain, 1850-1914', Journal of
Contemporary History, 20 (1985), 503-20.
" 3. V. Pickstone, 'Ways of knowing: towards a historical
sociology of science, technology and medicine', British
Journal for the History of ScIence, 26 (1993), 433-58; the
four overlapping types of medicine discussed here are:
biographical, analytical, experimental, and techno-medicine.
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high prestige attached to certain types of research. 54 There
are Implications for policy on research, such as the slow
take-off for clinical research in Britain between the wars."
However, this historical literature addresses the links
between medical research and health policy only obliquely.
More overt concern with the links between research and policy
can be found in policy science literature: a good starting-
point Is Klein's work (referred to earlier) which straddles
the border between history and policy science. An absolutely
fundamental concern here is what Klein defines as 'one of the
main policy dilemmas faced by all modern societies: how best
to integrate experts into the policy machinery' along with the
workings of broader political processes. 5' Policy scientists
have tended to focus on the role of social scientists and
health professionals as experts, as in the work of Bulmer or
Wistow. 57 American work offers a wider notion of science but
warns that research often fails to make any impact on
On the wider issues of changing attitudes to medicine and
its rising social value up to the interwar period, see:
Lawrence, Medicine in the making of modern Britain.
" C. Booth, 'Clinical research', in Austoker and Bryder,
Historical perspectives on the MRC, pp. 205-41.
' Klein, Politics of NHS, p. vi.
" M. Bulmer (ed.), Social science and social policy (London:
Allen and Unwin, 1986), includes chapters by the author on:
'the policy process and the place in it of social research',
and 'Types of research utilization: an overview'; G. Wistow,
'The health science policy community: professionals pre-
eminent or under challenge?', In D. Marsh and R. Rhodes (eds),
Policy networks in British government (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1992).
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policy;" research that is closely tied in with policy, while
appearing more effective, is often fatally compromised." Fox
provides a rare review of historians as experts whose skills
might feed into the policy process.'°
It is one thing for research findings to be used by policy
makers, and another for researchers themselves to become
actors in policy making, as Berridge and Thom point out, In a
paper which tests theories of the relationship between
research and policy against their findings in case studies of
policy on illicit drugs and alcohol." Research does not
simply Inform policy in a direct fashion, through the force of
evidence (the 'rational model'); rather it influences policy
gradually, by diffusion through the networks or policy
communities mentioned earlier (the 'enlightenment model'). In
some instances of direct input, for instance when experts were
called upon by the Department of Health to research the value
of needle exchange schemes for addicts, research validates
pre-existing policy agendas - in this case, a growing
consensus for 'harm mInimisation'. Berridge and Thom are
discussing social science research here, and epidemiology and
se D. Colllngridge and C. Reeve, Science s peaks to power: the
role of experts In policy making (New York: St Martins Press,
1986)
" D. M. Fox, 'Health policy and the politics of research In
the United States', Journal of Health Policy. Politics and
15 (1990), 481-99.
'° D. M. Fox, 'Review essay: Health and the care of sick
strangers: Rosenberg, Stevens and the uses of history for
health policy', Journal of Health PolIcy. Politics and Law, 16
(1991), 169-77.
6z V. Berridge and B. Thom, 'Relationship between research and
policy'.
27
statistics in relation to alcoholism; do their findings apply
to the 'biomedical' research and epidemiology discussed In
this thesis? Perhaps of particular importance Is their
identification of the powerful link between civil servants and
medical experts as a 'policy community', almost separate from
other interested parties.
For hepatitis B as for other diseases, we can expect to see a
wide range of interpretations of current scientific evidence,
and a variety of views on the best ways of implementing the
latest understandings and technologies, all changing over
time. The 'policy community' would include scientists,
involved in research, who may actively inform policy making by
sitting on advisory committees. Medical research may have
been informed by policy needs, or divorced from them. Public
funding of such research would arise partly from the
perception of a public health problem, partly from the role of
hepatitis B in the developing fields of virology and
immunology, while commercial funding would be tied to the
likelihood of profit from future sales of tests and vaccines.
Moreover, medical research was one among a range of
responses - preventive measures were an alternative focus for
policy attention, or there could be a reluctance to act unless
spurred on by political embarrassment.
(d) Literature relating directly to this study
The most important historiographical contribution so far in
this field has been made by an American historian, William
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Muraskin, looking at issues raised by hepatitis B in the US.'2
Muraskin's first paper introduces the evocative term 'The
silent epidemic' to describe the lack of public attention
given to this large-scale problem. He is making a contrast
with the reaction to the epidemic of HIV/AIDS which shares
many features with hepatitis B. However, in another memorable
phrase, Muraskin calls hepatitis B 'the "Russian Roulette" of
diseases' since its effects can vary from undetectable malaise
to rapid death, or chronic and sometimes fatal illness.'3
Rather than use this variability as part of the explanation
for the different response to hepatitis B and AIDS, Muraskin
concludes that public health issues were suppressed in the
case of hepatitis B because health workers form a significant
risk group for this disease.
In a later paper, Muraskin argues that individual rights were
placed above the public health interest, in the case of
integration of mentally retarded children - many of whom would
be hepatitis B carriers - into New York City schools in the
late 1970s.' 4 He comes to a similar conclusion in a further
paper on the failure of adoption agencies and public health
authorities to inform American families of the hepatitis B
62 w Muraskin 'The silent epidemic: the social, ethical and
medical problems surrounding the fight against hepatitis B',
Journal of Social History, 22 (1988), 277-98.
' Ibid, p. 277.
W. Muraskin, 'Individual rights versus the public health:
the controversy over the integration of retarded hepatitis B
carriers into the New York City public school system', Journal
of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences, 45 (1990), 64-
98.
29
carrier status of Asian children they adopted. 65 Muraskin's
approach veers towards conspiracy theory, and he tends to
judge past actors rather as though they were up before a
court. However, his accounts are fascinating, and his clearly
delineated thesis on individual rights overwhelming the public
health interest provides a springboard for thinking about
issues like screening and vaccine policy.
There is little other historical work specifically on
hepatitis. A particularly relevant conceptual history is
offered in a paper by Ackerknecht on changing medical notions
of the diseases now known as viral hepatitis, during the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 6' For the role that
understandings of hepatitis B have played more recently, in
relation to another disease, Oppenheimer's piece on the
epidemiological construction of AIDS makes fascinating
reading. 67 Reference has already been made to two papers
published during preparation of this thesis; these have formed
the basis for parts of Chapters 6 and 8 below.
In sum, most of the literature cited in this review provides
broad context in terms of understanding the processes of
65 w• Muraskin, 'Individual rights vs the public health: the
problem of Asian hepatitis B carriers in America', Social
Science and Medicine, 36,3 (1993), 203-16.
66 E. H. Ackerknecht, 'The vagaries of the notion of epidemic
hepatitis or infectious jaundice', in L. G. Stevenson and R.
P. Multhauf (eds), Medicine, science and culture (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), pp. 3-16.
67 G. M. Oppenheimer, 'In the eye of the storm: the
epidemiological construction of AIDS', in Fee and Fox, AIDS:
the burden of history, pp. 267-300.
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medical research, of health policy making, and the
relationship between these two. Because hepatitis B, like
AIDS, is spread through blood, drug use and sexual contact,
potentially a very wide range of secondary sources could be
useful; however, there is a lack of histories of many of the
services involved such as blood transfusion. Some of the
scientific literature on hepatitis B can be used to form a
narrative outline of 'discoveries', while policy documents
enable a parallel framework of policy initiatives to be drawn
up. For a coherent account and an understanding of issues
raised by hepatitis B (selected issues, varying over time),
detailed historical research was needed.
Sources
This study, located in the period from the middle of the
Second World War up to the present, and dealing in most detail
with the 1970s and 1980s, confronts the usual challenges of
contemporary history:'6
 lack of conventional archival sources,
expectations from some quarters that the study will be
oriented to future policy making, and the risk of offending
actors personally involved in the history, whether they have
been included as interview sources or not. Berridge has
discussed these problems in relation to the history of health
policy, pointing out that much of what we know about the past
decade or so comes from other fields such as sociology,
' For relevant commentary on the concept of contemporary
history, see: V. Berricige and P. Strong, 'AIDS policies in the
UK: contemporary history and the study of policy', Twentieth
Century British History, 2 (1991), 150-74.
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science policy, policy studies more generally or journalism.69
Certainly, I suspect, the reader of this thesis will notice a
marked difference in density of information between the first
chapter, which utilises material from the MRC archives, and
all the rest. I asked for permission to use the Department of
Health (D0H, formerly DHSS) archives and the MRC archives, now
at Kew, for the post-1960 period with which the thesis is
mainly concerned, but permission was refused. For this
period, major primary sources have been articles in medical
journals, policy documents, and interviews; in addition, I
have used press cuttings, assorted material donated by
interviewees, and other published material: obviously, certain
books count as primary sources.
In fact one of the problems that I wrestled with in the early
stages was how to categorise books and articles which seemed
on the border between primary and secondary sources - this
arose especially with very recent sources that were not
obviously historiographical. The problem evaporated once I
stopped making the distinction, listing them all in one
bibliography. This may be unavoidable with contemporary
history, and I think will be acceptable to other historians,
as long as I have used a range of evidence to support my
interpretations, rather than rely on the opinions of
informants or journal authors.
69 Berridge, 'Health and medicine in the twentieth century',
pp. 309-10, 313-14; see also: V. Berridge, 'Researching
contemporary history: AIDS', History Worksho p Journal, 38
(1994), 228-34.
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Another important question for historians using medical
journals is that of selection, which does not apply only to
contemporary history, but perhaps is exacerbated by the
enormous profusion of recent publications on a topic like
hepatitis B (and of course the problem is a thousand times
worse for AIDS). I began by looking for articles that had
some bearing on policy; coming from an awareness of AIDS
history, I looked particularly for papers which mentioned
homosexuals or drug users. Then, as I built up a more rounded
picture of my topic, I searched for articles on whichever part
of the picture I was trying to clarify, for example hepatitis
in haemophiliacs, or risks to laboratory workers. I acquired
reprints from informants, on the science of hepatitis B more
often than the policy. Since it was possible to read only a
fraction of the - largely scientific - literature on hepatitis
B, it seemed worth concentrating on the work of those I had
interviewed; this approach yielded insights into the careers
and types of work of selected researchers.
My outline of policy developments was built up from policy
documents, loosely defined as documents having some official
bearing on what was to be done with regard to hepatitis B in
the health sphere. 7° I found most of the key DHSS reports
quite early on, but compiling the various guidelines with a
bearing on hepatitis B took longer. Current officials do not
keep a complete set dating back twenty years, and the
For discussion of 'systems theory' in policy studies, see:
Ham, Health policy, pp. 77-83: 'Outputs are essentially the
decisions and the policies of the authorities' (p. 80) but
there is also recognition of Inaction, and of policies
developing over time without formal announcements.
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Department of Health library appears not to have a full
listing either. In some cases, I was alerted by references in
journal articles; in others, an informant provided a copy of
guidelines I had not known about. DHSS documents appeared,
until recently, to be very partial, with health workers
figuring prominently, while drug users or gay men were
relatively absent, an important finding about policy which was
confirmed by other sources.
Documents relating to hepatitis B emanating from professional
bodies or from local sources helped build up a more complex
picture of the 'policy community' and the policy process.
Examples include material on health and safety emanating from
health and laboratory workers' unions; and papers loaned by a
public health virologist reflecting local doctors' concerns
over hepatitis B. Press cuttings from professional newspapers
provided occasional illuminations of workers' worries, for
instance over vaccination.
Clearly, interviews are another important source for such
recent history; I have already referred to the way that
informants supplied supplementary material, but the primary
aim of the interview was to secure oral evidence. For the
methodology of oral history, Thompson is the standard source,
while Seldon and Pappworth discuss interviewing members of the
'elite'. 71
 As with all interviewing, it was often difficult
P. Thompson, The voice of the past (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1978; revised edition, 1988); A. Seldon and
J. Pappworth, By word of mouth: elite oral history (London and
New York: Methuen, 1983)
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to separate the informants' memories of the recent past from
their (current) interpretations; there is an additional level
of difficulty attached where interviewees are high-powered
doctors and scientists who have written a great deal on their
subject, and may also have been involved in policy-making.
Another common difficulty with oral sources is informants'
desire for confidentiality, which becomes particularly acute
in sensitive areas of medical research and policy, especially
for very recent periods. I understood this could be a problem
for AIDS history, but I was surprised at the extent of the
problem I faced in relation to hepatitis B history, with a
high proportion (about a third) of informants declining to
allow a tape recorder to be used. These tended to be people
who were still working in the field, and they tended to be
elite rather than 'shop floor' workers. Although some leading
experts were willing to be recorded, they tended to retain
tight control by insisting on previewing questions and
allocating minimal time for the interview. Had I not already
employed oral history methodology, I might have thought that
my approach was faulty; but I had conducted forty to fifty
Interviews for a previous history of anaesthesia, 72 and had
encountered only two refusals to have the interview taped.
The very recent nature of the study was clearly a factor in
all this. Many informants were still at work, often stressed
by their workload, and concerned about the repercussions of
72	 Beinart, A history of the Nuffield Department of
Anaesthetics, Oxford, 1937-1987 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1987)
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giving information which then might be used in ways they had
little control over. Retired people are often more willing to
provide information without strings attached. But I sensed
that beyond the usual factors, hepatitis B was a field riven
with rivalries and littered with wounded professional
sensibilities. It was also, clearly, at times seen as a dread
or dirty disease, around which people had learned to tread
carefully. The reason for not letting me see advisory
committee minutes, according to the Department of Health, was
that the issues discussed were still current - and very
sensitive. There were times when the whole exercise seemed
almost too difficult to carry through, but on the other hand,
the lack of previous historical work on hepatitis B in this
country was a great inducement to continue.
Outline
Chapter 2 traces major stages in scientific construction of
hepatitis B which took place during and after the Second World
War; prior to this time, there were very tenuous ideas about
different types of hepatitis. Jaundice became important
during the war on three main fronts: epidemics among troops,
outbreaks associated with yellow fever vaccination, and cases
following blood transfusion. Wartime work in Britain under an
MRC Jaundice Committee, using volunteers, established that the
commoner epidemic form (A) was transmitted via faeces 73 The
F. 0. MacCallum, A. M. McFarlan, J. A. R. Miles, M. R.
Pollock and C. Wilson, Infective He patitis. Studies in East
Anglia during the Period 1943-47, Special Report Series of
Medical Research Council, no. 273 (London: HNSO, 1951)
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terms hepatitis A and hepatitis B (for the blood-borne form,
also seen after inoculation) were coined by this group. In
the l950s, Krugman in the US investigated the distinction
between hepatitis A and B, experimenting on children in an
institution for the mentally retarded. 74 The known high
endemicity of hepatitis in such institutions was given as
justification for these experiments, but their ethics were
later questioned - an issue discussed in Chapter 2 in relation
to both Krugman and the British wartime investigations. For
the general theme of the thesis, insights into the workings of
expert committees in this period are especially valuable.
Chapter 3 begins with an outline of postwar developments that
form a backdrop for the history of hepatitis B after 1945,
including new openings in clinical research. After a fairly
quiet period, a major breakthrough in understanding hepatitis
B came with Blumberg's mid-1960s identification of the
'Australia antigen', associated with the virus of hepatitis B;
this American contribution is crucial. 75 From then on,
testing for hepatitis B became a possibility, although early
tests were not very sensitive and much effort went into
improving their sensitivity and accuracy. Chapter 3 looks at
the immediate impact of the Australia antigen discovery in the
UK, where electron microscopy first revealed both the core
structure of the virus and the viral particle itself. This
brings the story up to 1970.
See: S. Krugman, 'Perspectives on viral hepatitis', pp. 6-7
for summary of findings of this research.
B. S. Blumberg, 'The Australia antigen story'.
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The next four chapters cover different themes within roughly
the same timespan. Chapter 4 deals with a dramatic episode:
between 1965 and 1972, outbreaks of hepatitis B in renal
dialysis units introduced something of the 'shock of the new'
to the picture. 7' With a few hundred cases up and down the
British Isles, concentrated in ten of these units, the shock
came not just from the spectacle of illness and death but from
the fact that staff were frequently among the victims.
Several informants spoke of the legacy of this period,
comparing the fear inspired by hepatitis B at the time with
that associated with AIDS fifteen years later. A relatively
rapid and effective policy response came from an advisory
group which in 1972 recommended exclusion of carriers of the
Australia antigen. 77 Outbreaks in renal units ceased; the
renal dialysis and transplantation programme was allowed to
progress unhindered. Testing was not extended to other areas
of the health service, other than to blood transfusion.
Chapter 5 looks at issues around hepatitis B in the blood
supply. Prior to the Australia antigen discovery, the British
system of unpaid donation was seen as superior, with respect
to the rate of hepatitis in recipients, to that in countries
' For comparable use of the term 'A shocking novelty' see: P.
Strong and V. Berridge, 'No one knew anything: some issues in
British AIDS policy', in P. Aggleton, P. Davies and G. Hart
(eds), AIDS: individual, cultural and policy dimensions
(Basingstoke: Falmer Press, 1990), p. 236.
DHSS, Hepatitis and the treatment of chronic renal failure,
Report of the Advisory Group, 1970-1972; Chairman: Lord
Rosenheim (Department of Health and Social Security, Scottish
Home and Health Department, Welsh Office, 1972) ['Rosenheim
Report']
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where blood donors were paid. 78 After the test for hepatitis
B was applied throughout the blood transfusion service, from
l972, the blood supply in the UK was regarded as extremely
safe. There was no room for complacency. The major problem of
hepatitis in the blood supply arose - in some ways reflecting
the problem in renal units - from medical innovation, in this
case the fractionation of clotting factors, mainly Factor VIII
for haemophiliacs. As growing amounts of these products were
supplied to haemophiliacs through the 1970s, many became
infected with hepatitis B or non-A, non-B, although often
without becoming overtly ill. In the interpretation offered
in Chapter 5, the government's slow response to the request to
make the UK self-sufficient in blood products is linked with
the later infection of many haemophiliacs with HIV.
Chapter 6 explores research conducted through the 1970s. As
the epidemiology was clarified, prevalence of hepatitis B was
found to be high in Asia and Africa, moderate in eastern
Europe and Latin America, and low In the more developed
countries of the northern hemisphere. Hepatitis B was linked
with primary cancer of the liver, an important cause of death
in poor countries. The World Health Organization (WHO) worked
to pool knowledge and ideas on means of control of
78 Titmuss, Gift Relationship.
" DHSS, Australia (hepatitis-associated) anti gen, Revised
report of the Advisory Group on testing for the presence of
Australia (hepatitis-associated) antigen and its antibody.
Chairman: W. d'A Maycock (Department of Health and Social
Security, Welsh Office, 1972) ('Maycock Report']
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hepatitis; 8° WHO policy may have helped gradually to shape
national policy on hepatitis B, even in low-prevalence
countries. In the UK, the hepatitis B test was the subject of
intensive work in clinical, academic and pharmaceutical
laboratories, with both public utility and private profit as
motives. Aspects of the virology and immunology of hepatitis
B were investigated, with difficulty since the virus would not
grow in cultures. Chapter 6 studies a network of researchers
in London: ways in which these scientists, doctors and
technicians Interacted are explored using notions of sample
banks, and exchange of materials, summed up in the term 'blood
brotherhood'. This analysis aims to bring an anthropological
perspective to the question of how certain researchers come to
be regarded as experts.
The construction of hepatitis B as an occupational disease is
the heart of Chapter 7, together with questions of individual
rights versus the public health interest. Laboratory workers
afraid of losing their jobs without compensation succeeded in
having hepatitis classified under industrial injuries
legislation in 1975.81 Accounts of practice in clinical
laboratories suggest that safety measures were only gradually
improved, and remained highly variable; codes of practice for
° For example, with relevance to Europe: WHO, Viral Hepatitis,
Report of a European Symposium convened by the World Health
Organization, Prague, 29 Sept - 3 Oct 1964 (Copenhagen: WHO
Regional Office for Europe, 1965); WHO, Viral Hepatitis,
Report on a Working Group, Bucharest 25-29 Aug 1975
(Copenhagen: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 1976)
$1 DHSS, Viral Hepatitis, Report by Industrial Injuries
Advisory Council in accordance with Section 141 of the Social
Security Act 1975 on the question whether viral hepatitis
should be prescribed under the Act (London: HNSO, 1975)
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safety in laboratories became a battleground in the late
1970s. For many health workers, the chance of compensation
was far outweighed by the fear of loss of livelihood if they
contracted hepatitis B. The degree of concern varied, with
dentists at the forefront. 82
 But health workers, particularly
surgeons, evidently wished to avoid compulsory screening, a
position enshrined in 1981 DHSS guidelines on screening. The
balance was set in favour of individual rights over public
health; the role of expert advisers in formulating this policy
is here examined.
The American vaccine against hepatitis B was available in the
UK from 1982. Chapter 8 looks at the formation of vaccine
policy, recognising that hepatitis B is a special case but at
the same time relating it to other historical case studies.
Since hepatitis B was seen as an occupational hazard for
health workers, the vaccine might have been expected to
provide the perfect public health solution: theoretically all
new NHS staff, and those existing staff who were vulnerable,
could have been protected from hepatitis. However, restricted
guidelines persisted through the 1980s. The initial vaccine
suffered from high cost and 'image' problems, but even when a
cheaper recombinant (genetically engineered) vaccine with a
cleaner image was introduced in 1987, the problem of cost
still hindered delivery. Only one group other than health
workers was strongly targetted for vaccination: that is babies
82 DHSS, Report of Expert Group on Hepatitis in Dentistry
Department of Health and Social Security, Scottish Home and
Health Department, Welsh Office (London: HMSO, 1979)
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of mothers known to be carriers. 83 Delivery to the groups
with highest prevalence - gay men and drug users - remained
patchy. Chapter 8 explores the alliances for and against a
broader vaccination policy, noting the possibility in the
1990s of a switch to universal childhood vaccination against
hepatitis B.
Clearly some chapters focus more on research while others deal
mainly with questions of policy: aspects of the relation
between them emerge throughout. The policy focus on health
workers and the enduring power of the medical hierarchy to
influence policy, which have been identified by other writers,
will be explored. The variable nature and locations of
research - another theme raised elsewhere - will be used to
explore networks of contacts and the making of experts.
Interactions between initiatives at a local level and central
policy making will also be highlighted. These and other
aspects of the linkage, or lack of linkage, between research
and policy on hepatitis B over a span of fifty years should
have a bearing beyond this history.
S. Polakoff, 'Immunisation of infants at high risk of
hepatitis B', British Medical Journal, 285 (1982), 1294-5.
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CHAPTER 2: WARTIME DEVELOPMENTS: THE JAUNDICE COMMITTEE AND
THE ETHICS OF HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION [Mainly 1942-1947]
This chapter focusses on work undertaken in Britain during the
Second World War, which helped develop certain understandings
of hepatitis A and B. First, previous changes in ideas about
jaundice will be discussed in brief, with special attention to
Ackerknecht's argument that the nature of infectious hepatitis
was a subject of international scientific rivalry around the
turn of the century. The mid-twentieth century notion that
there was a form, or forms, of hepatitis caused by viral
infection was contingent on the development of a concept of
'the virus', which will also be briefly reviewed. By 1942,
hepatitis was seen as a hazard to troops, there were fears of
spread to civilians, and urgent research was seen as the
answer. A detailed account will be given of the wartime
Jaundice Committee, particularly the contribution of the chief
virological researcher and concerns raised by his experiments
on human 'volunteers'. A growing recognition of hepatitis as
a problem in blood transfusion was another outcome of wartime
experience. Lastly, postwar hepatitis experiments in the US,
which have generally received much more attention than the UK
wartime experiments, raise interesting questions of changing
ethical attitudes.
Concepts of hepatitis before the Second World War
Scientific papers on hepatitis which offer brief histories
tend to delve into the ancient world and scan the whole of
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history for references to jaundice, conveying little to the
reader, beyond the fact that people have always noticed and
linked illnesses which turn patients yellow. 1 Ackerknecht's
review of medical Ideas about hepatitis from the eighteenth to
the mid-twentieth century is far more helpful, though marred
by talk of 'improvements'. 2 It is surely more profitable to
discuss past ideas In terms of 'understandings' rather than
'misunderstandings', to avoid separating the present 'us' with
superior knowledge from the past 'them' with inferior
knowledge - just as anthropologists gain greater insights by
working from the interior meanings that social structures and
rituals have for people practising them, than if they regard
them as quaint and misguided customs.
Ackerknecht describes an influential nineteenth-century lobby,
headed by German authorities (VIrchow and Frerichs),
supporting a non-infectious theory of jaundice. 3 The growth
during the nineteenth century of chemically-induced liver
disorders reinforced a research orientation towards toxins as
a cause of acute cases of jaundice - Ackerknecht mentions
phosphorus poisoning, an occupational disease, and we might
add arsenic poisoning in venereal disease clinics in the early
twentieth century. This orthodox view of acute hepatitis as a
non-infectious condition was challenged towards the end of the
See Introduction, n. 23 and n. 24.
2 E. H. Ackerknecht, 'The vagaries of the notion of epidemic
hepatitis or infectious jaundice' in L. G. Stevenson and R. P.
Muithauf (eds), Medicine, Science and Culture (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), pp. 3-16.
Ibid, pp.6-7.
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nineteenth century by accounts of epidemics, first in military
campaigns where epidemics of jaundice were witnessed, then in
a factory and a mental institution where revaccination against
smallpox seemed the common factor. The First World War and
its aftermath saw reports of epidemics of jaundice multiply;
Ackerknecht regards Germany's defeat in the war as
contributing to the defeat of the old German notions about
non-infectious jaundice, in favour of the views of French,
Scandinavian, British and American physicians.
The concept of 'infectious jaundice' which was established by
the interwar period tended to be unitary for many doctors, but
those concerned with liver disease, with vaccination, or with
the developing technology of blood transfusion, were becoming
aware of a variant or variants, often associated with the use
of needles and syringes, with a longer incubation period than
the commoner epidemic form. By the Second World War, the
terms 'infectious jaundice' or 'acute epidemic hepatitis' were
in general use for the more common form, while 'homologous
serum jaundice', 'arsphenamine' or 'arsenotherapy jaundice'
and 'post-transfusion hepatitis' were used to indicate
supposed variants arising In the peculiar circumstances of
inoculation, injection or transfusion. These variations
allowed room for continuing uncertainties over etiology,
especially in the case of arsenic therapy, where the chemical
was suspected of causing jaundice. But the notion that a
virus could cause the disease was beginning to gain ground.
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'The virus', virology and a viral etiology for hepatitis
The late nineteenth century had seen the emergence of Koch's
postulates regarding the method of isolating a micro-organism
from a diseased animal, plant, or person, and proving it
caused a particular disease by reproducing that disease in
another subject. The germ theory was shaken when it was shown
that in the case of tobacco mosaic disease the infective agent
could pass through a microbial filter. Either the germ theory
was not universal for Infectious diseases, and there were
diseases caused by something akin to humours or miasmas, or
else there must be sub-microscopic infectious agents which
were far smaller than bacteria. Thus the concept of the virus
around the turn of the century was, broadly speaking: a
filterable disease-producing agent. Whether it fitted the
definition of an 'organism' was (and still is) a matter of
debate.4
While significant virus-oriented research in the interwar
period centred on discoveries and debates on bacteriophage, a
turning point came with further research relating to tobacco
mosaic virus. As the historian Sally Smith Hughes puts it,
the crystallization of tobacco mosaic virus by Stanley in 1935
changed the focus of virology from pathology to biochemistry,
sparking off a whole new wave of investigations. 5
 By 1950,
See: S. S. Hughes, The virus: a history of the concept
(London and New York: Heinemann, 1977)
Ibid, p.89, citing W. M. Stanley, 'Isolation of a crystalline
protein possessing the properties of tobacco-mosaic virus',
Science, 81 (1935), 644-45.
46
molecular biology and genetics were contributing to virology,
with Watson and Crick's 1953 elucidation of the structure of
DNA leading eventially to an explanation of the mode of
reproduction of the virus within the host cell. Hughes points
out that viruses have proved attractive to geneticists and
molecular biologists because of their relative simplicity
compared with the cell. Much progress in virology through the
1950s and l960s was of a pure rather than applied nature,
unravelling DNA and RNA rather than combatting viral
infections 6
There appears to be a contradiction in Smith Hughes'
periodisation, giving the mid-century as the point at which
virology emerged as an independent discipline, since this is
also the point at which it became definitively inter-
disciplinary. Her argument hinges on the development of the
concept of the virus, which reached a conjunction around 1950
that allowed more productive hypotheses to be formulated, with
more interactive research deepening as well as broadening the
field. Much research hinged on DNA; but much also arose from
technological innovations such as tissue culture and electron
microscopy. These general observations on virology in the
postwar period are important for the next chapter.
But to return to the problem of hepatitis, and the tentative
view that there was a viral etiology for at least some forms
of jaundice. Papers published in 1937 and 1939 by Findlay and
MacCallum exemplify the way that virology often worked at that
Ibid. p.l02.
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time, by a process of elimination. 7 They pointed out that for
hepatitis, no micro-organism had been found which could be
seen under a microscope, or trapped in a filter and cultured;
therefore the causal agent presumably had to be a virus. Thus
on the threshhold of the war, hepatitis was one among many
diseases with 'candidate' viral etiology, but with the limited
scientific tools at their disposal, it was not obvious how
these virologists could hope to take matters further. In
fact, they were concentrating on rather different problems
which were to bring them back to hepatitis in an unexpected
way.
MacCallum, Findlay, yellow fever vaccine and hepatitis
According to his own account, Fred MacCallum left Toronto for
the UK in 1934 because he wanted to learn more about viruses,
and resources were poor in Canada after the recession. 8 In
Britain, he knew of three centres currently studying viruses:
the Lister Institute, the Medical Research Council unit at
Hampstead, and Findlay at the Weilcome Bureau of Scientific
Research on the Euston Road, where the whole of the fourth
floor was taken up with tropical medical research. Half the
area was occupied by chemists working on antimalarials and
G. N. Findlay and F. 0. MacCallum, 'Note on acute hepatitis
and yellow fever immunisation', Transactions of the Royal
Society of Tropical Medicine & Hygiene, 31 (1937), 297-308; G.
M. Findlay, F. 0. MacCallum and F. Murgatroyd, 'Observations
bearing on the aetiology of infectious hepatitis (so called
epidemic catarrhal jaundice)', Transactions of the Royal
Society of Tropical Medicine & H ygiene, 32 (1939), 575-86.
8 F. 0. MacCallum, interview, 29 April 1992. Most of this
section is based on this interview.
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leishmaniasis, while Findlay worked alone on yellow fever,
lymphogranuloma and rift valley fever. The Euston Road
laboratories were the nexus of a chain reaching into Africa,
with Weilcome's research laboratories in Khartoum and its
mobile, floating laboratory on the Nile; and connecting with
the laboratories at Beckenham in Kent, and others in the
States, where drugs were manufactured.9
MacCallum originally took a job at the London Hospital under
the professor of bacteriology, Professor Bedson, who had
discovered psittacosis, but in July 1936 he secured a post as
assistant to Findlay for research on yellow fever. They were
experimenting with a vaccine, their Welicome salaries
subsidised by the Colonial Office which was concerned about
yellow fever as a scourge of white officials and traders in
West Africa. Others had long been searching for a vaccine,
notably the Americans in relation to the building of the
Panama Canal, 1° and Findlay collaborated with both the London
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) and the
Rockefeller Foundation in New York, which had contact with
South American ventures.
At this point - when MacCallum joined Findlay in 1936 - they
were able to produce a live virus vaccine, manufactured from
' A. R. Hall and B. A. Bembridge, Physic and philanthropy: a
history of the Wellcome Trust 1936-1986 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986)
10 W. H. Wright, 40 years of tropical medicine research
A history of the Gorgas Memorial Institute of Tropical and
Preventive Medicine, Inc. and the Corgas Memorial Laboratory
(Washington: Reese Press for Gorgas Memorial Institute, 1970)
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the brains of mice inoculated with infected serum. Passage
through mouse brain was thought to attenuate the virus
partially but not sufficiently for safety: to counteract any
remaining virulence, large doses of serum from convalescent
yellow fever patients were added to the freeze-dried mouse
brain extract.' 1 Later, it was found possible to grow the
virus in chick embryos, a more satisfactory medium because
more controllable. Rockefeller researchers found that after
many passages through chick embryos, the virus vaccine was so
attenuated that no anti-serum need be added; this vaccine
proved satisfactory in trials conducted in Brazil in the
1940s.'2 However, although yellow fever vaccine had few
precedents - it was the first virus vaccine for humans after
smallpox and rabies - fixed ideas seem to have developed
around it rather rapidly, and the notion that the freeze-dried
vaccine must be made up with serum rather than water persisted
right through the Second World War. This could be normal
rather than convalescent serum, however.
Soon after MacCallum joined Findlay, cases of jaundice began
to occur in people who had received yellow fever vaccine
before going to Africa. MacCallum, still a new boy wrapped in
notions of non-infectious jaundice, made little of this.
Findlay was more concerned, and began to wonder about
connections between this and other instances where jaundice
followed injections. Together with MacCallum, he embarked on
' Findlay and MacCallum, 'Note on acute hepatitis'; MacCalluin,
interview.
12 Wright, 40 years of tropical medicine.
©
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a literature search which revealed occasional cases of
jaundice in various types of clinics - diabetes, arthritis,
and others - in many different countries. They published on
this phenomenon in l937,' stating that their cases could not
be yellow fever - the apparently obvious explanation in view
of the colouration - since the jaundice occurred about sixty
days after receiving the vaccine; moreover, blood samples
taken from some patients established that thay had developed
antibodies to yellow fever ten to fourteen days after
inoculation. The findings pointed to hepatitis of a type
analagous to that observed in the clinic cases they had
surveyed.
Following this episode of 1936-7, Findlay and MacCallum had a
clear period of about five years, providing yellow fever
vaccines without further cases of jaundice. At the outbreak
of war, Findlay was sent to West Africa as a tropical disease
adviser, and MacCallum was left making yellow fever vaccine
'with a couple of technicians'. He was required to increase
production from some twenty millilitres per week to several
thousands, to provide for all service personnel going to West
Africa.' 4 Besides needing to increase the output of mouse
brains, he believed he needed an enormously increased supply
of serum for dilution of the vaccine. With what then seemed
good fortune, a newly developed technology was available to
channel large volumes of serum in a compact form: that is,
freeze-dried plasma using pooled serum derived from many
13 Findlay and MacCallum, 'Note on acute hepatitis'.
14 MacCallum, interview.
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donors. The newly organised Blood Transfusion Service, set up
in expectation of the war in 1938-9, relied heavily on freeze
drying of blood and plasma, manufactured with the
participation of the Welicome company.
Thus when MacCallum was asked to step up yellow fever vaccine
production, he called on a contact at Beckenham and secured a
bottle of freeze dried plasma, which he reconstituted with
water and incorporated into a batch of vaccine. Three months
later, he was telephoned by the Director of the Royal Air
Force medical services, who had suffered a nasty attack of
jaundice sixty-six days after yellow fever inoculation.'5
This was one of several cases, the most severe in terms of
seniority of the victim. MacCalluin, knowing the batch number
of the dried serum he had used, telephoned his Weilcome
contact who still had some bottles of that same batch of
plasma in store. These were used in some of the experiments
that followed, instigated by the War Office.
The wartime Jaundice Committee and research team
As the war progressed, hepatitis became a cause of concern on
a number of fronts. One the one hand, there were outbreaks of
jaundice among troops stationed in the North African desert
and in Italy - about 16,000 cases, with a few deaths, between
1941 and 1943, mostly ascribed to 'infectious hepatitis'."
j Ibid.
16 
'Homologous serum jaundice', Memorandum prepared by Medical
Officers of the Ministry of Health, Lancet, 1943, (1), 83-8.
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On the other hand, outbreaks associated with yellow fever
vaccine were an increasingly serious embarrassment. In the
past, yellow fever had been a major impediment in the
prosecution of military ventures in the tropics;' 7 the vaccine
was now seen as an essential safeguard. For a prophylactic
measure to produce an illness, mimicking the disease it was
designed to prevent, must have seemed an unfortunate mockery
of the progress of British tropical medicine.' 8 With America
joining the war, there was a far more spectacular vaccine-
associated jaundice outbreak: 28,000 Us troops were affected
in the first six months of 1942 (with 62 deaths), following
inoculation with yellow fever vaccine made by the Rockefeller
group, evidently still using serum to dilute the attenuated
vaccine. The thousands of cases presented a frightening
spectre of medically induced mass disablement.' 9 When 500
American troops, newly arrived in Northern Ireland in 1942,
suffered jaundice, the British became alarmed over possible
spread to the civilian population.
As so often happened, the impact of war - in this case, an
17 P. Curtin, Death by mi gration: Europe's encounter with the
tropical world in the nineteenth century (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988) surveys the stastistics, but shows how
public health measures reduced yellow fever mortality long
before vaccine was available.
' At this stage the British were feverishly stepping up
production of synthetic anti-malarials, having been caught in
the same trap of reliance on German manufactures they had
experienced in the First World War, despite warnings in the
interim. See: J. Beinart, 'The inner world of imperial
sickness', in Austoker and Bryder, Historical perspectives on
MRC, pp. 117-18, esp. 122.
'Jaundice following yellow fever vaccination' (Editorial),
Journal of the American Medical Association, 119 (1942), 1110.
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indirect impact, via a preventive health measure - acted as a
stimulus to action on a medical front. It appears that the
British and the US military agreed that research was needed to
stem the flood of jaundice cases. Although there was an
understanding that the US army was to investigate the yellow
fever association, and the British to concentrate on infective
heaptitis, in fact researchers on both sides of the Atlantic
looked at every variant of hepatitis, since so little was
known about it.
Sir Wilson Jameson, Chief Medical Officer at the Ministry of
Health, asked the MRC to correlate existing research on
jaundice and co-ordinate further investigations; a joint
committee was established with NRC, armed forces and Ministry
of Health representation. The Jaundice Committee met six
times between March 1943 and May 1945, with a post-script
gathering in October 1945 to settle its affairs. Clearly much
negotiating was conducted before and between meetings; at the
first meeting a research team was selected, with names already
agreed upon, the only proviso being that the Weilcome Research
Institute would have to be asked to release MacCallum for this
work. A laboratory in the Department of Pathology at
Cambridge was allocated for use by the research team, probably
thanks to connections of one of the committee members. 2° The
Ministry of Health was to make jaundice notifiable in Civil
Defence Region 4 - that is, East Anglia and adjoining counties
- to allow epidemiological surveillance of a normal civilian
20 This was Bedson, MacCallum's former boss, now serving on the
Jaundice Committee, who was detailed to form the 'Jaundice
Research Team'.
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population of some two and a half million. All cases of
jaundice among troops stationed in the area were to be closely
monitoried by the research team. Already by the first meeting
also, the use of 'human volunteers' for transmission
experiments was under discussion.
Chair of the Jaundice Committee was Leslie Witts, Nuffield
Professor of Medicine at Oxford; he was familiar with the
field of haematology. Witts and Edward Mellanby, Secretary of
the MRC, probably guided selection of committee members,
though the other joint bodies (the forces and the Ministry)
put forward their own men. A note from Witts to Me1lby late
in 1943 reveals something of the personal element that must
often have played a part:
Poole [Major-General L. T. Poole, a medical supremo at
the War Office, already on the Jaundice Committee] is
very anxious that Biggam [another medical Major-General
at the War Office] should be invited to become a member
of the Jaundice Committee. Biggam is taking an active
part in the Army's jaundice research and he is a person
with whom I very much like working.21
Mellanby made sure that Biggam was invited. Members, as well
as representing interested bodies - the Army, the Ministry of
Health and the War Office - had to be eminent, known to the
initiators, and, it would seem, compatible with the chairman.
Almost all were London-based except Witts in Oxford and W. J.
Tulloch, Professor of Bacteriology at St Andrew's - and A. M.
McFarlan, an epidemiologist at the Emergency Public Health
Laboratory at Cambridge who acted as Secretary to the Jaundice
Committee and was also a member of the research team.
21 MRC 3217/1, Jaundice, increase in the incidence. Committee,
constitution & members, L. Witts to E. Mellanby, 4 Oct 1943.
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Each of the five members of the research team covered a
particular aspect. McFarlan, seconded from the Public Health
Laboratory Service (PHLS), conducted the epidemiological
surveys. Clifford Wilson, a senior Army physician, undertook
clinical observations. M. R. Pollock, a bacteriologist from
the PHLS, dealt with the biochemical problems of early
detection of infective hepatitis (prior to onset of jaundice),
and assessment of liver function in relation to different
treatments. J. A. R. Miles, a clinical pathologist from the
Army, conducted haematological and serological investigations.
Transmission experiments were the responsibility of MacCallum.
The following account will concentrate mainly on the latter,
and on the role of the Jaundice Committee in facilitating,
sanctioning, and 'image-managing' these experiments.
It appears from the final report of the research team as if
MacCallum initially concentrated on finding an animal model,
but in fact he had already done this work before the Jaundice
Committee was established, as he reported to an MRC sub-
committee on Jaundice in Industry in November 1942.22 Noting
the almost totally unsuccessful work of other researchers, he
had tried pigs, golden hamsters, Orkney voles, cotton rats,
guinea pigs, canaries, mice, and rats, all with negative
results. The failure of these earlier attempts to find an
animal in which hepatitis could be produced, led the Jaundice
Committee to support MacCallum's call to use human beings as
experimental subjects:
22 MRC 3217/4, Jaundice in Industry, 'Hepatitis Sub-Committee',
minutes of meeting at LSHTM, 20 Nov 1942.
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It was decided, therefore, that experiments on human
volunteers were essential if further knowledge was to be
obtained on the mode of spread and duration of
infectivity of the various types of hepatitis designated
as infectious, homologous serum and arsenotherapy
hepatitis 23
How were volunteers obtained? The first line was to try
conscientious objectors; MacCallum 'went to talk to Quakers in
that building [the Friends' Meeting House] next to the
Weilcome Institute on the Euston Road' and persuaded 'first
one then another' to participate. This source was not
plentiful enough, however; soon 'there weren't any more
conchies' willing to act as experimental subjects. 24 Dr W. H.
Bradley, a Ministry of Health appointee on the Jaundice
Committee, suggested that rheumatoid arthritis patients might
be recruited, on the basis of reports in the prewar
literature, suggesting an attack of jaundice sometimes brought
about remission of arthritis symptoms.25
Witts leaned on rheumatology colleagues and secured a group of
volunteers in a unit in London, for what was billed as a
therapeutic trial of the effects of jaundice on rheumatoid
arthritis. Witts used the term 'inoculation' of the procedure
used in these trials, but MacCallum describes various methods
of administering the infected material - nasopharyngeal
23 MacCallum et al, Infective hepatitis, p.117.
24 MacCallum, interview.
25 Bradley cited (incompletely): G. F. Still, 'On a form of
chronic joint disease In children, Transactions of the Royal
Medical-chirugical Society, 80 (1897), 52, where only passing
mention is made of this effect; and the much fuller account
in: P. S. Hench, 'Effect of jaundice on chronic infectious
(atrophic) arthritis and on primary fibrositis', Archives of
Internal Medicine, 61 (1938), 451-80.
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washings, blood, urine or faeces from hepatitis patients -
including spraying into the nose and mouth, swallowing, and
injection. In the case of faeces, which (from delicacy of
feeling) MacCallum left till last, a suspension in orangeade
was apparently most favoured among the recipients.26
Infective material was derived from Wilson's patients, mostly
service personnel in East Anglia (for infectious hepatitis);
and from cases of post transfusion hepatitis supplied by the
Blood Transfusion Service.27
By March 1944 a fresh supply of volunteers was needed, for
further transmission experiments; the Jaundice Committee
decided to request the use of military prisoners both in the
Middle East and in the UK, and also civilian prisoners. Witts
asked Mellanby to contact the civil and army authorities, and
provided him with a persuasive case, including statistics
which appear, in retrospect, rather chilling:
The risk of fatality is probably no greater than Is
represented by a fatality rate of 8 in 10,000 cases in
the recent epidemics in the Middle East. The risk of
subsequent disability is probably about 1 per cent of
cases. These rates of mortality and disablity apply to
Individuals actually contracting infective hepatitis, and
26 MacCallum, Interview: military colleagues advised first
investigating faeces, as the most likely means of transmission
of infectious hepatitis, but MacCallum prioritised the views
of a Yorkshire GP who thought the disease might be carried by
airborne particles; see: W. N. Pickles, Epidemioloqy In
country practice (Bristol: Wright, 1939). Faecal material was
treated by centrifugatlon and ether extraction or freeze-
drying, then disguised with vanilla or suspended in orangeade,
before use; see: MacCallum et al, Infective hepatitis, p. 119.
27 F. 0. MacCallum and J. D. Bauer, 'Homologous serum jaundice.
Transmission experiments with human volunteers', Lancet, 1944
(I), 622-7. See also: MacCallum et al, Infective hepatitis
p.127 for reference to pool of serum identified as source of
jaundice; this Batch 034 was made from serum from 1000
'supposedly normal' donors at blood banks.
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these would be only a small fraction of the total number
of volunteers inoculated.28
Witts speculated that men who were serving sentences for
desertion or cowardice might 'welcome this means of
rehabilitating themselves in the eyes of society', that
civilian prisoners would like to contribute to the war effort,
and that all would welcome remission of their sentences. But
the prisoners were never subjected to this tempting offer,
since the Adjutant-General ruled that the need for six months
observation of experimental subjects might hamper remission
for military prisoners who were in for short sentences.
Besides, as Lieutenant-General Sir Alexander Hood, Director-
General of the Royal Army Medical Corps added, in relaying the
decision to Mellanby:
Though the risk of fatality is exceedingly low, there
might well be a death In the earlier stages of the
experiments, and this might easily lead to very
considerable trouble.29
Mellanby drew a similar blank with his request to the Prison
Commissioner for the use of civilian prisoners, on the grounds
that additional remission (above that normally allowed for
good behaviour) would not be acceptable to the Home Office.3°
Refused the use of prisoners, and seeing problems with other
possible groups which they discussed (such as Inmates of
lunatic asylums and monastic orders), the Jaundice Committee
pressed ahead with a search for further pools of rheumatoid
2$ MRC 3217/8, Jaundice - Transmission to volunteers, L. Witts
to E. Mellanby, 24 March 1944
29 MRC 3217/8, A. Hood to E. Mellanby, 25 May 1944
° MRC 3217/8, Dr Methven, Prison Commissioner, to E. Mellanby,
10 May 1944.
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arthritis patients. A letter to The Lancet was drawn up over
the signatures of Bradley and MacCallum, on the beneficial
effects such patients sometimes experienced with jaundice. As
Witts confided to Landsborough Thomson, second secretary to
the MRC, in July 1944, one of Bradley's superiors at the
Ministry of Health was 'very worried about his connection with
this work and raised very strong objections to publication
unless it had the declared support of the Council'. 3' The
requisite support for publication was secured, with the
assurance that the Jaundice Committee fully recommended it.
Their grounds for so doing were partly that transmission
experiments had already shown that the faeces of patients with
infective hepatitis contained an infectious agent - a finding
of great practical importance - and partly the desire to
establish Bradley's priority with regard to this transmission
and the use of the infectious agent in treating rheumatoid
arthritis patients. After this, Bradley was no longer to be
closely associated with transmission experiments.
The Ministry of Health perhaps had additional reason to be
wary of their man's name being associated with further
experiments; the Ministry itself had requested the Jaundice
Committee to look into what was termed 'homologous serum
jaundice' in the context of transfusions of blood and serum.
Bradley told a Jaundice Committee meeting in July 1944 that:
the Ministry of Health had records of 200 cases of
hepatitis in transfused persons with 5 deaths ... The
Ministry was concerned about the possibility of public
" MRC 3217/8, L. Witts to A. Landsborough Thomson, 17 July
1944. By 'support of the Council [the MRC]', Witts meant the
support of Mellanby.
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clamour if it became known that many cases of jaundice
and some fatalities were due to transfusion.32
Most of these cases had been reported by doctors 3. F. Loutit
and Janet Vaughan, both of whom attended this meeting; 33 the
latter requested a full time social worker to assist her
search for further information on the links between blood
transfusion and jaundice, which the MRC agreed to fund.
To those involved with the transmission experiments, it was
now clear that further trials would not be limited to the less
harmful infectious jaundice, but would include serum jaundice.
To this was added a third variant, representing what MacCallum
referred to as the 'social aspects' of the disease; 34 that is,
jaundice associated with the arsenical treatment of venereal
diseases: arsenotherapy or arsphenamine jaundice. The theory
that this type of jaundice arose as a side-effect of the
arsenical drugs had survived from the original cases until
well into the 1940s, but the prevalence of jaundice in
venereal disease clinics attended by Italian prisoners of war
had worried the military doctors and led to some suspicion
that an infectious agent might be responsible - something that
was inadvertently transmitted via needles and syringes.
By September 1944, Witts had taken steps to facilitate the new
round of experiments, as he told Mellanby:
32 NRC MB39, Jaundice Committee Minutes, Minutes of fourth
meeting, held at LSHTM, 11 July 1944.
Dr Janet Vaughan sat on the Transfusion Hepatitis sub-
committee of the MRC Blood Transfusion Research Committee.
MacCallum, interview.
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We have provided 58 patients with rheumatoid arthritis
for MacCallum to inoculate here in Oxford. Although I
say 'we', my Assistant Director, Dr Alice Stewart has
made all the arrangements."
These arrangements included the opportunity to draw on
patients at another centre, as Witts explained:
Dr Alice Stewart is the daughter of Naish, Emeritus
Professor of Medicine at Sheffield, and she has a number
of connections there. We have made tentative enquiries
and it would be possible for us to work up the Sheffield
area and collect at least 100 volunteers with arthritis,
probably more.36
Oxford and Sheffield were the main centres for the human
transmission experiments which now included several different
types of jaundice; but other cases were 'made available' in
several hospitals in Scotland, Wales and elsewhere in England.
Sensitivity on the part of hospital authorities to the
possible public view of these transmission experiments emerges
in a couple of instances. The medical superintendant of
Aberdeen Royal Infirmary, Dr J. C. Knox, wrote directly to
Mellanby, pointing out that a voluntary hospital which was:
very dependent on public trust and goodwill for its
financial support cannot afford any suggestion that
patients, even volunteer patients, are being
'experimented' upon
Mellariby, after referring the question to members of the
research team in Cambridge (MacCallum and McFarlan), assured
Knox that the risk to his arthritis patients from jaundice
therapy was no greater than with gold therapy, another more
favoured experimental treatment, and advised that he emphasize
NRC 3217/8, L. Witts to E. Mellanby, 29 September 1944.
36 Ibid.
NRC 3217/8, J. C. Knox to E. Mellanby, 11 February, 1944.
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this therapeutic aspect to the hospital's Board of Governors.
But Mellanby also stressed the question of the national
interest: jaundice research was 'of high priority in relation
to the war'. 38 A further instance of potential for objections
from the hospital authorities will be discussed below, in
relation to the final stages of the research team's findings.
NacCallum's typical weekly schedule during the peak period of
transmission experiments was fairly hectic. 39 He spent Monday
mornings at the Welicome laboratories in the Euston Road,
where he was still making yellow fever vaccine, with a medical
conscientious objector as assistant. On Monday afternoons he
went up to the headquarters of the jaundice research group in
Cambridge, to coordinate the team's work (and perhaps collect
clinical material). He would spend Tuesday and Wednesday in
Sheffield conducting transmission experiments on volunteer
arthritis patients, and then return to Cambridge on Thursday
to monitor the progress of his animal experiments. Friday
would be spent back in London. Meanwhile, McFarlan was
working in East Anglia, looking at outbreaks of hepatitis in
schools, nurseries, and a large institution for mental
defectives where there were 85 cases of 'infective hepatitis'
in an outbreak in 1944.° Wilson was in Cambridge making
" E. Mellanby to J. C. Knox, 28 February 1944.
MacCallum, interview. Note that he refers to animal
experiments; in this recollection, nearly fifty years after
the event, these were continuing alongside the human
transmission experiments. This may indeed have been the case
even though it is not evident from the published or archival
sources.
40 MacCallum et al, Infective hepatitis, p. 37.
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clinical observations on patients - three hundred of the two
thousand servicemen in the region notified as cases of
infective hepatitis - while Pollock developed biochemical
tests for early detection of infective hepatitis and changes
in liver function. Miles, also at the jaundice research
team's headquarters, worked on haematological and serological
reactions to clarify the clinical profile and distinguish the
different types of hepatitis.
Towards the end of the war (and of the Jaundice Committee's
activities), there was further cause for alarm over potential
objections to the transmission experiments, and this time
there is evidence of deliberate evasion. MacCallum had been
publishing his findings in a series of articles, each of which
had first to be submitted to the Jaundice Committee for
approval. The last in the series dealt with arsenotherapy
jaundice, which appeared to be transmitted by blood, but not
by faeces and nasal washings. This was an important finding
but there was a problem, as MacCallum had to confess to
Mel 1 anby:
I had included Dr Alice Stewart's name, as we had done
the work together, but as you will see she has erased
this, as she felt the situation in Sheffield would be
happier if the clinic did not realise that material from
patients receiving arsenotherapy had been inoculated into
their patients.4'
The real problem, which MacCalluiu avoided spelling out, was a
fear of possible syphilis transmission alongside hepatitis,
since arsenic therapy was used for treatment of syphilis.
MacCallum was confident that his methods ensured that the
" MRC 3217/8, F. 0. MacCallum to E. Me]lanby, 7 March 1945.
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material he used would carry only hepatitis, not syphilis, but
there could be little doubt that this part of the trials was
potentially very controversial.
MacCallum's experiments using material from two patients who
had become jaundiced during arsenical treatment, with nineteen
volunteers as recipients, confirmed the view that an infective
agent carried from one patient to another via needles and
syringes might be responsible for so-called 'arsenotherpay
jaundice', rather than the arsenic itself. The infective
agent appeared to be the same as for serum hepatitis (as in
the cases of vaccine and transfusion hepatitis). The findings
also indicated that better sterilization of needles and
syringes could stop transmission. 42
 These were important
advances. But Witts well understood Alice Stewart's refusal
to associate her name with the work - as he told Mellanby:
I have been on tenterhooks about this work, as it has
been carried out in patients with rheumatoid arthritis
under the guise of homologous serum jaundice ... I have
become increasingly uneasy about the issue raised (of
possible transmission of syphilis] ... At the meeting in
December ... I got the Jaundice Committee to give a
ruling that experiments on the transmission of post-
arsenical jaundice must not be carried out on patients
with rheumatoid arthritis, and I believe that no further
experiments of this kind have been performed since that
date ... I am hopeful that this is the last hurdle which
the Jaundice Team faces. I must confess that this study
of human transmission has caused me a good deal of worry
and it is a great relief that rio permanent ill effects
have been observed in any of our volunteers.43
Whether by permanent Ill-effects he meant syphilis or
42 MacCalluni et al, Infective hepatitis, p. 134; MacCallum,
Interview: in a large and busy Army clinic syringes thrown
into the autoclave and removed at random might not stay in for
the requisite 10 mins; Army informants confirmed the presence
of minute quantities of blood in the needles/syringes.
MRC 3217/8, L. Witts to E. Mellanby, 7 March 1945.
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hepatitis, Witts could indeed count himself lucky that no
patients showed lasting damage - and that there were no deaths
from the more serious serum hepatitis. (The question of
patients suffering sub-clinical infections leading to a
carrier state would not arise at this time.) Mellanby,
acceding to Witts' request for clearance of MacCallum's
article, without recourse to the Jaundice Committee, commented
that 'publication certainly has my approval and, although some
people might regard it as strong meat, I realise that it is
the kind of work that had to be done.' Shortly afterwards,
MacCallum was moved to typhus research and the Cambridge
jaundice team was dispersed.
The final report of the research team was published in 1951,
some four years after the last recordings were made; in its
preamble, it was stated that the MRC decided not to prioritise
publication because many of the findings had been published
during the course of the investigations, and other reports now
took first turn. 44 But this seems an inadequate explanation;
it seems reasonable to suppose that the delay may in part have
been occasioned by the nervousness so eloquently displayed in
the Jaundice Committee files.
The broad scope of the enquiries, and the various prior
classifications of types of jaundice, led to a wide ranging
" Preface to MacCallum et al, Infective hepatitis, p. iii;
authorship of the Preface is not given; it is dated 4 Sept
1951, and states that: 'The investigation recorded here ended
in 1947 and the report in its present form was accepted for
publication not long afterwards', but was then postponed to
make way for other reports; it was published unrevised despite
further knowledge on hepatitis accumulated meanwhile.
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series of conclusions, among which the major distinction
between two types of hepatitis does not always stand out. For
instance, under the summary findings for serology: 'The
evidence suggested a different causation for infective
hepatitis from that of homologous serum or arsenotherapy
hepatitis, but there is no evidence for or against cross-
immunity between the latter two conditions'. 45 In discussion
of transmission experiments, a new term was Introduced:
Infective hepatitis is believed to be due to a virus
called virus A ... Virus B causing homologous serum
hepatitis has not been found in faeces ... the derivation
of virus B and its possible relation to virus A remains
undecided."
Would It be reading backwards to see the distinction between
hepatitis A and B as the most important achievement of the
Jaundice Team? The same point was stressed in the MRC's
preface to the report, without using the terms 'A' and 'B':
The outstanding findings of the human experiments were
that a virus is present in the blood in arsenotherapy
jaundice and that virus is excreted in the faeces in
infective hepatitis.47
A wider audience had probably been reached, however, through
journal articles, possibly the most crucial being one written
by MacCallum but appearing anonymously in The Lancet in
1947 . 48
 Here, the suggestion was clearly made for the first
time that the disease with a short incubation period (20-40
days), known as catarrhal jaundice or infectious or infective
hepatitis be called hepatitis A, while the disease with a long
MacCallum et al, Infective hepatitis, p. 143.
Ibid, p. 144.
Ibid, p. iii.
48 'Homologous serum hepatitis' (Editorial), Lancet, 1947 (ii),
691-2.
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incubation period (60-100 days), known as homologous serum
jaundice, be called hepatitis B.
Very much remained a mystery regarding the nature of hepatitis
B, and its epidemiology was far more obscure than that of A.
NacCallum thought the high attack rate among his experimental
subjects, inoculated with B, suggested that 'only a small
proportion of the population has been exposed to this agent as
compared to virus A in Englandt . 	 Perhaps this was a new
disease, he speculated, or was natural transmission extremely
difficult? The apparent increase in cases over the years
might be due to better recognition, or to an actual increase
due to the more widespread use of blood products. There was
even a possibility of interaction between viruses, as there
seemed to be some evidence that individuals who had recovered
from B were more susceptible to A than normal.
We can see in this sort of speculation an image of hepatitis B
as a rare, possibly new, disease, chiefly associated with
medical procedures involving blood, serum or plasma. The
virus had been found to be tough, yet the disease apparently
failed to spread widely where there was no puncture of the
skin by needle: it was not transmitted by the faecal-oral
route like hepatitis A, nor by droplet infection like so many
other infectious diseases. Buried in the MRC report, in
McFarlan's discussion of two outbreaks of hepatitis in a
mental institution, was a possible clue; he referred to both
types of hepatitis (the prior outbreak was supposed to be B,
MacCallum et al, Infective hepatitis, p. 138.
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and the one he studied in 1944, to be A) as having spread
partly through 'contact'.'° While McFarlan emphasized the
uncleanly habits of the 'low-grade' Inmates in relation to the
spread of Infective hepatitis,SZ the pattern of spread among
people living in close proximity echoed that observed in
families In the villages he had studied. 52 Further, postwar
studies in a mental institution in the US were further to
elucidate the nature of the transmission routes and the
meaning of 'contact'.
Wartime work on post-transfusion hepatitis
During the war, the MRC ran a blood transfusion research
committee to tackle problems arising from wartime expansion of
the blood transfusion programme. In 1942/3 it set up a sub-
committee on hepatitis, mainly because of the hazard
associated with serum and plasma: measles convalescent serum,
yellow fever vaccine containg human serum, and transfusion of
pooled plasma for peripheral vascular disease. At this point,
'only few cases of hepatitis have been noted following
transfusion',' 3
 but this was almost undoubtedly due to follow-
up difficulties. Janet Vaughan submitted a memorandum on
post-transfusion hepatitis, and the committee agreed to
Initiate a survey of Emergency Medical Service hospitals to
Ibid. pp. 37-45.
Ibid, p. 43.
Ibid, pp . 27-33.
" MRC 2181/lOg/2 Jaundice following transfusion, MRC blood
transfusion research committee. Sub-committee on hepatitis
following transfusion (Draft circular, no date, probably 1943)
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uncover the extent of the problem.54
Two immediate questions arise. Why did not the Ministry of
Health make jaundice notifiable, to facilitate collection of
data? This was discussed in August 1942 at a special meeting
on jaundice associated with homologous serum (eg measles or
mumps serum), where Professor Arthur Ellis of the MRC asked
why the Ministry had decided against making jaundice
notifiable. Dr J. R. Hutchinson from the Ministzy explained
the basis for the decision, and 'the meeting then did not
press for notification' - but Dr Hutchinson's reasons are not
recorded in the minutes. 55 One can only guess, that in the
fraught conditions of wartime, the Ministry wished to avoid
the risk of a nationwide scare over vaccine programmes which
had resulted in hepatitis deaths. Limited notification was an
alternative, as in the East Anglia region for the Jaundice
Committee's research, or the proposed reporting of post-
transfusion jaundice from selected hospitals.
A second question arises over the organization of research:
why should the MRC, rather than the Ministry, organize
collection of data requiring routine transfusion follow-up?
This happily is fully answered, in a passage which gives a
Ibid, Minutes of second meeting, Thurs 28 July [1945]; Dr
Vaughan's work is also mentioned in same file, Committee on
Jaundice, Minutes of fifth meeting, 7 Dec 1944: 'Dr Janet
Vaughan had obtained the services of a whole-time social
worker, Miss N. Spurling, to follow up patients who had been
transfused'.
MRC 2181/lOg/2, Jaundice following administration of
homologous serum, Note of informal meeting, 13 August 1942;
the Army Blood Supply Depot, the US Army, the Emergency Blood
Supply, the MRC and the Ministry of Health were represented.
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frank MRC view of the Ministry's shortcomings with regard to
research:
...there was general agreement that this was a research
problem, and could only satisfactorily be tackled by some
ad hoc organization best run by the MRC. If it were run
by the Ministry a host of officials would be involved and
there would be little hope of satisfactory contact or co-
ordination.56
The chief result was to be a six-monthly report on hepatitis
following transfusion of blood or plasma in selected regions.
Although relating specifically to hepatitis, the view of the
respective abilities of the MRC and M0H for data collection
recorded here presumably applied much more widely.
The question of whether or not to exclude donors with a
history of jaundice from giving blood received perfunctory
discussion at this point. A rapid survey was undertaken,
within one of the committees: 'A third of the committee had a
history of jaundice at one time or another and if this were a
picture of the entire population donor panels would be
seriously affected by omitting those with a history of
jaundice.' 57 It may be fortunate that not all MRC research
was conducted in so cavalier a fashion.
Clearer details of the findings on post transfusion hepatitis
appear in a summary supplied in April, 1946, by Witts, chair
of the Jaundice Committee. Witts pointed out that only late
in the war was the danger of plasma jaundice noted. He quoted
56 MRC 2l8l/lOg/2 MRC sub-committee on transfusion hepatitis,
second meeting, 28 July [1945].
" MRC 2l8l/lOa Blood transfusion - Research problems - General
VI, Blood transfusion research committee, ninth meeting, 6 Nov
1942.
71
Janet Vaughan's suggestion that most plasma pools caused one
to two per cent post transfusion hepatitis, but some caused
far more; her own follow-up survey had given a rate of 7.3 per
cent. In a study under the Jaundice Committee, of over 1,000
injured, transfused patients kept under observation for three
months or more, 124 developed hepatitis, which proved fatal in
17 cases, a rate of 9.4 per cent.58
Until late 1944, policy on plasma production had been to pool
at least 100 litres of plasma from about 500 donors, giving
250 bottles of the final product; but from March 1945, in the
light of the findings outlined, the pool size was reduced to
10 bottles per batch. 59 Accumulated evidence was pointing
towards large pools as the culprit in major incidents of serum
hepatitis transmission, and the lesson was learned and applied
before handing the transfusion service over to the NHS.'°
Postwar developments in the blood transfusion service will be
outlined in the next chapter, while issues of hepatitis B in
the blood supply will be explored in Chapter 5. However, it
Is appropriate to discuss here a contentious series of postwar
hepatitis experiments carried out on children in a mental
deficiency institution in the US, in order to make comparisons
MRC 2181/lOg/2 Jaundice following transfusion MRC sub-
committee on transfusion hepatitis, second meeting, 28 July
[1945], addendum 3: J. C. 24, Table of results of search of
Ministry of Health's statistical branch at Norcross of
Emergency Medical Service hospital records of 1940-45
inpatients.
Presumably this means 10 donations.
60 MRC 2181/lOg/2 Jaundice followin g transfusion NRC sub-
committee on transfusion hepatitis, letter from L. J. Witts to
A. Janeway, Harvard Medical School, 25 April 1946, quoting
JC24, table of results of search of MoH statistical branch.
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with MacCallum's UK wartime experiments.
Postwar experiments on hepatitis: Kru gman's Willowbrook
studies
The hepatitis experiments carried out by Saul Krugman between
1956 and 1971 subsequently received both high commendation and
(to a much greater extent) deep opprobrium; but at the time
they started, they appear to have been fairly uncontroversial.
Krugman was a New York paediatrician, with a post from 1946 in
the Department of Pediatrics at New York University, where he
worked with colleagues on infectious diseases of children,
particularly measles and rubella. His interest expanded to
hepatitis and in 1956, together with Joan Giles and Jack
Hammond, he began a series of studies in Willowbrook, a
residential school on Staten Island in New York, housing about
five thousand mentally defective children between the ages of
three and ten years old. Within this institution - as in many
such institutions for the mentally deficient - viral hepatitis
appeared to be common, and Krugman's team sought to elucidate
the type of hepatitis involved, and the means of transmission,
by adininstering infective material to newly-admitted children.
A special hepatitis unit was established in the school and
children whose parents agreed to submit them to the trials
were given faecal material or serum from hepatitis sufferers,
in drinks or by injection."
" Parental permission was crucial, but was given on a general
understanding of the nature of the experiments rather than
detailed protocol; as with MacCallum's experiments, the exact
nature of the material used for transmission trials was not
spelled out to subjects.
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Fifteen years of experiments on several hundred children at
Willowbrook resulted in many papers, published in leading
American medical journals, and wide acclaim for Krugman's
achievements.' 2 However, the Willowbrook trials came under
increasingly hostile scrutiny. In 1966, Henry K. Beecher,
anaesthesia professor at Harvard, included Willowbrook among
twenty-two studies whose ethics he questioned, in an article
on the ethics of clinical research.' 3 Criticism of the
experiments from an ethical standpoint continued over many
years, and will be discussed in more detail shortly. It is
important to note that many of Krugman's colleagues in the
hepatitis world stood by him, organising the second
international symposium on viral hepatitis in 1981 as a
tribute to Krugman,' 4 defending his experimental protocols and
'assurance of truly informed consent'.' 5 The foreward to this
volume ends with a quote from what must be the most execrable
praise-poem ever penned:
To this man, this friend, this Krugman, Saul
62 For results of Willowbrook studies, see (inter alia): S.
Krugman, J. P. Giles and J. Hammond, 'Infectious hepatitis.
Evidence for two distinctive clinical, epidemiological and
immunological types of infection', Journal of the American
Medical Association, 200 (1967), 365-73; for view that these
studies 'represent an important contribution to our
knowledge', see: 'Is serum hepatitis only a special type of
infectious hepatitis?', Journal of the American Medical
Association, 200 (1967), 407.
' H. K. Beecher, 'Ethics and clinical research', New England
Journal of Medicine, 274 (1966), 1354-60; see also: H. K.
Beecher, Experimentation in man (Springfield, Illinois:
Charles C. Thomas, 1958)
" W. Szmuness, H. J. Alter and J. E. Maynard (eds), Viral
Hepatitis: an International Symposium (Philadelphia: Franklin
Institute Press, 1982)
" R. W. McCollum, 'Tribute to Saul Krugman, M.D.', in Szmuness
et al, Viral hepatitis, p.xxii.
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I convey the respect, and the pride,
and the thanks of us all.
When others might wither, this tree stands tall.
In the autumn of his life, his leaves will not fall.
This is the man whose life we're honoured to recall
This is the man we love, this Krugman, Saul."
What ever else Is lacking, the verse conveys an emotional
solidarity between clinical researchers, suggesting that they
all felt vulnerable to the attacks which had apparently made
Krugman's life a misery for many years.
What had Krugman achieved with the Willowbrook experiments?
Foremost was the distinction between two types of hepatitis
which he labelled MSI and MSII, corresponding to A and B; the
first having a faecal-oral route of transmission and a shorter
incubation period and the second a mainly parenteral route of
transmission and a longer incubation period. There was some
suggestion that MSII was transmissable by mouth, but to a
lesser degree. McKee, in an historical review in 1988, noting
the previously accumulating evidence for two distinct types of
viral hepatitis, states that: 'The existence of separate
hepatitis A and B viruses was finally confirmed by Krugman' in
the Willowbrook experiments.' 7 McKee cites MacCallum's 1947
paper, but not the 1951 MRC report which covers the British
wartime hepatitis studies in full detail.
Krugman himself, in a 1978 overview paper, cites another
66 Excerpt from 'Who is this man named Krugman, Saul?' by H. J.
Alter (one of the editors), in Szmuness et al, Viral
Hepatitis, 'Foreword' by the editors, p.xix.
67 c M. McKee, 'Hepatitis B in Northern Ireland - who should
be immunised?', submission towards part 2 of MFCM exam, 1988,
Chapter 3: Historical overview, p. 10.
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MacCallum paper, together with five other human transmission
studies from the 1940s, as precedents for his own work; he
omits the 1951 MRC report.' 8 His own interest, according to
this account, was sparked by a symposium on laboratory work on
hepatitis, sponsored by the National Academy of Sciences
National Research Council and the Armed Forces Epidemiological
Board, at New York University and Bellevue Hospital in 1954.
The comprehensive failure to propagate hepatitis in laboratory
animals pointed to the necessity for further human
experiments. Krugman does not here mention that his
subsequent research was partly funded by the United States
Armed Forces; according to the historian William Muraskin, the
Army was 'the major sponsor' of Krugman's Willowbrook work.'9
In his 1978 account, among his summarised results, Krugman
lists the observation:
that HB could be spread from person to person following
the type of prolonged, intimate contact that involved
sharing of excretions. Thus, it was clear that a
parenteral [e.g. inoculation] type of exposure was not
the only mode of transmission of HB infection.'10
Although the group had published on the possibility of oral
transmission of MSII, the singling out of 'intimate contact'
here seems a post hoc recognition of an important facet whose
significance really only became clear to clinicians during the
1970s, and was not originally picked up by Krugman: that is,
68 Krugman, 'Perspectives on viral hepatitis'.
" Muraskin, 'Silent epidemic', p. 282; see: S. Krugman and J.
P. Cues, 'Viral hepatitis. New light on an old disease',
Journal of the American Medical Association, 212 (1970), 1019-
29, for acknowledgement of contract from the US Army Medical
Research and Development Command among others.
70 Krugman, 'Perspectives on viral hepatitis', p. 6.
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sexual transmission.
The other outcome of the Wlllowbrook experiments - apart from
the confirmation of two types of hepatitis - which is often
quoted as a valuable breakthrough, was the preparation of a
crude vaccine by boiling serum containing the hepatitis B
virus. MacCallum had also attempted to inactivate the virus;
he had not found a satisfactory means, though irradiation held
some promise. 1' What MacCallum had not done was to administer
infective serum to the same volunteers who received treated
serum; in other words his interest was in rendering the serum
used in blood transfusion safe, rather than finding a vaccine.
In this sense, Krugman was definitely taking a step further
than his predecessors. However, the later development of an
active vaccine depended heavily on the recognition of the
antigen by Bluntherg; 72
 Krugman's vaccine was too experimental
to be tried outside Willowbrook, where it was only used on a
small group of children.
There is another catch in the vaccine story at Willowbrook.
Early in his investigations there, Krugman had managed to
reduce hepatitis by some 80 per cent, by administering gamma
globulin, an established 'passive vaccination' prophylaxis for
hepatitis.' 3
 Krugman's work on the active vaccine is usually
emphasized at the expense of the immunoglobulin findings. Yet
71 MacCallum, Infective hepatitis, p. 128.
72 See Chapter 3, below.
L. Goldman, 'The Willowbrook debate', World Medicine, 7
(1971), 22.
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from the viewpoint of inmates and staff, his use of gamma
globulin was more effective. Whilst his transmission
experiments were continually justified on the grounds that
most children admitted to Willowbrook were bound to catch
hepatitis, Krugman's own work with passive vaccination showed
this need not be the case.
A final aspect of the Willowbrook work should be considered as
a partial explanation for the support for Krugman among his
colleagues:
Many thousands of serum specimens collected over a period
of about 20 years have been stored in a "serum bank".
These valuable sera were obtained before, during and for
many months and years after onset of HA and HB [hepatitis
A and B]. These pedigreed materials have been shared
with many investigators who have been actively engaged in
hepatitis research.14
The passage of clinical material between research laboratories
can be interpreted - in a version of anthropological theories
of gift exchange - as a means of incurring obligation, on the
one hand, and securing a share of privileged access to
knowledge, on the other. Almost certainly, such gifts help to
cement bonds of loyalty whether between patron and client, or
between equals. 75 Krugman at Willowbrook was mining a rich
seam of hepatitis-infected blood from the mentally retarded
children there; 7' parcelling out the serum for years to come
probably helped him to survive in an increasingly hostile
envi rorunent.
Krugman, 'Perspectives on viral hepatitis', p. 7.
" See: Stanton, 'Blood brotherhood'.
' Krugman and Giles, 'Viral hepatitis. New light', published
in 1970, mentions 2,500 serum specimens from 700 'patients'
[children].
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Ethical issues in MacCallum's and Kru gman's hepatitis
investigations
Bynuxn, writing on the history of human experimentation,77
draws a contrast between two books by medical men, books with
similar titles but separated by over twenty years, with very
different standpoints: Mellanby's Human guinea pi gs of 1945,78
and Pappworth's Human guinea pigs: experimentation on man of
l967.	 Mellanby discussed without qualms his wartime
researches into scabies, using conscientious objectors as
subjects, taking the view that medical research was seen by
the participants as a valid alternative to military service.
Pappworth on the other hand presented a highly critical review
of a whole range of clinical research on human beings; his
book brought him hostility from fellow professionals but is a
standard reference in subsequent medical ethics. The gap
between these two, and the shadow of the postwar Nuremberg
Trials, illuminates a pattern which we may trace as emerging
again in the contrast between the British wartime hepatitis
experiments and the American hepatitis experiments of 1956-71.
There is a problem in making this comparison. The debates are
W. Bynum, 'Reflections on the history of human
experimentation', in S. F. Spicker, I. Alon et al (eds), 	 g
use of human beings in research with special reference to
clinical trials (Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kiuwer Academic
Publishers, 1988), pp.29-46, esp. pp.29-30.
78 K. Mellanby, Human guinea pi gs (London: Victor Gollancz,
1945)
' M. H. Pappworth, Human guinea pi gs: experimentation on man
(Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1968). This follows Beecher's
1958 book and 1966 article cited above, n. 63.
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about Willowbrook, and MacCallum's work does not appear in the
ethical literature. This presumably reflects the changing
social context of medical research, which produced these
ethical debates of the postwar period. It may not be
historically valid to compare the ethical implications of the
two sets of investigations, given that 'medical ethics' is not
a timeless concept but one that has grown and changed. In any
case, making such a comparison is difficult, since one set of
investigations has been copiously covered in the literature,
and the other not at all. Here, a brief discussion of the
Willowbrook debate will be followed by an equally brief, very
tentative, comment on MacCallum's experiments.
Following Beecher's 1966 article, the Journal of the American
Medical Association continued to voice support for Krugman,
alongside further Willowbrook papers - despite giving a
favourable review of Beecher's work on medical ethics. 8° The
debate over Willowbrook spilled over into the British journals
which, like the American medical press, tended to be impressed
by Krugman's work. In 1971, Stephen Goldby, a doctor at the
Radcliffe Infirmary in Oxford, wrote to The Lancet asking if
it could be right to perform an experiment on a child when no
benefit could result to that individual; In his view, the
answer must be 'no'.' Although The Lancet printed replies
from Krugman himself and other doctors Including Pasamanick of
° Krugman, Giles and Hammond, 'Infectious hepatitis', and
Editorial, 'Is serum hepatitis a special type?' (1967).
81 s Goldby, 'Experiments at the Willowbrook State School'
(Corr.), Lancet, 1971 (1), 749; for comment on Krugman's
studies of the sort Goldby objected to, see: 'Australia
antigen and hepatitis' (Editorial), Lancet, 1971 (i), 487-8.
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the New York Department of Mental Hygiene - involved in the
Willowbrook project - its subsequent editorial policy was
critical of the experiments.82
The justification for the Willowbrook experiments had been
countered at several levels. The argument that children
entering the institution were likely to be infected with
hepatitis, and therefore would be no worse off with a
controlled dose of infection, was challenged by Krugman's own
success with imxnunoglobulin. 83 Parental consent could not,
according to many commentators, justify experiments on
children in any case, but especially when children were unable
to comprehend anything of the proceedings. The successful
outcome of the experiments was not a vindication either, since
ethical validity must be present from the outset, and must be
assessed independently of the scientific outcome. Above all,
patients should not be used for experiments that might cause
them harm, even if others might benefit.
Since the last argument is the strongest, most comprehensive
one, demolishing any justification on grounds of outcome, it
may seem superfluous to add that the Willowbrook experiments
were anyway largely duplicating the MacCallum experiments.
Nevertheless, the point is worth making, since it has escaped
attention elsewhere. When MacCallum was asked why he thought
Krugman underplayed the British work, he replied that
82 Ushered in by an editorial comment immediately following
Goldby's letter; see subsequent correspondence in same issue.
83 Goldman, 'Willowbrook debate', 21-2.
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communications were poor during and after the war; although
the articles in the medical journals were available, they told
only part of the story, and it was very possible that Krugman
had not actually read the full MRC report on hepatitis. 84 If
that were so, it cannot be called unethical, but it was more
than unfortunate. On the other hand, MacCallum's conclusions
may really have seemed to leave much unexplained; perhaps only
in retrospect does the important distinction between two types
of hepatitis seem so clear.
Should the work of MacCallum and colleagues be seen as
essentially different in ethical terms from that of Krugman?
The absence of published comment has been remarked; scraps of
opinion gathered from other researchers are contradictory and
seem to depend on the informant's personal relations with
MacCallum. Some say that such use of 'volunteers' was quite
unethical, since no-one knew what would happen when they were
inoculated with hepatitis. This echoes a 1951 comment by R.
A. McCance, profesor of experimental medicine at Cambridge:
The risk in any experiment depends very much on whether
the investigator knows that he will always retain control
of the situation. To inoculate somebody with icterogenic
[jaundice-inducing] serum is a risk that I personally
would never take, nor would I ever have cared to take it
even before the risks were so well known, for once the
inoculation had taken place I would have lost control.85
MacCallum believed that the low mortality in recipients of the
hepatitis-contaminated yellow fever vaccine pointed to the
probable containability of the infection; others would say he
F. 0. MacCalluin, personal communication, 19 May 1992.
85 R. A. McCance, 'The practice of experimental medicine',
Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine, 44 (1951), 189.
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was simply very lucky not to have had fatalities among his
experimental subjects.
Supporters of MacCalluxn would also point out that he first
experimented on animals, exhaustively; that the volunteers for
his human experiments were adults, and in the case of
arthritics might benefit from the infection; and that the
human experiments ceased the moment peace was declared. These
were strictly wartime experiments, in which the primary
justification for carrying out the work on human volunteers
was the need of the military to understand and contain the
problem of hepatitis. However, in the case of other nations,
military requirements are not held to justify experiments that
would otherwise be unacceptable. And if hepatitis infection
was thought to aid arthritics, why not continue after the war?
Perhaps the greatest difference between these and the
Willowbrook experiments, in terms of ethical issues, lies in
the age and mental condition of the 'volunteers'. However,
the adult, mentally sound arthritis patients were not fully
informed of the nature of the experiments - especially the
source of the infective material - and the archival evidence
cited here shows that the Ministry of Health and the chair of
the MRC Jaundice Committee were acutely aware of the
objections that might be raised. Their great uneasiness over
this series of experiments probably explains why they ceased
when the war ended and may well explain why publication of the
full report was delayed. Did the chief difference in context
between the wartime and postwar studies lie in the degree of
secrecy, with increasing openness of debate in the postwar
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period eventually capsizing Krugman's work?
Conclusions
This chapter outlined changing ideas about viral hepatitis
through the first half of the twentieth century and suggested
that developments in the concept of 'the virus' itself were
important for further research. By mid-century, the notional
'infectious' and 'serum' types of viral hepatitis had been
identified as following different routes of infectu.on, the
former through the mouth (faecal-oral), the latter via other
routes (parenteral), and having different incubation periods
(20-40 compared with 60-90 days). MacCallum, who aed the
British wartime research team which established these
distinctions, coined the terms 'hepatitis A' and 'hepatitis B'
for these two types. Awareness was also beginning to grow
during the war of hepatitis in clinical settings, such as the
blood transfusion service, which were to become important foci
for concern over hepatitis B in the postwar period..
Means of transmission of hepatitis B other than via infected
needles or infectious blood or serum were not known, but could
be postulated. MacCallum regarded it as inherently unlikely
that a virus could survive if it depended entirely on the
technology of the needle; unless it was something new and
rare, there must be other means of transmission. The notion
that some people became passive carriers of the disease rather
than exhibiting overt symptoms was also induced from these
studies, but the extent of Infection in the British or any
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other population was a matter of conjecture.
A further, prolonged, series of hepatitis studies conducted at
Willowbrook, a special school in New York, between 1956 and
1971 by Krugman and colleagues, produced similar results to
those of the British wartime studies. Ethical issues raised
by experiments using mentally retarded children at Willowbrook
have been widely discussed elsewhere and were briefly reviewed
In this chapter. 86 A range of justifications offered at the
time and afterwards, including production of an experimental
vaccine, were not seen as valid. A question was raised here,
as to apparent failure to learn from earlier British studies.
The ethical debates, which have changed over time, leave
another question: who wanted the research done, and why? Both
the British and the American hepatitis studies were backed by
their respective armed forces. Hepatitis was regarded as a
hazard in the forces, especially in wartime, when crowding of
troops in unhygienic conditions could result in outbreaks of
hepatitis A, and mass inoculations could result in outbreaks
of B. The other major area where hepatitis B was recognized
as a problem was in the blood transfusion service. The point
was raised in the Introduction, that policy needs may set the
agenda for research, or allow previously unrecognized research
to be seen as valid. During and after the war, the need to
understand hepatitis B was growing, as the next chapter will
indicate.
86 See also: S. E. Lederer, 'Orphans as guinea pigs: American
children and medical experimenters, 1890-1930', in Cooter,
Name of the child, pp. 96-123.
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CHAPTER 3: POSTWAR DEVELOPMENTS AND THE AUSTRALIA ANTIGEN
DISCOVERY [1948-1971]
The previous chapter showed how wartime conditions produced
outbreaks of jaundice, prompting research which distinguished
two main routes of infection. Epidemics of hepatitis A could
be more readily contained once it was known that the putative
virus was transmitted by faecal matter contaminating food or
water. This variant will henceforward play little part in the
present account, although it should be borne in mind that it
remained difficult to distinguish clinically between types of
hepatitis in cases of acute jaundice.
The transition from wartime to postwar conditions forms an
important background to later research and policy on hepatitis
B, in general and particular ways: the first part of this
chapter will discuss in brief a number of changes in postwar
medicine. While clinical research was developing and changing
in many parts of the world, the new structures of the National
Health Service in Britain 1 opened up greater possibilities for
such research than had been available in this country before
the war. Ways of handling hospital infection were affected by
the new pattern of hospital organization. Special services,
first established as wartime emergency services - blood
transfusion and public health laboratories - expanded and
consolidated their functions. Many new technologies were
introduced or expanded, including mass inoculation and renal
' These organizational structures varied between component
countries of the UK, as pointed out in Harrison, Hunter and
Pollitt, Dynamics of British health policy, pp. 2-3.
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dialysis. All of these are relevant either to the spread of
hepatitis B, or to its control: in some cases, to both spread
and control. Other areas where hepatitis B spread, however,
remained relatively 'invisible' during this period, although
some doctors saw it as a disease of needle-using drug takers.
At the same time, various branches of research allied to
virology were developing, though with little overt reference
to hepatitis A or B. Hepatitis had proved difficult to
transfer to animals and now proved equally difficult to grow
in tissue cultures, an apparently essential tool of postwar
virology. From biochemistry, via genetics and the study of
blood proteins, came an inadvertent discovery that had direct
bearing on hepatitis B. This was a previously unidentified
antigen, which turned out to be an antigen of the hepatitis B
virus: it took several years and the work of a number of co-
workers before the connection was established, so unlikely did
it initially appear. This antigen was referred to as the
'Australia antigen' (for reasons that will be explained),
reflecting uncertainty over its identity. The middle sections
of the chapter will outline the path by which the American
researcher Baruch Blumberg made the initial finding; and
responses in the UK, at the point when the significance of
Australia antigen was open to debate. Then In the last
sections, contributions made by two British researchers will
be discussed in terms of the type of work involved, and
networks of reciprocal interest, which are the focus of
further discussion in Chapter 6. These steps in research on
hepatitis B are linked with the structural changes discussed
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earlier, especially developments in clinical research.
Postwar medicine
The new National Health Service established in 1948 was very
hospital-centred, entrenching the power of hospital doctors
and creating new openings for them. Among other effects,
research - clinical research - was facilitated, as more
hospitals were upgraded to teaching hospital status and bigger
budgets were provided to enable departments of medicine,
surgery and obstetrics and gynaecology to be run in a similar
way to science departments. 2 The concept of medical
departments with integrated teaching, research and practice
components, after the American and German model, had been
around since the early twentieth century. There had been
attempts to implement it primarily with Rockefeller money, but
a major problem had always been the discrepancy between the
salaries and status of university professors and the much
higher rewards available on the open market, in private
practice allied with an honorary appointment as a consultant
at a leading teaching hospital.
The advent of the NHS made it easier for doctors to devote
less time to private practice and more time to research. They
were provided with space and funds for research in hospitals
which had relatively little money for capital building until
2 For important interwar initiatives including the work of T.
R. Elliott and Thomas Lewis at University College London, and
the expansion of clinical research in the immediate postwar
period, see: Booth, 'Clinical research'.
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the l960s, and which invested instead in personnel. There was
a move away from the municipal hospital pattern, with its
medical superintendent; as in the old voluntary hospitals,
most patients were brought under the control of consultants.
As hospitals were upgraded, clinics and laboratories were
added, to bring the often poorly-equipped ex-municipal
hospitals up to regional standard. In addition to the greatly
expanded opportunities provided by hospital restructuring, as
Booth has pointed out, the NRC had more money available than
ever before and was setting up more research units; and the
university sector was expanding rapidly. Together these
developments provided an unprecedented base for the
'exploitation of the new biological sciences in the study of
human disease'.3
Although this chapter will focus on research, it is important
to consider aspects of the postwar organization of medicine
that will be relevant to other aspects of this history; in any
case, they often have some research functions as well. The
Public Health Laboratory Service was a continuation of the
wartime emergency service, set up to counter germ warfare; Its
initial emphasis was therefore on bacteriology. Its expanding
national network of laboratories was under NRC direction until
1960, when the Ministry of Health took over; Its organisatlon
was parallel to, but somewhat separate from, that of hospital
laboratories, with an emphasis on preventive, epidemiological
work. 4 During the period of MRC supervision:
Ibid, p. 233.
Webster, Health services since the war, p. 317.
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the whole administration was on a purely personal basis,
laboratory directors were able to approach the
headquarters office directly and often solve problems or
obtain urgent supplies with a speed that was the envy of
those working in National Health Service laboratories who
had to work through committees and often experienced long
delays .
It appears that even after the Ministry of Health took over,
the PHLS retained Its separate identity, although in some
regions It merged into the hospital service more than in
others. At both regional and central levels, it developed
research functions to complement its reference and, later,
surveillance work.' It was, above all, ideally placed to
gather epidemiological evidence on a wide range of infectious
diseases.
As mentioned above, under hospital reorganization of 1948, the
role of medical superintendant was abolished with the result
that no single person had similar responsibility for dealing
with outbreaks of infectious diseases within hospitals. The
function could be taken on by the consultant in charge of the
nearest PHLS laboratory; or the chief bacteriologist in the
hospital might be called upon to deal with the problem. But
until the appointment of Control of Infection Officers in many
hospitals, there was no formal system of co-ordinated response
in case of outbreaks. It could be argued that a more relaxed
attitude to hospital infections was developing because
antibiotics increasingly seemed to promise a cure for every
R. E. 0. Williams, Microbiolo qy for the public health: the
evolution of the Public Health Laborator y Service 1939-1980
(London: Public Health Laboratory Service, 1985), p. 36.
' Ibid, p. 161: the Communicable Diseases Surveillance Centre
(CDSC) at the central PHLS was set up on the recommendation of
the Cox Report after the 1973 smallpox Incident at LSHTM.
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Ill. The pre-war spectre of an outbreak of streptococcal
infection, affecting patients and staff indiscriminately, had
been laid to rest with the mass production of penicillin.
This may partly explain the very strong responses to outbreaks
of hepatitis B in renal units in the 1960s, when modern
medicine had nothing to offer to help the afflicted.
Renal dialysis could be seen as another child of the war.
Experimental work had been done in the interwar period, but
the first successful haemodialysis (that is, leading to
recovery of the patient) took place in Holland in l942.
Subsequently the technique was refined and further developed
in Scandinavia, Britain and the US, and by the 1950s units had
been established to provide dialysis for acute renal failure.
Many individuals undergoing this treatment received copious
blood transfusions, in addition to having their own blood
removed and circulated around the dialysis machine. There was
thus a chance that they would receive a blood-borne infection
and that it might be passed on to those tending them.
However, the risk was not very apparent, until the advent in
1960 of a further innovation, the arterio-venous shunt, which
allowed a patient to be repeatedly connected to, and
disconnected from, the dialysis machine: it allowed dialysis
to be used longterm, to sustain Individuals whose renal
failure was irreversible. Some would say it created a new
This was the work of Kolff in Kampen; but see: H. Klinkman,
'Historical overview of renal failure therapy - a homage to
Nils Aiwall', Contributions to nephroloqy, 78 (1990), 1-23,
esp. 8 for suggestion that the 17th patient treated by Koiff
with a rotating drum dialyser, and the first to survive, would
probably have recovered without dialysis.
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condition of 'chronic renal failure' or 'end-stage renal
disease', applied to patients who previously would have been
seen as moribund. 8 The serious outbreaks of hepatitis that
occurred in renal dialysis units from the mid-1960s, following
this extension of the technique to chronic kidney failure
patients, will be described in the next chapter.
Another area where hepatitis was long recognized as a hazard,
already mentioned in the previous chapter, was in blood
transfusion. Like the PHLS, the blood transfusion service was
a special service allied to, but not an integral part of, the
hospital service. 9 Blood transfusion, which had been a little
used, experimental technology in the earlier twentieth
century, became a massive life-saving innovation during the
Second World War, when an emergency blood transfusion service
was organized for military and civilian casualties. The
wartime emergency service laid the foundations for a co-
ordinated, nationwide, blood transfusion service, tied in with
the regionally-organized hospital service.' 0 Regional Blood
Transfusion Centres (BTCs) collected blood and distributed it
mainly within their region, although both whole blood and
plasma could be redistributed to some extent. Freeze-dried
plasma had been widely employed during the war as an
alternative transfusion material: its lower bulk and longer
shelf life gave logistic advantages over whole blood or
• Thanks to Professor C. Normand of LSHTM for this insight into
'end-stage renal disease' as a technology-dependent diagnosis.
' Webster, Health services since the war, pp. 319-21.
'° In England and Wales. The Scottish service was more
centralized.
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plasma, but it invariably originated from pooled donations,
carrying a greater risk of infection - as we have seen, it had
resulted in hepatitis outbreaks when used in yellow fever
vaccine. In the postwar period, the central Blood Products
Laboratory (BPL) at Elstree, outside London, received blood
and plasma from BTCS, which it used to develop such blood
products as general and specific immunoglobulins used in
boosting the immune system and combatting certain infectious
diseases. 1' Other fractions were developed for treatment of
inherited clotting disorders, notably Factor VIII for the more
common form of haemophilia. 12 The hepatitis hazard escalated
enormously, as larger pools were needed for manufacture of
concentrated blood products.
America to some extent set the pattern for the expansion of
clinical research discussed above; an international culture of
science was developing in this period. Having set the scene
for an exploration of research on hepatitis B, with a focus on
the UK, this chapter first follows the career of an American
researcher: Baruch Blumberg, whose discovery of the antigen of
hepatitis B in the 1960s, together with progress towards
making a vaccine, earned him a Nobel Prize in 1976. Blumberg
himself has often pointed out that he was not working on
hepatitis when he happened upon the antigen. He is as a prime
example of the postwar breed of medical researchers, with
training in medicine and biochemistry, supplemented with
11 Immunoglobulins are fractions of plasma, containing
antibodies.
12 Factor VIII was used for treatment of Haemophilia A.and
Factor IX for the rarer Haemophilia B.
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genetics, virology and later - less usual for a medical
scientist - anthropology. It may have been this sort of
combination, supported by generous institutional funding and a
network of clinical researchers, that made possible the steps
leading to the 'discovery' and its elucidation. UK responses,
and the role of two British researchers in illuminating the
nature of Blumberg's findings will be discussed in the latter
sections of this chapter.
The story of the discovery of Australia antigen has been told
many times, and its implications for the understanding of
hepatitis B are well known to scientists in this field.13
Why, then, recount this episode here? The intention is not to
repeat the well-worn trail but to offer fresh interpretations.
While the scientific papers read as though the puzzle of
hepatitis B was being purposefully unravelled, by Blumberg and
successive investigators (for our purposes, notably Dane and
Almeida), the oral record reveals that none of these people
set out study hepatitis B. A leading figure in this country
who tackled hepatitis B more directly - Zuckerman - was less
successful in making a major breakthrough (see Ch.6 below).
Looking further into the ways in which researchers are drawn
into work in a particular field can offer insights into the
interrelations between individual scientists and clinicians,
research teams, and institutions.
Individual stories also help to pinpoint the role of ideas or
13 The antigen discovery was widely regarded as such an
important turning point that, initially, It had been Intended
to take it as the starting date for this study.
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technologies in enabling research to move in certain
directions; blockages in other directions may be equally
important. The clinical problems of hepatitis B often appear
distant in these narratives, yet they are constantly present
in the form of 'clinical material' - that is, patients, or
samples of blood or serum - which play a crucial role in these
developments, just as they did in the earlier hepatitis
studies discussed in the previous chapter. It could be
hypothesized that the outbreaks of hepatitis in renal units in
the late l960s, as well as providing an impetus for research
and policy developments, actually assisted the recognition of
the virus, by providing more active samples than were normally
available. Further, it will be argued that transatlantic
advances may have received a disproportionate amount of
recognition, since the discovery of the virus itself and of
the core particle both took place in the UK.
Blumberg and the discovery of Australia antigen
Blumberg was medically qualified (New York), when he came to
Oxford in 1957 to do postgraduate work in the biochemistry
department, on the properties of viscous compounds like
synovial fluid and aqueous humour, under Sandy Oxton, the
Reader in Physical Biochemistry. While carrying out his
research, he became enthused - If not sidetracked - by
discussions with Anthony Allison, a white Kenyan studying in
the Zoology Department which had a strong population biology
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strand.' 4 E. B. Ford, a leading lepidopterist in the
department, had developed a definition of 'polymorphisms'
based on studies of variations in wing patterns of moths and
butterflies. Blumberg and Allison speculated about applying
the notion of polymorphism to human populations. From his
student days, when he had spent an elective period in Surinain,
Blumberg had been fascinated by variations in people's
responses to a given disease, such as filarlasis, depending on
the population they originated from.' 5
 He and Allison
discussed ways of looking at variations - polymorphisms - in
serum proteins of various populations, which might help to
explain variations in response to disease.
Around this time, they became aware of a new method of
separating serum proteins: electrophoresis, developed by
Oliver Smithies. This analytical technique, using starch gel
gradients, has been described by Blumberg as the 'minor
equivalent of a new microscope'.' 6
 Armed with this effective
but simple new technology, Blumberg began a series of summer
trips to areas of the world with clearly defined indigenous
populations, combining the collection of blood samples with a
public health function wherever possible. He has fantastic
stories to tell of adventures among the Fulani of the Jos
" Interview with B. S. Blumberg (Master of Balliol), 25 March
1992.
15 Interview, Blumberg, 12 March 1991.
16 B. S. Bluntherg, 'The hepatitis B vaccine', talk given to
Wellcome Trust Twentieth Century History of Medicine Group,
Weilcome Institute for the History of Medicine, London, 9 Feb
1993.
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plateau in northern Nigeria, or the Eskimos (Inuit) of
Alaska. 17 When he returned to the States, to the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) at Bethesda, he continued this
pattern of summer trips collecting 'bloods', but augmented the
range by asking others to send him samples too. Among these
were sera from Australian aborigines sent by Dr Robert Kirk of
the University of Western Australia, who 'had collected them
as part of an extensive investigation of genetic traits in
this interesting population'.
Blumberg looked at reactions of multi-transfused patients in
the US to antigens in samples from around the world. Multi-
transfused patients could be seen as a potential catalogue of
polymorphic variations: their blood might contain antibodies
to a variety of antigens that occurred normally in only a
small proportion of the local (US) population. Blumberg was
joined at his NIH lab in 1960 by Tony Allison, who had also
travelled in Africa collecting blood samples; at about the
same time, a haematologist and technician joined the team. In
1963, they observed a reaction between the serum of a multi-
transfused, haemophiliac patient from New York City, with
serum from an Australian aborigine. They had no idea what
this signified - Blumberg goes so far as to say that their
investigations could not have been planned so as to find the
cause of hepatitis, and that if they had been looking for it,
17 Blumberg, interview, 25 March 1992.
B. S. Blumberg, 'A short history of Australia antigen', in
W. Gerok and K. Sickinger (eds), Dru gs and the Liver, 3rd
international symposium, Freiburg, Oct 1973, (Stuttgart, New
York: F. K. Schattauer Verlag, 1975), p. 9.
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they would never have found it.'9
Transferring in 1964 to the Fox Chase Institute for Cancer
Research in Philadelphia, Blumberg continued to build his
collection of samples of serum and plasma, but additionally
had access to sample banks accumulated in the NIH and
Institute for Cancer Research by other researchers. The new
antigen, termed 'Australia antigen' after its aboriginal
Australian source, was tested against a wide selection and
found to be very rare in the normal US population, but more
common in samples from Asia. Sam Visnich, the technician,
when asked to select out multi-transfused sera, found the
antigen was prevalent in leukemia patients. 2° The team then
tested groups with a known higher than usual susceptibility to
leukemia. One such group was Down's syndrome patients, and
they were found to have a high frequency of Australia
antigen - a 'gratifying' result because it fulfilled the
prediction of an association with leukemia, and also allowed
detailed study of subjects 'closer to home than the Australian
aborigines' and other high frequency populations.2'
After many findings which seemed to indicate that a person's
Australia antigen status was fixed - being either positive or
negative - there was great agitation when one of the Down's
19 Ibid, p.9. There was a previous finding which informed
their next moves, involving a polymorphic low density
lipoprotein system, but this seems important in retrospect
mainly as demonstrating clearly to the team that they were
onto something different.
20 Ibid, p. 10.
21 Blumberg, 'Australia antigen story', p. 8.
98
syndrome patients who had been negative on a previous test was
found to be positive on a second test. The patient whose
antigen status had converted was admitted to the Clinical
Research Unit at Jeanes Hospital, attached to the Institute,
and subjected to a wide range of tests. One of these was a
liver function test, which revealed a form of anicteric (non-
jaundiced) hepatitis, generating huge excitement among the
investigators. 22 It now appeared that the Australia antigen
was linked with hepatitis, an unexpected but clearly momentous
finding, given the previous difficulty of investigating
hepatitis.
Subsequent tests for links between the Australia antigen and
hepatitis confirmed this finding. Sera from patients with a
known history of chronic hepatitis, or from populations with a
high incidence of hepatitis, were examined. Many of these
studies were carried out in Africa and Asia, using reagents
supplied by the NIH. They confirmed that in populations with
a high rate of hepatitis, there was a greater prevalence of
Australia antigen. Back in the US, the particles that
constituted the Australia antigen were visualised using
electron microscopy (EN); they were minute and lacked nuclear
material, DNA, raising the question whether they represented a
new form of virus, or an incomplete part of the virus.
By 1969, there seemed enough certainty that the Australia
22 A. I. Sutnick, W. T. London, et al, 'Anicteric hepatitis
associated with Australia antigen: occurrence in patients with
Down's syndrome', Journal of the American Medical Association,
205 (1968), 670-4.
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antigen particles were Identical with hepatitis B antigen for
Blumberg and colleagues to propose using them, in a purified
form, as a vaccine against hepatitis B. When this proposal
was patented in 1971, its originators did not In fact know
whether they had found the virus of hepatitis B, and could
only postulate that a whole virus would have greater mass than
the antigen particles and would thus be precipitated by
centrifugation, leaving purified antigen, without infectious
virus, to be used in the vaccine. 23 If the antigen had in
fact proved to be the virus, as one hypothesis had proposed,
there could have been trouble: but by this time, additional
evidence was accumulating about the nature of the virus. The
remainder of this chapter focuses on British responses and
research immediately following the Australia antigen findings.
Australia anti gen and hepatitis: UK views, 1969-71
When the observations of Blumberg and his colleagues were
supplemented by others in the US and elsewhere, strongly
supporting a theory that Australia antigen was associated with
hepatitis, British investigators began to contribute to the
debates. It is argued here that the role played by British
researchers, especially in making components of the virus
visible through electron microscopy, was crucial in solving
important aspects of the Australia antigen/hepatitis puzzle.
This puzzle had many elements, but perhaps the three that were
most urgent at this stage can be summarized as follows: (1)
23 Bluntherg, 'Australia antigen story', p. 10; Blumberg,
'Hepatitis B vaccine' talk.
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The identity of the antigen - was it definitely the hepatitis
antigen - and if so, which form of hepatitis?
(ii) Was the Australia antigen itself the virus causing
hepatitis B, or was it a non-viral particle? (iii) What was
the explanation for the different immunological responses
which led to some patients having an acute form of the
disease, others having a chronic form, and yet others
apparently having no reaction but becoming carriers?
By mid-1969, enough evidence was accumulating for the editors
of The Lancet to feel it was worth publishing summaries of the
current position - once in July and again in September. The
July editorial mentioned, among other questions not yet
resolved: 'Is the antigen in serum the virus particle itself,
or is a viral protein, for example, also implicated?' and
speculated on the common factor linking the oddly assorted
groups of patients with persistent Australia antigen in their
blood, perhaps due to 'an immunological defect'. 24 The
origins of this discovery, embedded in genetic serological
work, suggested that the antigen might have been an inherited
trait, and this idea clearly still lingered.
The September edItorial recalled the UK wartime hepatitis
study, then ran through Krugman's investigation, 'a model of
its kind', emphasising the findings on possible oral infection
and on spread to 'contacts' - an aspect that was to become
increasingly important. It used recent electron micrographs
24 
'Australia antigen and hepatitis' (Editorial), Lancet, 1969
(ii), 143.
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to argue that Australia antigen was in fact the virus:
'Although the structure is not clear, these pictures are
compatible with the idea that the antigen Is a virus causing
hepatitis'. 25 The identity of the antigen with serum rather
than infectious hepatitis was emerging, but not yet fully
established.
The journal also published current hepatitis research,
including a report from a team at Yale on Australia antigen in
acute and chronic liver disease, 26 and several articles on
hepatitis in haemodIalysis units, where outbreaks were
beginning to be observed. In one of the latter, the authors
used the term 'SN antigen' (serum hepatitis antigen) coined by
Dr A. M. Prince of New York, and thanked him for 'the generous
gift of his reference antiserum' •27 At this time, there were
few sources for the antigen and antibody, and one important
role played by researchers like Prince and Bluiuberg was to
disseminate these materials to other researchers. As the next
Lancet example shows, recipients could then act as resource
centres in their own locality.
Almeida and Waterson, whose further work will be discussed
below, provided an Important clarification of the 'carrier
25 
'Hepatitis virus' (Editorial), Lancet, 1969 (ii), 577-9.
26 R. Wright, R. W. McCollum and G. KlatskIn, 'Australia
antigen in acute and chronic liver disease', Lancet, 1969
(ii), 117-121. (Wright was at the Radcliffe Infirmary, Oxford,
when the article was submitted.)
27 G. C. Turner and G. B. Bruce White, 'S. H. antigen in
haemodialysis-associated hepatitis' (Liverpool), Lancet, 1969
(Ii), 124. See also: 'Hepatitis virus and renal dialysis'
(Editorial), Lancet, 1969 (Ii), 989-90.
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state', a notion which had been present in previous research
in a blurred form, but which had chiefly derived from
practical experience in the blood transfusion service. 28 Now
Almeida and Waterson compared the sera of a symptom-free
carrier, a patient with chronic hepatitis, and one who had
died from acute hepatitis B. To compare the former, which had
no antibody, with the other two, they added antibody produced
in a rabbit. In their acknowledgements, they thanked Drs A.
J. Zuckerman and P. E. Taylor of the London School of Hygiene
and Tropical Medicine 'for doing the immunodif fusion tests and
for making available to us the specific rabbit antiserum
supplied to them by Dr Baruch S. Blumberg'. 2' The carrier had
transmitted hepatitis 20 years previously, when his blood had
been found to be responsible for three cases, one of them
fatal. Samples had been saved and were now examined by
electron microscopy, which revealed that the carrier had
failed to form antibody to hepatitis B, thus remaining
infectious, though himself apparently healthy.
Informants who played a role in hepatitis research in the UK
tend, unsurprisingly, to emphasise the contribution of British
researchers, and its relative neglect compared with US efforts
28 MacCallum and Krugman used material from patients with
active hepatitis. Blumberg was initially finding hepatitis
carriers without rea].ising it; his subsequent recognition of
the identity of hepatitis B depended on a patient acquiring
the disease while under observation; see p. 98 above.
29	 D. Almeida and A. P. Waterson, 'Immune complexes in
hepatitis', Lancet, 1969 (ii), 986. This paper, published in
November, seems to represent work building on that reported in
a paper accepted for another journal in June of the same year:
J. D. Almeida, A. J. Zuckerman et al, 'Immune electron
microscopy of the Australia-SH (serum hepatitis) antigen',
Microbios, 2 (1969), 117-23.
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- reminiscent of the trials which established the difference
between hepatitis A and B, discussed in the previous chapter.
Two notable contributions to be outlined below tend to support
this view.
A rather different point emerges from a survey of the
literature, combined with analysis of the career patterns of
clinical scientists, their institutional affiliations and
links with researchers elsewhere. 3° Progress in hepatitis
research depended on a complex of factors, few of which were
determined by the research progranunes of funding bodies or
institutions. Keeping abreast of the current literature was
obviously important, but rather more important would appear to
be command of techniques appropriate to a particular line of
enquiry, which attracted fellow researchers and induced them
to supply ideas and clinical material. The exchange of blood
and serum leads to a notion of 'blood brotherhood' between
investigators3' - a sort of transatlantic tribal effort of
altruistic scientists. However, international exchange In
scientific endeavour can be a preface to bitter struggle, as
the story of the France/US exchange between Montagnier and
Gallo In AIDS research illustrates. 32
 The apparent generosity
30 j • Stanton, 'Hepatitis research and career trajectories',
talk given at Health Matters Symposium, Science Museum,
London, 5 March 1993; there Is less emphasis on careers and
more on type and place of work in the published version,
'Blood brotherhood'.
" Stanton, 'Blood brotherhood'.
32 Thanks to V. Berridge for pointing out this parallel. For
an account of this rivalry, see: S. Connor and S. Kingman, The
search for the virus. The scientific discovery of AIDS and the
guest for a cure (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1988, revised 1989)
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of sharing should not mislead us: it may play a part in the
battle for primacy. Sharing one's samples, for example serum
containing Australia antigen, could establish indebtedness, of
the recipient to the gift-giver; 33
 it also ran the risk that
the recipient might leap ahead in his or her research. This
is, In a sense, what happened next with two of the British
hepatitis B researchers.
David Dane and the virus of hepatitis B
David Dane is one of the unsung heroes of the hepatitis B
story, If one wished to approach history in those terms. A
clinician who trained as a virologist, he belonged to a
slightly earlier generation than Bluxnberg. The background to
his work on hepatitis was virological and clinical work on
polio, in particular trials of polio vaccines in the 1950s, in
Belfast, where Dane worked under Professor G. W. A. Dick. In
Dane's own account, this experimental polio work was so nerve-
racking that moving into another field seemed relatively
attractive, despite the risks and difficulties of hepatitis
research. 34
 During the Belfast trials, Dick and Dane had
administered live polio vaccine to their own and colleagues'
children, fortunately without mishap; but they knew of at
least one researcher who had committed suicide when an
attenuated strain of virus had recovered virulence and given
polio to recipients.
As expounded in: M. Mauss, The gift: forms and functions of
exchange In archaic societies (London: Cohen & West, 1954)
[Translation of Essai sur le don (Paris: P.U.F., 1925)]
D. S. Dane, interview, 6 Aug 1992.
105
In 1965 Dane, now Reader in Microbiology at Queen's University
Belfast, began a research programme aimed at identifiying the
hepatitis viruses by electron microscopy, with the assistance
of Moya Briggs. Since conventional tissue culture and animal
methods of growing the virus had so far consistently failed
with hepatitis, Dane looked for an alternative approach:
I thought that EM negative staining techniques had
developed to the stage where we could use them in much
the same way as bacteriologists had used light microscopy
to discover bacteria, like the leprosy bacillus, which
they could not culture.35
Apparently, Dane and Briggs' EM technique was largely self-
taught. As a first step, they learned to recognise a wide
range of viruses from a variety of specimens - from patients,
animals and tissue cultures - prepared with negative staining
techniques. Dane was keen to develop an ability to read
slides made from unpurified samples, in order later to be able
to recognise what had not been seen before: the hepatitis
virus.
During the following year, 1966, Dane and Briggs moved to the
Middlesex Hospital Medical School in London with Professor
Dick; a not uncommon instance of one appointment leading to
the removal of a group or team to a new establishment. The
hepatitis research lapsed for two or three years. Then in
1969, Dane was asked to test some of Professor J. W. Stewart's
patients 'for the mysterious "Australia antigen"'. 3' One of
the first was a haemophiliac patient, whose blood proved
" D. S. Dane, 'Discovering the virus of hepatitis B',
Transfusion Microbioloqy Newsletter, 11 (March 1991), 16.
' Ibid.
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positive for Australia antigen when tested by Cohn Cameron,
Dane's colleague. Dane decided to take the further step of
examining the sample under an electron microscope, utihising
previously acquired expertise. Together with Cameron and
Briggs, he saw round particles, larger than the small
spherical or tubular antigen particles that had already been
described many times. In a series of further samples from
patients with hepatitis, they were able to repeat this sort of
observation in two cases. Electron micrographs were produced
to show the double-shelled larger particles juxtaposed with
the smaller antigen particles. Publishing their findings in
1970, the team made several important suggestions: that the
larger particle they had visuahised was the infective virus of
hepatitis B; that the outer coat of this particle was made of
the same material as the Australia antigen particles; that the
latter were excess coat material; that because these larger
particles were denser they might contain nucleic acid.37
These findings were bound to cause something of a sensation in
hepatitis research circles. There was considerable
resistance, particularly in the US, before they became widely
accepted." The key article became a standard reference in
subsequent papers on the structure of hepatitis B, and in some
circles the viral body was referred to as 'the Dane particle'
D. S. Dane, C. H. Cameron and M. Briggs, 'Virus-like
particles in serum of patients with Australia-antigen
associated hepatitis', Lancet, 1970 (i), 695-8.
" J. Almeida, interview, 29 January 1993.
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for many years. 39 In essence the visualization of the virus,
together with the interpretations offered by Dane and his
colleagues, cleared several questions hanging over the
Australia antigen, showing the antigen previously visualized
to be free excess surface antigen, identical with the surface
antigen on the virus. Whereas the former was present in serum
samples in enormous quantities, the virus was far scarcer,
which explained why it had not previously been seen. The link
with hepatitis B was confirmed by antigen-antibody testing
using Australia antigen, as well as clinical observation.
As a result of this work, Dane was regarded as an expert on
hepatitis B in the UK, asked to give evidence to the Rosenheim
committee of 1970-72, appointed to serve on the Maycock
committees in the 1970s, and on a hepatitis advisory group in
the 1980s. 4° But while Bluntherg gained international
recognition, and was awarded the Nobel Prize for discovering
the Australia antigen - and for further contributions in the
field - Dane's achievements received more limited public
reward, even within the UK. For example, Zuckerman, another
hepatitis expert and clinician/virologist, became Professor of
Virology at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical
Medicine, and latterly Dean of Royal Free Hospital Medical
School; Roger Williams, a liver expert also appointed to
hepatitis commitees, heads the Institute of Liver Studies at
King's College Hospital Medical School; but Dane did not gain
" At Almeida's suggestion, according to one informant: J.
Beale, interview, 26 Feb 1993.
° These committees are discussed in detail in later chapters.
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a chair. The reasons for this are not clear but may be
connected with the way Dane channelled his energies into
local, rather than international networks. He continued to
work at the Middlesex, liaising with the North London Blood
Transfusion Centre and with the central Public Health
Laboratory, playing a key role in the practical implementaton
of policies on clearing the blood supply of hepatitis and
preventing further outbreaks in renal units. 41 He also gave
support to health workers, particularly doctors, facing the
stigmatization of having been identified as carriers of
heaptitis B.
Dane was definitely one of the key figures in UK hepatitis B
policy formation and implementation, as well as having made a
crucial contribution to the scientific understanding of the
virus. The lack of recognition, in terms of public accolade
and academic advance, is an interesting conundrum, only
partially solved by the observation that he is an essentially
modest man, perhaps lacking in ambition - facilitator of
others t
 work rather than promoter of his own. Comparing his
fortunes with those of Blumberg, the fact that the Australia
antigen came before the Dane particle is probably less
important than differences in the size and style of the
citation 'market' either side of the Atlantic: Americans are
more devout devotees of citations and cite publications by US
authors more than overseas papers, on the whole.42
' Further discussed in following chapters.
42 See citation analysis in: Studer and Chubin, Cancer mission;
the suggested UK/US contrast in hepatitis B citations is an
untested hypothesis.
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June Almeida and the core
Blumerg brought an antigenic soup to the notice of the
scientific community; Dane focused in on the virus; June
Almeida's contribution went farther into the structure of the
virus, laying bare the core. Almeida's answer, when asked how
she came to make a breakthrough in hepatitis B research, is
that she happened to be in the right place at the right
time. 43 By this she means, not once but repeatedly she was in
a position to benefit from the expertise of those around her,
to learn new EM techniques and to apply them in excellent
laboratory surroundings. Finally, when she was somewhat of a
recognised EM expert herself, she was in contact with the
right people, who brought her material which yielded the
secret that had eluded others (though it had been touched on
by Dane and his colleagues). And although her EM work was
morphological, structural and visual, with no first-hand
clinical dimension, Almeida gained greater recognition than
Dane for her contribution, probably because her convincingly
clear pictures of the viral core enabled others to start
unravelling the genetic material to be found there. Finally,
the fact that she was a woman, not medically qualified, who
had worked her way up from laboratory technician to scientist,
made her perhaps less threatening in what was becoming a
fiercely competitive sub-culture. Not that she was a shy
retiring flower - Almeida was certainly a forceful personality
who expected due respect. But she seems to have succeeded in
winning co-operation from a wider range of co-workers than
" Almeida, interview.
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most in this field.
Almeida was trained in electron microscopy in a Toronto
laboratory in 1958, when the technique of negative staining
had just been introduced; she was fortunate to be in Toronto
which was a leading virological centre.' 4 Negative staining
transformed the picture, allowing tiny virus bodies which had
not been seen before to be visualised with sufficient clarity
to enable Almeida to launch on a long process of classifying
them according to shape. The technique also had diagnostic
potential as she later explained:
On the one hand, the technique of negative staining
allowed direct studies of virus construction at a
molecular level to be undertaken, and on the other hand,
it allowed the electron microscope to become one of the
fastest and most efficient means of identifying a
virus •
Almeida was clearly very good at using the technique. The way
that she had developed it attracted the attention of Tony
Waterson, a British virologist visiting Canada, and he invited
Almeida to join him at St Thomas's Hospital Medical School in
London. She was there from 1964 to 1967, then accompanied
Waterson when he moved to the Hanunersmlth Postgraduate Medical
School, where she stayed until 1972. Along the way, Almeida
produced sufficient scientific papers, of sufficient merit, to
be awarded the DSc for publications in 1970.
" Almeida, interview. She mentions work carried out with A.
F. Howatson and D. F. Parsons at the Ontario Cancer Institute
in: J. Almelda, 'A classification of virus particles based on
morpholgy', Canadian Medical Association Journal, 89 (1963),
787-98.
' J. Almeida, 'Practical electron microscopy', Lab-Lore
(Welicome Service in Laboratory Technology), 5,7 (April 1973),
252.
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Almeida describes the next important step as also occurring
through personal contact, when an American visitor introduced
her to the idea of immune electroscopy. In this technique,
antibody was added to a serum sample, causing antigen and
virus particles to clump together, so that the antibody could
actually be seen. Thus, smaller particles were made visible
than previously thought possible - rather like negative
staining in relation to viruses - for antibodies are far
tinier even than antigens, being conglomerates of molecules.
Immune electroscopy was an invaluable tool in Almeida's hands,
allowing closer studies of the antigenic complexes of many
viruses.
Following Dane's discovery of the virus of hepatitis B,
Zuckerman, with whom Almeida already had links, appeared at
her laboratory in the Hammersmith one day to ask if she would
like to look at a sample of hepatitis B material. Almeida,
along with Waterson and others, had already subjected the
Australia antigen to electron microscopic scrutiny; 4' this
time she was looking for, and at, the Dane particle. The help
of two virologists from Northwick Park Clinical Research
Centre was enlisted; according to Almeida their greatest
contribution was to confirm that the virus could not be grown
in tissue culture, an enormous drawback in terms of
conventional virology but a vindication of the contribution of
electron microscopy.
' Almeida and Waterson, 'Immune complexes in hepatitis'.
Almeida, interview.
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Almeida knew that the outer coat of the virus could be split
to release an inner particle; Dane's original article shows an
example of this phenomenon. However Dane did not secure
adequately detailed pictures of the core to suggest more than
the possiblity of a polyhedral structure. Almeida had greater
experience with EM morphological studies of viruses. She
stripped the lipid (fatty) coat with a detergent, and obtained
core particles in good concentration, with the help of her
Northwick Park colleagues. It was clear to her that the core
particle conformed to the sort of structure expected of a
virus - unlike the antigen particles she had previously
examined. Moreover she could identify the morphology of the
core (an icosahedron), and demonstrate that the sides were
made of identical repeating units, with a given periodicity.
It was possible to postulate that this was the body which
entered the host cell, inserting its own nuclear material to
instigate mass production of viral and antigenic material.
The core discovery was published in 1971.48
About the time of this publication, Almeida was invited to a
closed meeting in the US, called to discuss the state of
knowledge about hepatitis particles. Despite initial
scepticism from some participants, who were inclined to cling
to the theory that the Australia antigen was a strangely
deviant virus, Almeida was able to convince the assembled
experts - through her micrographs of the core - that the Dane
particle was the virus causing hepatitis B. The meeting
3. D. Almeida, D. Rubenstein and E. 3. Stott, 'New antigen-
antibody system in Australia-antigen--positive hepatitis',
Lancet, 1971 (ii), 1225-7.
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agreed upon standardised terminology for the particles that
had so far been identified: the surface antigen was to be
referred to as HBsAg, the core antigen as HBcAg, and the whole
viral particle, the Dane particle or hepatitis B virus.
However, It was some years before the term HBsAg came to
replace 'Australia antigen' universally.
Conclusions
The first part of this chapter outlined developments on both
the service and research side of the health service in the UK,
in the two decades after the establishment of the NHS. These
include specific sectors such as the blood transfusion service
and Public Health Laboratory Service, which grew out of
wartime emergency services, and general questions of changing
notions about hospital infections, and changes in the
organization of clinical research in the postwar period.
Hepatitis B was partly seen, at this time, as associated with
medical innovations such as blood transfusion, where it was
recognized as the major hazard. Another medical innovation,
renal dialysis, was about to gain a notorious association with
hepatitis B, to be discussed in the next chapter. Yet in
clinical laboratories where samples of blood and serum were
routinely handled, it appears that blood was regarded as a
non-hazardous substance.
The remainder of the chapter examined scientific research
which has often been described as leading to 'breakthrough' in
dealing with the problem of hepatitis B. Historical accounts
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by scientists or doctors often use a progressive model (an
extreme form of Whig history?), in which scientific advances
lead to progress in medicine, especially the ability of
scientific medicine to tackle disease. Within these sorts of
histories, the role of the 'discoverer' is paramount: there
may be a search for particular qualities of character that led
that researcher to make that discovery. Yet each of the
accounts given by three key players in work on the hepatitis B
antigen and virus 49
 shows a strong consciousness of the role
of contingency, and the input of other workers. The role of
chance or opportunity has long been recognised in scientific
research, where it has been discussed under the charming term
'serendipity'. In framing a historical account, we seek to
explain what surrounding events and changes enabled such
apparently chance events to occur when they did.
A common element, stressed in the first-person interpretations
recorded for this chapter, was a technical innovation or new
idea: for Bluntherg, the idea of polymorphism and the technique
of electrophoresis; for Dane and Almeida, the technique of
negative staining in EM; and for Almeida, the technique of
immune electroscopy, also within EM. Such advances in
technique can be seen as necessary but not sufficient pre-
conditions for the findings on hepatitis B made by these
researchers. Less tangible factors - location of research,
and the researchers position within research networks -
emerge as important elements, overlapping with notions of
These three were not, of course, the only leading
contributors: no slight is intended on other researchers by
choosing to focus on Blumberg, Dane and Almeida.
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'insiders' and 'outsiders' in research and policy. For
hepatitis B, the exchange of ideas, techniques and samples of
clinical material seems to have been crucial to the (informal)
organization of successful research.5°
The next chapter will look at events which coincided with the
research discussed in this chapter: the outbreaks of hepatitis
B in renal units, and policy-making on hepatitis B in these
units, around 1970. The timeliness of the scientific
contributions introduced In this chapter raises the question
of whether it was purely a matter of coincidence. Perhaps the
renal unit problem was in a sense part of the solution, by
focussing the scientific gaze at the same time as providing
plentiful samples of blood from patients at various stages of
the disease.
50 These ideas will be further explored in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 4: HEPATITIS B IN RENAL UNITS [c.1965-1972]
During the war, as recounted in Chapter 2, evidence of serum
hepatitis as a side-effect of blood transfusion was gradually
growing. With post-war extension of the blood transfusion
service, hepatitis became recognized as the major hazard of
blood transfusion, although it affected under one per cent of
transfused patients in Britain.' This was clearly a matter of
concern in all hospitals, and for any branch of health care
involving blood transfusion. A more specific and concentrated
series of outbreaks of hepatitis in renal dialysis units, in
all countries which adopted renal haemodialysis for chronic
kidney disease, shocked the medical community. Outbreaks
started in 1965 in this country; their impact will be outlined
in this chapter, while the following chapter will look at the
blood supply. In 1970, the Department of Health set up two
advisory committees: Rosenheim on the renal unit outbreaks and
Maycock on hepatitis in the blood supply. Both reported in
1972; both recommended utilization of the newly available
Australia antigen test, as part of the means of clearing their
respective target areas of the hepatitis B hazard.
Following on from the second half of the previous chapter, on
the discovery of the antigen which was a marker for hepatitis
B infection, these chapters may, at first glance, appear to be
presenting a triuxnphallst account of the application of a
P. L. Mollison, Blood transfusion in clinical medicine
(Oxford: B].ackwell Scientific Publications, 5th edition 1972),
p. 603, mentions hepatitis B as the main serious consequence
of receiving blood.
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scientific breakthrough to solve the major problems associated
with hepatitis B in the health care arena. It is not intended
that the account should be read that way. Once the utility of
the Australia antigen test was accepted, perhaps it was to be
expected that it would be used to exclude hepatitis B from
renal units and the blood supply; conversely, concern in these
areas may have hastened acceptance of the test. The crisis in
renal units began before the identity of the Australia antigen
was known; the early UK response was shaped by local factors
which subsequently facilitated use of the test. Other
countries did not take up testing as a solution to renal unit
outbreaks in the same way. And, as the next chapter will
show, use of the test was by no means the end of the story for
hepatitis in the blood supply, since blood products such as
Factor VIII continued to be infected.
Further, the antigen test is not here presented as 'the
solution' to 'the problem' of hepatitis B, because the
predominant policy construction at this time focussed on areas
of concern within the health arena, but virtually ignored
hazards which affected far greater numbers of people -
intravenous drug users, and gay men - even though these were
beginning to be recognized. This sidelining of groups outside
the health service continued through the 1970s and into the
1980s, and was only slowly overturned by the Impact of AIDS on
policy approaches. Thus the changing construction of a
disease (hepatitis B) affected the way in which the usefulness
of a new technology (the antigen test) was filtered.
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The present chapter outlines the story of renal unit outbreaks
of hepatitis B in the UK and of their resolution following the
Rosenheim Committee of 1970-72. Important elements in
clearing hepatitis B from renal units predate Rosenheim: work
undertaken by individuals at the central PHLS; also, patterns
of coping evolved at local level in renal units and associated
public health laboratories. The way that these elements
worked depended both on individual initiative and on the
national network of public health laboratories - a particular
feature of the UK - which partly explains the difference in
approach here, compared with other European countries. Thus
the antigen test was employed in a specific set of structural
circumstances, which are often omitted from scientific
accounts.
Renal unit outbreaks: local reports and PHLS 1968 guidance
The first kidney haemodialysis unit in the UK had been set up
at Leeds in 1956, and wider application of this technology
followed the introduction in 1960 of the arterio-venous shunt,
which enabled repeated dialysis of patients with chronic
kidney disease. By 1967, about 30 dialysis units had been
established; these were usually fitted into existing hospital
accommodation, but some were purpose-built, like the Liverpool
unit set up in 1958 in a prefabricated block. With the
extension of dialysis to chronic kidney disease, the number of
patients treated exceeded the number of beds, since each
patient attended for a session of dialysis two or three times
a week. Despite meticulous attention to hygiene,
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opportunities were created for the spread of infection, by the
constant turnover of patients and sharing of dialysis
machines.
There were other problems of infection: for example, in a few
patients, streptococcal infection developed in the area where
the arterio-venous shunt was inserted. But hepatitis was the
greatest problem, not least because there was no cure, and
initially, no means of determining which type of hepatitis was
involved. In a series of widely dispersed outbreaks, each of
which was lengthy, messy and frightening, both patients and
staff were affected; although the total number of deaths was
small, the cumulative effect was deeply shocking. Between
1965 and 1971, hepatitis was reported in ten kidney dialysis
units, covering a wide geographical spread: Manchester,
Liverpool, Charing Cross (London), Birmingham, Royal Victoria
in Newcastle, Royal Free (London), Hanunersmith (London),
Edinburgh, Guy's (London), and Cardiff. There was a total of
357 cases with 18 deaths. Cases divided up into 206 patients,
122 staff and 29 contacts; twelve patients and six staff
died.2
The first hepatitis outbreak began in the Manchester Royal
Infirmary in the spring of 1965, when a surgical registrar, a
male nurse and a female staff nurse fell ill with severe
hepatitis; the staff nurse died. Several unrelated cases of
hepatitis were being treated in the Infirmary, but these three
staff cases seemed to be linked via their attendance on a
2 Rosenheim Report, p. 13.
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patient with acute renal failure admitted for haemodialysis.
This patient later developed jaundice. Two laboratory
technicians who had handled samples from that patient also
caught hepatitis. Two more patients coming in from other
hospitals to the dialysis unit were infected; a house
physician and a staff nurse fell ill following contact with
these patients. There was a further death in this group.3
The newspapers reported the death from hepatitis of a hospital
porter on his honeymoon, although the hospital denied he had
been in contact with the dialysis unit. Precautions against
cross-infection, especially contaminatton with blood and
faeces from patients, were stepped up. Staff considered to be
at risk were offered immunoglobulin. More cases followed,
though it was thought that immunoglobulin modified the course
of the illness, at least in the case of one doctor. By 1966,
five patients and eleven staff had suffered acute hepatitis,
and there had been three deaths.
Three important points about the response to this first renal
unit outbreak, expressed in a Lancet article suinmarising the
events, 4
 are worth noting. (1) There was no certainty which
type of hepatitis was implicated: the term 'infectious
hepatitis' was used in this brief Lancet notice, and both
blood (for serum hepatitis) and faeces (for infectious
hepatitis) were suspect. (2) There was a call for infectious
'Hepatitis and the artificial kidney' (Annotations), Lancet,
1965 (ii), 1000, suggests this was a patient (i.e. on
haemodialysis) but the Rosenheim Report lists three staff
deaths and no patient deaths in the Manchester outbreak.
Ibid.
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hepatitis to be made a notifiable disease, so that more could
be learned about the epidemiology of the forms that were
presumed to be viral. (3) There was also a call for the use
of the artificial kidney to be continued, especially in the
treatment of acute kidney failure where a 'revolution' had
been achieved. Thus despite the fatalities among healthy
staff, and despite the continuing uncertainty around the
etiology of the disease(s) involved, the risk of hepatitis
outbreaks was not regarded by the public face of medical
opinion as outweighing the advances in treatment offered by
the artificial kidney.
In the next renal unit hepatitis outbreak, in Liverpool in
1967, there were no deaths, but the experience was clearly
harrowing for all concerned. 5 Staff who suffered hepatitis
refused to work again in the renal unit. Moreover, during the
outbreak which lasted for nearly a year, there were staff
shortages as hundreds of person hours of work were lost
through illness. Liverpool saw the problem in terms of a
hazard to staff who contracted hepatitis from the blood of
patients, who had probably received the virus in blood
transfusions given as part of the dialysis treatment.'
At Charing Cross there was also an outbreak in 1967, with 15
patients but no staff infected. Here, the problem was
The total number of cases in the Liverpool outbreak between
1966 and 1971 was 55, with 15 patients, 7 contacts and 33
staff affected: Rosenheim Report, p.l3; it is unclear how many
were Ill during the initial phase lasting about a year.
' P. 0. Jones, H. J. Goldsmith, et al, 'Viral hepatitis: a
staff hazard In dialysis units', Lancet, 1967 (i), 835-40.
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interpreted locally as one of patients at risk from a hospital
infection. 7 Charing Cross used immunoglobulin to protect
staff and patients, on the assumption that they were dealing
with infectious hepatitis (hepatitis A). A difference in
approach between two units, based on different experiences of
the disease, became a focus of debate.
As consternation grew at local level, it was reflected among
the growing fraternity of dialysis experts, some of whom had
been meeting at intervals in an informal group at the
Department of Health and Social Security. In 1967, Hugh de
Wardener of Charing Cross, who was chairing this DHSS dialysis
group, called on the PHLS headquarters at Colindale to clarify
the Issue of immunoglobulin as a protective agent for those
exposed to risk of hepatitis infection. Both Charing Cross
and Liverpool had used immunoglobulin supplied by the PHLS:
Charing Cross considered it to be effective, while Liverpool
claimed it was virtually useless. The Director of the
Epidemiological Research Laboratory at PHLS, Dr M. T. Pollock,
asked Dr Sheila Polakoff to attend the dialysis group
meeting. 8
 Polakoff wished to settle the dispute by randomly
allocating those at risk to one of two groups, to receive
immunoglobulin or not, but she found that opinions were too
strongly divided to allow this sort of trial to go ahead.'
In a second phase in 1968-71, 64 patients but only one staff
member were affected: Rosenheim Report, p.13.
Polakoff was working on measles, in the communicable diseases
section of the PHLS headquarters at this time: S. Polakoff,
intervIew, 14 October 1992.
Polakoff, interview.
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Instead, the upshot of the meeting was that 20 of the renal
units agreed to send in records of cases of hepatitis
including results of liver function tests, so that the PHLS
could monitor what was happening country-wide, looking at
inapparent as well as apparent infection.
Through the next twelve months, Polakoff recalled, 'nothing
much happened' except that Charing Cross, continuing to find
patients with raised liver function (which indicated that they
might be hepatitis carriers) was 'consuming gallons of
immunoglobulin'. 1° Meanwhile, the PHLS set up a working
party on dialysis units, which compiled an overview paper,
outlining the major microbiological hazards of dialysis, and
pointing to preventive measures that all renal units could be
taking. 1 ' Hepatitis was aligned with shunt sepsis and issues
around the hygiene of the dialysis equipment, although these -
unlike hepatitis - affected patient health alone. The PHLS
noted that one means of preventing the spread of hepatitis,
the use of immunoglobulin, was recognised as problematic, with
expert opinion still divided over its efficacy.' 2 Patients'
exposure to hepatitis could be reduced, by reducing blood
10 Ibid.
" Public Health Laboratory Service (Working Party on
Haemodialysis Units), 'Infection risks of haemodialysis - some
preventive aspects', British Medical Journal, 1968 (3), 454-
60.
12 A PHLS study of the efficacy of British immunoglobulin was
published alongside the report on infection in renal units;
this was aimed at control of infectious hepatitis in schools
and other institutions, rather than renal units. See:
'Assessment of British gaminaglobulin In preventing infectious
hepatitis: a report to the director of the Public Health
Laboratory Service', British Medical Journal, 1968 (3), 451-
54.
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transfusions (initially large and frequent); trying to provide
each patient with their own machine; separating chronic from
acute patients; using sterile disposable syringes. Overall
management and hygiene of the units could be geared towards
greater infection control. Above all, the PHLS placed
responsibility for each site onto the hospital bacteriologist.
Local decisions and procedures were emphasized repeatedly,
accommodating a de facto devolution of control to regional,
district and hospital level. Meanwhile, in 1968, notification
of hepatitis was introduced, but it was not considered
practicable to demand separate notification of A and B.'3
There were two notable developments in 1969: the advent of the
antigen test for serum hepatitis; and a further series of
outbreaks of hepatitis in renal units, perhaps demonstrating
the ineffectiveness of the 1968 PHLS guidelines. These
hepatitis outbreaks varied in scale and outcome, with the
largest at Guy's Hospital in London involving 89 patients,
staff and contacts between 1969 and 1971, with no deaths,
while at another London hospital, the Hanunersmith, there were
only seven cases but three deaths.' 4 All dialysis units,
whether or not they were directly involved, became haunted by
' At this date, doctors had to rely on clinical signs (not
very different for the two diseases); it is not clear to me
why separate notification was not introduced after the antigen
test for hepatitis B became available. Polakoff of the PHLS
used laboratory reports on hepatitis B cases for her
epidemiological work through the 1970s.
" As with the initial outbreak at Manchester, hepatitis deaths
outside the unit could be recognized as associated with it, if
there was a link; one such death at Newcastle's Royal Victoria
Hospital where there were five cases of hepatitis in the
dialysis unit was included in the total.
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the spectre of hepatitis. The most terrifying scenario was
played out at the Western General Infirmary in Edinburgh,
where among 28 dialysis-associated hepatitis cases between
1969 and 1971, four members of staff and seven patients died.
While these outbreaks raged, the new tool of the antigen test
was being applied to the problem. As early as July 1969, a
report on the antigen status of cases in the Liverpool
outbreak was produced by two workers at the Liverpool Public
Health Laboratory.' 5 They had aquired the reference antiserum
for their tests directly from Prince, whom they thanked for
the 'generous gift'. Their findings supported the 'hypothesis
that a positive test for S.H. antigen is associated with the
presence in the blood of the causal agent of serum-hepatitis'.
Besides this finding, confirming that the outbreak involved
serum rather than infectious hepatitis, they reported that the
antigen could only be detected in the blood of staff members
for the first two weeks after the onset of disease, while in
the blood of dialysis patients it persisted with no diminution
over time. Thus staff exhibited a stronger reaction to the
infection, becoming more acutely ill but then eliminating the
virus; patients with the antigen showed less acute hepatitis,
or lacked overt symptoms entirely, but tended to become
chronic carriers.
A further extension to these observations on the different
course of hepatitis infection in staff and patients was
' Turner and Bruce White, 'S. H. antigen in haemodialysis-
associated hepatitis'.
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provided by a team at the Royal Free Hospital in London."
There, they found that five patients with no symptoms of
hepatitis retained antigen in their blood for a prolonged
period, whereas three other patients who suffered clinical
hepatitis subsequently became antigen negative. These three
patients were regarded as fit before they were exposed to
hepatitis infection, having been restored to health by
dialysis, but the patients who became carriers were either
still unwell or had been readmitted because of illness. Thus
it appeared:
that the two patterns of disease previously noted in
staff and patients depend not on category but on the
state of health of the subject when exposed to the virus.
It appears that a person who is unfit at the time of
contact with the virus may, for reasons as yet
unexplained, be incapable of mounting the host/virus
response (clinical hepatitis), thus retaining the
antigen. It is our experience that when a state of
physical health is achieved subsequently by adequate
haemodialysis the carrier state nevertheless persists.'7
The authors suggested screening for the hepatitis associated
antigen to avoid introducing positive cases into renal units;
at Royal Free they believed the test had enabled them to
curtail what might have become a much more severe outbreak.
Local and central responses: the Rosenheim committee
Reading the accounts from various dialysis units in the
medical press, and looking at events from the viewpoint of the
PHLS (and DHSS so far as their viewpoint Is discernible), we
" A. H. Knight, R. A. Fox, et al, 'Hepatitis-associated
antigen and antibody in haemodialysis patients and staff',
British Medical Journal, 1970 (3), 603-6.
Ibid. 605-6.
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are confronted with two rather different versions of the
resolution of hepatitis outbreaks. Essentially the same
measures appear in both versions, but - unsurprisingly - there
is an emphasis on local intiatives in the former, and on
central efforts in the latter account. Thus the Royal Free
article, just discussed, mentions the 1968 PHLS guidelines but
regards screening and exclusion of hepatitis carriers,
combined with ever-increasing use of home dialysis, as the
solution in their case which can be transferred to other
settings.
Similarly the Liverpool team, in an update on the outbreak at
Sef ton General which had caused 55 cases by 1971, note that
enhancing their own original hygiene precautions with those
recommended by the PHLS had failed to prevent futher cases.18
Antigen testing revealed that inapparent cases were entering a
new supposedly hepatitis-free unit established after the early
phase of the outbreak. This group suggested complete
segregation of three categories of patients: infected, non-
infected and potentially infected. Immune staff - those who
had recovered from an attack of hepatitis - should if possible
be induced to return to work on the unit. In general, staff
should be offered incentives to undertake this hazardous work.
Meanwhile Polakoff's PHLS study, of 21 dialysis units which
had agreed to send regular reports, provided a more panoramic
vision of the pattern of infection, enormously enhanced by the
B. J. Hawe, H. J. Goldsmith and P. 0. Jones, 'Dialysis-
associated hepatitis: prevention and control', British Medical
Journal, 1971 (1), 541.
128
introduction of antigen testing. At this stage (1969),
Polakoff recruited Yvonne Cossart of the Virology Reference
Laboratory at Colindale,. who had been on the panel for the
survey, to supervise antigen testing at PHLS headquarters for
the participating units. A further seven units agreed to send
blood samples, bringing the total to 28 . 19 A new phase of the
study, based on the antigen test, began in January 1970. Sera
from all units were tested; thereafter sera from patients were
tested at intervals of three months, and newcomers were tested
on arrival. Where a new outbreak occurred, sera were tested
more frequently. Liaising with consultants in charge of
dialysis units, marshalling and analysing the data, were
enormous tasks; persistance of hepatitis in some units
undoubtedly amplified the pressure under which the two women
worked. According to Polakoff, although the director of the
PHLS agreed to her undertaking this antigen survey, no extra
money, staff or premises were allocated; she and Cossart
worked flat out with assistance from a medical statistician
and presumably some laboratory support, but little else, from
1970 to 1975.20
By 1970, however, there were moves afoot at departmental
level: in view of the serious nature of the outbreaks of
hepatitis in renal units, the DHSS set up a committee to
review the situation and recommend steps to deal with it.
19 Edinburgh was not included in the survey whereas three
Glasgow units were.
20 Polakoff, interview; another informant described Polakoff
becoming ever thinner while Cossart gained pounds, as they
reacted in opposite ways to the enormous pressure of work: E.
Vandervelde, interview, 1 April 1992.
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Without seeing the papers of the Rosenheim Commitee, as it
came to be known (from the name of its chairman, Lord
Rosenheim, an eminent nephrologist and consultant physician at
University College Hospital, London), it is of course
impossible to do more than speculate about the negotiations
leading to the formation of the committee, or the nature of
the evidence which it heard. 2' It was clearly framed as an
advisory group to make recommendations on the hepatitis
problem in renal units, rather than a commission of enquiry
which might have sought to allocate blame. The situation was
interpreted as a hazard and a misfortune, not anyone's fault.
Sir James Howie, head of the central PHLS at Colindale, and Dr
(later Sir) William Maycock, head of the Blood Products
Laboratory at Elstree, sat on the committee; there were also
representatives from five of the hospitals whose dialysis
units had experienced hepatitis outbreaks. These were
consultant surgeons and physicians plus one chief technician.
A professor of bacteriology from Dundee, a consultant
physician from Glasgow, a nursing sister from Lambeth and a
matron from Bristol were presumably called upon for the views
of those involved in the issues of hepatitis prevention,
without having experienced an outbreak. Dr C. E. Gordon
Smith, Dean of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical
Medicine, and Fellow of the Royal College of Pathologists,
21 My requests for clearance to look at these, and other papers
relevant to hepatitis falling within the 30-year period,
started with the Departments of Health and Social Security
Departmental Records Management at Nelson in Lancashire and
continued as far as Dr K. Calman, Chief Medical Officer, to no
avail: corr. Aug-Oct 1992.
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perhaps provided an overview, 22 while Dr Roger Williams,
Director of the Liver Research Unit at King's College Hospital
and Medical School could offer specialist insight into the
impact of hepatitis on the liver.
Between October 1970 when it was appointed, and May 1972 when
it produced a report, the group held thirteen meetings, taking
oral and written evidence from clinicians and nurses in
dialysis and transplantation units, and from microbiologists
and epidemiologists. Comparative statistical data were
obtained from the European Dialysis and Transplantation
Association. There is no mention of technicians giving
evidence although they figured prominently among the victims
of hepatitis. Perhaps their views were thought to be
sufficiently represented by the chief technician from
Newcastle, Mr P. J. Dewar, who sat on the committee, and by
Howie and Gordon Smith, the two pathologists. Certainly,
Howie later appears as somewhat of a hero to technicians,
despite the general hierarchical divisions between officers
and ranks in clinical laboratory work.
Roger Williams remembered the meetings as being efficiently
conducted, without a sense of panic because although the
outbreaks were worrying, the numbers were small; there was
some 'emotional attachment' when young doctors and nurses
died, but he did not recollect the committee meetings actually
22 And an echo of the wartime MRC Jaundice Committee meetings
which were held at LSHTM.
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becoming emotional. 23 Level-headed common sense was the
keynote of the group's report which stressed that anxiety over
the hepatitis outbreaks must not lead to a defeatist
attitude - by which, it may be assumed, the authors meant the
closure of renal dialysis and transplantation units.
Reassuringly, they claimed that: 'The problem is no different
in kind from problems of infectious disease which have been
met and overcome in the past' •24 Previous situations where
serum hepatitis had emerged as a problem were not called into
play in the report, which rather implied that these hepatitis
outbreaks were similar to the broad range of hazards in
clinical and laboratory settings. Hepatitis, instead of being
singled out, was being normalized.
While Rosenheim may have been absolutely fair and correct to
attempt to stabilize the perception of hepatitis B and bring
it within the fold of normal hospital infection hazards, in
order to avoid over-dramatization, the committee omitted two
potentially valuable comparative dimensions, at least in its
report. 25 One of these would be a comparison of the hepatitis
outbreaks with those of other diseases regarded as hospital
infections such as puerperal fever or streptococcal
infections. The framework of thinking about hepatitis B
referred repeatedly to the hospital setting, as in the
recommendation to reduce transfusions for dialysis patients to
Dr Roger Williams, interview, 14 December 1992.
24 Rosenheim Report, p. v.
25 Again, the group's deliberations, which may have included a
review of these elements, cannot be considered until the
unpublished records are available.
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a minimum, on the assumption that this was the commonest route
of infection in the first instance. Why then the lack of
comparison with other hospital infections, and the 'lessons of
history' to be learned from them? Rosenheim pointed out that
other such infections had been met and conquered in the past,
so presumably hepatitis would be, but gave no details of these
past conquests. Perhaps there was a reluctance to admit that
these other problems had been very serious until specific
drugs had been found to counter them: sulphonainides for
puerperal fever, penicillin and other antibiotics for
streptococcus.
Past incidents involving hepatitis constitute another area for
comparative insights, also overlooked by the committee. Post-
transfusion hepatitis was apparently the predominant form of
serum hepatitis with which the group and their informants were
familiar; but this affected individuals separated in space and
time, rather than causing 'outbreaks'. Those who recalled
hepatitis outbreaks among troops during the Second World War
perhaps derived some comfort from the fact that the renal unit
outbreaks affected lesser numbers absolutely (though possibly
a higher proportion of the given population). The lesson
learned from arsenic-therapy jaundice, that syringes could
transmit hepatitis, 2' was indirectly applied in the call for
disposable syringes to be used.
Other avenues might have been explored. The appearance of
26 A lesson apparently relearned in the 1960s: see Chapter 6,
n. 30.
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serum hepatitis in venereal disease treatment might have
suggested a venereal route for transmission. The commonest
form of syringe transmission, by illicit drug injection, was
recognized by this time but scarcely discussed - despite the
finding in the Royal Free report that the source of the
hepatitis outbreak there appeared to have been a drug user,
who shared syringes with others before admission to the
dialysis unit. 27 In the past, serum hepatitis had afflicted
groups herded together, to undergo vaccinations or treatments
(shipyard workers, troops, mental hospital inmates - and at
one stage it was thought munitions workers), but as the
committee noted, it had rarely appeared as a problem in
hospital contexts •2
The Rosenheim group absorbed from the various units and the
PHLS the message that strict precautions to avoid contact with
patients' blood and other bodily secretions should be taken by
all staff working in dialysis units; they also emphasized
isolation, not only in the sense of isolation units for
treatment of hepatitis carriers within the units, but working
towards a situation where each patient should perform his or
her own dialysis, in hospital if necessary and preferably as
soon as possible at home. Ideally every chronic renal failure
patient would receive a kidney transplant, obviating the need
for further dialysis, but since this could not be achieved in
the forseeable future, the majority should move to home
dialysis. There was hope of developing a disposable dialyser
27 Knight et al, 'Hepatitis-associated antigen', 605.
Rosenheim Report, p. 12.
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(cost was not discussed); this would clearly reduce the
infection risk, just as the currently available disposable
syringe had done.
If hygiene precautions were one important part of the
Rosenheim message, another was the identification of the
'culprit' as an agent associated with Australia antigen or
antibody (they were unclear on this), enabling far more
precise methods of separation and exclusion of infected
persons to be brought into play than previously possible.
Patients and staff were to be regularly screened, infectious
patients excluded from the main unit and movement between
units to be controlled. Staff were to be screened before
working in renal units and excluded if positive for the
Australia antigen. It was not made clear what would then be
their fate - whether they could work elsewhere in the hospital
or not. Those staff already working in the units who
developed suspicious symptoms would be off duty until they
exhibited and cleared the antigen or turned out to have some
other ailment.
These recommendations for screening and separation or
exclusion of patients and staff carrying the Australia antigen
partly coincide with suggestions in published papers
describing outbreaks in particular renal units, and partly
appear to have been based on the work of the PHLS team. Sir
James Howie wrote to Polakoff in the autumn of 1970, shortly
following the establishment of the Rosenheim group, saying
that he wanted a written report on her work by the following
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Monday. Polakoff and Cossart managed to meet the deadline,
working like Stakhanovites over the weekend, and Sir James was
apparently 'charmed' by their report. 2' The Rosenheim
conclusions were heavily influenced by the Polakoff/Cossart
explanation of the connection between Australia antigen and
the renal unit outbreaks, and equally by their views on
screening and isolation. Polakoff was called to give evidence
in person later, but was ill with overwork and recalls little
of the meeting; she needed three weeks bed-rest to recover.
Although the PHLS approach might be thought of as a central
response, it must be remembered that Polakoff and Cossart were
monitoring data from, and collating action taken by, many of
the renal units that had suffered outbreaks. In a sense they
had started the information gathering process that Rosenheim
was engaged upon, two years ahead of Rosenheim. From the
centre, the PHLS and Rosenheim disseminated to all renal units
an amalgam of 'best practice' garnered from local units and
laboratories, informed by discussions with UK experts and by
monitoring internationally published literature. Rosenheim
achieved a policy on screening and exclusion by a synthesis of
scattered efforts, largely, it is argued here, on the basis of
PHLS work, which also ensured follow-up via surveillance.
The continued monitoring of the renal units was paying off,
even by mid-1972 when the Rosenheim group reported and its
recommendations were circulated to all renal dialysis and
29 Polakoff, interview.
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transplantation units. 3° Now the policy of screening and
exclusion was official and nationwide, local differences of
interpretation were more readily overridden, and Polakoff and
Cossart were able to secure almost total cooperation with
their programme of monitoring hepatitis. 31 They themselves,
according to Polakoff, 'couldn't beliveve how well it worked',
but by 1975 they had cracked the problem and there were no
further hepatitis outbreaks in renal units in the UK.32
Perhaps the severity of the Edinburgh outbreak of 1969-1971
had also played a part in convincing all workers in renal
units to observe strict precautions. But the setting of a
central policy by Rosenheim, and above all the role of the
PHLS, would appear to have been crucial.
In other countries where similar action was not taken,
hepatitis B remained a hazard in renal units far longer than
in the UK. For example, in France it was reported that as
many as half the staff in renal units were infected with
hepatitis B by 1978.
	 In America, too, renal units continued
° Public Health Laboratory Service, 'Decrease in the incidence
of hepatitis in dialysis units associated with prevention
programme', British Medical Journal, 1974 (4), 751-54. [Report
prepared by S. Polakoff.]
31 Almost, but not quite total - for example, one London
hospital resisted the request to have its patients and staff
tested, until they had an overt case of hepatitis: D. S. Dane,
interview, 16 August 1992.
32 Polakoff, interview. See also: S. Polakoff, 'Hepatitis B in
retreat from dialysis units in United Kingdom in 1973',
British Medical Journal, 1976 (1), 1579-81.
P. Maupas, A. Goudeau, et al, 'Hepatitis B vaccine: efficacy
in high-risk settings, a two-year study', Inter-viroloqy, 10
(1978), 196-208, gave figures of hepatitis B infection of 40-
60 per cent among patients and 50 per cent among staff each
year in French renal dialysis units. An informant who worked
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to operate with a high level of hepatitis B transmission
through the 1970s. 34 In other countries with a screening
policy, such as the Netherlands, hepatitis was checked much
earlier." The difference seems to have been mainly a matter
of the organization of health services, particularly public
health laboratories, in each country: Britain's advantage lay
in the central PHLS's link with peripheral laboratories. Quite
possibly the PHLS network itself would not have been
sufficient without the efforts made by two workers at the
centre to contact key people in all the hospitals involved.
The aftermath of the renal unit hepatitis outbreaks
I would argue that the hepatitis outbreaks in renal units had
a far wider and deeper impact than the numbers involved might
indicate; an impact that appears to have gone largely
unrecorded, although it emerges strongly from oral sources.
This impact was long lasting, despite the 'normalizing'
message of Rosenheim. Clearly, there were immediate changes
in policy and practice relating to infection prevention in
renal units themselves, as a result of the Rosenheim Report
and the efforts of the PHLS described above. There were
associated effects in the handling of samples of blood and
in such a unit during the 1970s described immunoglobulin
injections administered to all staff at three-monthly
intervals as a painful and not very effective: A-M. Moulin,
personal communication, 19 Nov 1993.
B. Surgenor, T. C. Chalmers et al, 'Clinical trials of
hepatitis immune globulin', New England Journal of Medicine,
293 (1975), 1060-2.
" F. M. Parsons et al, Proceedings of the European Dialysis
and Transplant Association, 11 (1974).
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serum in clinical laboratories. One informant likened the
fear inspired by the hepatitis outbreaks to that engendered by
AIDS some fifteen years later. 3' Not only would samples from
patients with the disease be handled as potentially lethal
substances, but all blood samples acquired a new aura of
risk. 37 Simultaneously, the view of the risks that doctors
and nurses ran in the course of their routine hospital duties
also altered, perhaps to a degree corresponding with proximity
to one of the centres that suffered an outbreak.
Fictional sources must be used with care, but there is one
which must be acknowledged in this context, for it sheds a
baleful if tangential light on 'the aftermath' of the renal
unit outbreaks. In The Houseman's Tale, a novel loosely based
on the Edinburgh hepatitis B outbreak, Cohn Douglas uses a
device borrowed from the detective genre: he lays a trail of
clues for observant eyes throughout the book, hinting that
junior hospital doctors are exposed to the deadly 'serum
hepatitis' in the course of their duties. 38
 Their routine
contact with the blood and bodily secretions of dozens of
patients, any of whom might be an unknown carrier, puts them
in the front line. But at the denouement, the culprit is
revealed to be something completely different - though the
clues were there for even more canny eyes - a nurse called
Maggie who had contracted hepatitis B in the renal unit has
36 B. Gee, interview, 21 June 1991.
" Responses including changes In handling of blood in clinical
laboratories will be further explored in Chapter 7.
38 C. Douglas, The Houseman's Tale (London: Hutchinson, 1975)
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given it to at least three doctors she subsequently slept
with. One of these dies at the beginning of the book, a
second at the end (as in good detective stories, there are two
corpses), while the third survives to become the hero of a
whole series of 'doctor' novels.
The sense of dread induced by acute hepatitis is conveyed in a
description of precautions taken in the Isolation Unit:
[Mac speaks to his friend Campbell, the hero:] 'You know
Ivor, the SHO here? Came at me for blood dressed like a
deep-sea diver: boots, gauntlets, a thing like a welder's
mask on his face and funny paper hat like yours. It made
me feel I wasn't nice to know.'39
Later, lying ill in the next cubicle, Campbell hears Mac has
died, and although familiar with death on the wards, is
devastated:
Here [death] was brazen and fierce and had just snatched
someone with whom he had a conversation to finish: it was
an obscene and extravagant assertion of death as the
ancients had known it - random, sudden and implacable,
the seizer of all men, guided by blind fate.4°
Campbell is scared about his own fate, but comforts himself
that this disease was 'nasty but it was not new or unknown'.
Unlike Maggie, who commits suicide when she realises what has
happened (echoes of a Victorian novel), Campbell is lucky
enough to clear the virus from his system and continue his
life, and his career.
In The Houseman's Tale, the Edinburgh outbreak has spread
fictionally into the hospital. The device of using a nurse as
the agent of transmission has been critically analysed in
Ibid, p. 146.
40 Ibid. p. 161.
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relation to AIDS and gender issues. 4' It is certainly
striking that in the early 1970s, when few doctors were aware
of the sexual route of transmission for hepatitis B, this
author wove it so tellingly into his plot. The reference to
serum hepatitis as 'not new or unknown' bears comparison with
Rosenheim's normalizing rhetoric; it also underlines for us
the contrast with AIDS, when the unknown-ness of the disease
was one of its most terrifying aspects. On the other hand,
despite this phrase, the whole thrust of Douglas's portrayal
of hepatitis B in The Houseman's Tale shows it as a terrifying
and intractable disease. Exposure to it was one of the more
severe of the many trials that mark the transition of the
junior doctor from callow youth to medical manhood: those who
succumbed were heroes, those who survived were heroes. But -
in this version - the nurse who unwittingly passes on
infection to three doctors is an object of blame and disgust.
It would certainly be unwise to generalize from a reading of
this particular account; there is evidence elsewhere of
sympathy between members of different professional groups
within the health care arena over the issue of hepatitis B
infection. One Rosenheim witness spoke of being moved by
accounts of young doctors and nurses dying. The same witness
suggested that doctors were cautious when it came to treating
drug addicts who might be hepatitis B carriers.' 2 The renal
unit outbreaks possibly enhanced an already-existing
' P. A. Treichier, 'AIDS, gender and biomedical discourse:
current contests for meaning', in Fee and Fox, AIDS: the
burdens of history, pp. 190-266, esp. pp. 190-2.
42 Williams, interview.
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perception of certain categories of patients as hazardous.
Here is a description from the renal unit setting which,
despite the constraints of medical journalese, succeeds In
conveying the problems that could be encountered when a
patient was uncooperative:
Case P4 had developed renal failure with a right renal
carbuncle and pyelonephritis due to septicaemia from
self-administration of methadone ... Personality and
psychological difficulties greatly complicated treatment
in this man. Routine dialysis, with access to the
bloodstream by arteriovenous fistula, was frequently
disrupted, resulting in blood spillage and staff
intervention, with contamination.43
In another context, for instance, a discussion of samples in
test tubes, the term 'contamination' could be used in an
unemotive scientific way, but here It bears an emotional
connotation: staff who are forced to intervene are exposed to
danger from the spilled blood of a drug addict.
Conclusions
This chapter described the hepatitis outbreaks in renal
dialysis units in Britain in the period 1965-71, which are
seen to have had a major impact on the way that the medical
profession and policy makers constructed hepatitis B. Now
seen primarily as an occupational hazard of health workers,
hepatitis B was regarded as a far more threatening hazard
after this episode than before. On the other hand, this
chapter has also described how this dramatic new risk of
hepatitis was successfully contained after 1972, when the
Rosenheim committee reported.
Knight et al, 'Hepatitis-associated antigen', 605.
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How far was this success attributable to the Australia antigen
discovery and the availability of a test for hepatitis B, for
the first time, from 1969/1970? Clearly these scientific
developments provided very important tools. The timing of
their application was almost certainly influenced by the renal
unit outbreaks; had these not occurred, there would probably
have been a longer period of exploration, of testing the
tests, before implementation. Had a test not become
available, it seems renal units would still have continued in
operation, although greater changes in mode of operation might
have been seen, with patients treated in spatially separated
cubicles, and home dialysis favoured. 4' Since the system of
testing introduced in this country was not applied in many
other countries, or not applied so soon, it cannot be assumed
as the inevitable 'logical' response.'5
In view of the enormous impact of the renal unit outbreaks, in
reinforcing the construction of hepatitis B as a (blood
associated) hospital infection and as an occupational hazard
of health workers, the 'normalizing' efforts of the Rosenheim
committee must be seen as significant. There are implications
for Chapter 7, which shows health and safety of most health
' Britain actually moved towards home dialysis earlier, faster
and further than many other European countries despite its
success in containing hepatitis in renal units - other factors
partly account for this shift.
' See literature on different rates of diffusion of new
medical technologies, for example: Stocking, 'Factors
affecting diffusion'; chapter on 'Medical innovation' in J. R.
Hollingsworth, J. Hage and R. A. Hanneman, State Intervention
in medical care. Consequences for Britain, France, Sweden and
the United States, 1890-1970 (Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, 1990), pp. 112-36.
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workers, in relation to hepatitis B, tackled in the l970s by
hygiene precautions and compensation provisions, rather than
by testing (as in renal units); and by extrapolation, for
Chapter 8 also, where health and safety policies set the
agenda for a limited vaccine policy.
Perhaps the most important feature of the response to the
renal unit outbreaks, for the analysis of policy-making, is
not so much the arrival of the Australia antigen test, or the
setting up of advisory groups to make recommendations, but
rather the balance between central co-ordination and local
initiative. Health staff confronted with the problems were
working out their own solutions ahead of the establishment of
a central advisory groups by the DHSS, so that the experts
sitting on this group were able to draw on both positive and
negative experience at the 'coal face'. There was very
practical evidence of the utility of the Australia antigen
test in containing the hepatitis outbreak at Royal Free, for
example. The role of the central PHLS and the national
network of public health laboratories was also crucial. There
are analogies in the case of clearing the blood supply of
hepatitis B, the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5: HEPATITIS IN BLOOD AND BLOOD PRODUCTS: ISSUES OF
ALTRUISM AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY [c1972-1987]
From the earliest point when hepatitis B began to be
identified as a separate disease, during the war, it had been
closely associated with blood and plasma and in the postwar
period it was seen as a major hazard of blood transfusion.
The Australia antigen test was rapidly grasped as a means to
control this hazard - perhaps more rapidly than would
otherwise have been the case, had not the renal unit outbreaks
forced hepatitis B up the health policy agenda at the end of
the 1960s. The science of hepatitis B and the implications of
the Australia antigen finding were subject to much excited
discussion around this time, of course, but the mood was
rather one of opening up an area of investigation, than of
having found the answers. 1
 At the same time as establishing
the Rosenheim Committee, the Department of Health set up a
parallel committee on testing blood, the Maycock Committee,
the subject of the first part of this chapter.
The previous chapter warned against seeing the application of
Australia antigen testing to the problem of hepatitis B in
renal units as the whole explanation of the solution.
Organizational structures and initiative were as important as
central policy. This is clearly true of testing blood too,
and here we have to consider additional caveats to the notion
' See for example: 'Australia antigen and hepatitis', leading
article, Lancet, 1969 (ii), 143-4; 'Hepatitis virus', leading
article, Lancet, 1969 (ii), 577-8; oral evidence is not
particularly helpful here, tending to give an over-positive
interpretation of applications of the finding.
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of 'solution'. While testing effected a valuable reduction in
rates of hepatitis B following whole blood transfusion, it had
far less impact where blood products such as Factor V111 2
 were
concerned. The two main variables here, pooling and source of
the raw material (plasma), will be discussed in relation to
the influential work of Richard Titmuss on this subject; for
Titmuss, donor altruism was the greatest guarantee of safety,
and payment of the donor compromised safety. The remainder of
the chapter traces the failure to remove the infection hazard
from a small but important area of the blood supply: blood
products for haemophiliacs.
During the 1970s, a large number of haemophiliacs in England
and Wales became infected with hepatitis, as the use of Factor
VIII increased. 3
 Few died and it seems the risk was
subordinate to other considerations, of cost and convenience,
in choice of products. In any case, the organization of
transfusion services was not geared to meeting the ever-
increasing demand, and commercial Factor VIII, mainly from
America, filled the gap throughout the l970s and into the
1980s. Although expert opinion was divided on the question of
source versus pool size in determining hepatitis risk - and
NHS products used large pools - the inexporable rise in
hepatitis rates among haemophiliacs played a part in the drive
2 A concentrated plasma fraction contained the missing
clotting factor; there was also factor IX for a rarer form of
haemophilia. There were roughly 4,500 haemophiliacs in the UK
at the time the clotting factors were introduced.
Some of this infection was hepatitis B, some was non-A non-B
hepatitis, a diagnosis of exclusion as no test was available.
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to seek self-sufficiency in blood products.' Despite
government promises to upgrade the central Blood Products
Laboratory, from 1976 onwards, upgrading and self-sufficiency
in blood products was not achieved until ten years later, by
which time many haemophiliacs had been infected with HIV/AIDS
as well as hepatitis.
The Maycock committee and its successors
During the postwar period, the hepatitis risk associated with
transfusion had been monitored by the MRC, as well as the
blood transfusion service and the central Blood Products
Laboratory, at Elstree near London. A 1954 MRC study on
hepatitis after blood and plasma tranfusion reported a rate of
0.36 per cent for whole blood and 1.17 per cent for plasma.5
Subsequently an MRC Working Party on Post-transfusion
Hepatitis was established, to meet intermittently, with
Zuckerman of LSHTM as secretary from 1966, and Sir William
Maycock, Director of BPL, as chairman. Zuckerman felt that he
had stimulated MRC interest in hepatitis,' which may be partly
the case; but the concern which had developed during the war
had probably never faded completely. Figures such as
Mollison, Professor of Haematology at St Mary's Hospital
' An aim achieved north of the border, in Scotland, before
1980, with a consequent reduction in infection hazard.
'Homologous serum jaundice after transfusion of whole blood,
dried small-pool plasma, dried irradiated plasma, and kaolin-
treated filtered liquid plasma', Lancet, 1954 (1), 1328-9;
this was a report of a survey by an ad hoc group on behalf of
the MRC, Ministry of Health, and Department of Health for
Scotland.
' A. 3. Zuckerman, interview, 8 June 1992.
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Medical School, 7 and Maycock, head of BPL and adviser on blood
transfusion, were clearly aware of the problem.
Through its longstanding connections with the MRC on blood
transfusion policy, the Department of Health was primed for
action when rumours of the link between Australia antigen and
hepatitis B hardened into high probability, and tests became
available. In 1970, at the same time as setting up the
Rosenheim committee on hepatitis in renal units, the DHSS also
established a committee on Australia antigen testing in the
blood supply under Maycock. Reporting in 1972,8 the Maycock
Committee laid down ground rules for hepatitis testing of all
blood, which seem uncontroversial in retrospect. But the
scientific evidence on which the committee based its decisions
had shifted and accumulated with unprecedented speed during
the two years it had been sitting, so that technical choices
on which sort of test to use changed from one month to
another. With a national network of regional transfusion
centres administering about two million donations a year, the
organization and financing of testing appeared at the time as
formidable tasks.
Several members of the Maycock committee are familiar names
elsewhere in this history: F. 0. MacCallum, the virologist who
had led the wartime jaundice research team, now with the PHLS
at the Radcliffe Infirmary, Oxford; A. J. Zuckerman,
Author of Blood transfusion in clinical medicine (cited in
Chapter 4): 1st edition 1951, 2nd 1956, etc; Director of MRC
Experimental Haematology Unit at St Mary's.
e Maycock Report.
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virologist at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical
Medicine; D. S. Dane, virologist at the Middlesex Hospital,
London; and Yvonne Cossart of the Central PHLS Virus Reference
Laboratory at Colindale. These four, plus five of the
remaining six members of the committee, and the chairman, were
all Fellows of the Royal College of Pathologists. Only one
member represented the 'rank and file' of face workers in
daily contact with the process of testing blood, the
laboratory technicians: C. H. Collins, a Fellow of the
Institute of Medical Laboratory Technicians.' The Maycock and
Rosenheim committees liaised closely, but Maycock took no live
evidence, relying instead on papers 'from a wide variety of
sources at home and abroad including WHO', and information
passed on by contacts of committee members.'°
The MRC study of 1954 and another in progress in 1970-72 led
the Maycock committee to estimate that hepatitis with jaundice
occurred in about 0.2 per cent of transfusion recipients but
anicteric hepatitis (without jaundice and therefore not
diagnosed) possibly in about 4-5 per cent.' 1 Testing should
reduce this to about a quarter of the present incidence,
' There were also secretaries to the committee, two of whom
were provided by the DHSS.
'° Maycock Report, p. 1; the International Society of
Haematology Symposium, 1970, was another valued Input.
" Ibid, p.2. See also: Lendrum, R., Walker, J. G. et al,
'Post-transfusion hepatitis in a London hospital: results of a
two-year prospective study', Report to the MRC Blood
Transfusion Research Committee by the MRC Working Party on
Post-Transfusion Hepatitis, Journal of Hygiene (Cambridge), 73
(1974), 173-188, for estimate of morbidity and mortality at
around 27 cases of hepatitis, including 8 deaths, per 10,000
units of blood transfused in patients receiving blood only.
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lessening the burden on the NHS - as well as individual
suffering - and was therefore recommended. But the committee
sought a balance between safety, and ensuring that an adequate
supply of blood was maintained. With views about the
Australia antigen in a state of flux, there was uncertainty
over serological evidence of past infection - or rather, how
far to regard this as a danger.'2
 There was a dilemma over
whether to exclude donors found to be antibody positive, as
well as those who were antigen positive; Maycock recommended
exclusion of both on the basis of relatively insensitive
tests. 13
 Regional blood transfusion centres might choose a
more sensitive test, such as radioimmunoassay, which could
reveal a large number of donors with low levels of antibody;
Maycock recommended against exclusion of such donors,
recognizing that such a step might seriously reduce donor
panel size. There was no consensus at this point on the
likely infectivity of people whose blood carried antibody
without detectable antigen.
The task of the Maycock committee was undoubtedly facilitated
by the work of a few regional transfusion centres that had
previously started Australia antigen testing, providing a
limited amount of data on the likely numbers of donors in
different categories (antigen or antibody positive) using
different tests. Maycock made special mention of Glasgow and
12 Finding the evidence, i.e. presence of antibodies, required
a mirror image of the procedure for antigen testing, and was
possible once HBsAg testing itself was available.
Immunodiffusion, immunoelectroosmophoresis, complement
fixation: the point is, these would only pick up those with
high levels of antigen or antibody.
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West of Scotland, and Sheffield BTCs. Another centre which
introduced testing early was North London BTC; its Director,
Dr A. Cleghorn, decided to exclude only those donors found to
be antigen positive, on the grounds that antibody in the blood
indicated successful resistance to the virus and almost
certainly a non-infective state. Dane, who sat on the Maycock
committee, agreed with Cleghorn's policy, but this was the
minority interpretation, until gradually other BTCs came round
to the same view.' 4
 There existed for some time a situation
where North London BTC, contrary to the recommendations of
Maycock, was supplying blood which had tested positive for
hepatitis B antibody (but negative for antigen): in the view
of some experts running a risk of infecting patients.
Cleghorn, Dane and their colleagues, on the other hand, were
confident on the basis of the tests they were using that their
own interpretation was correct, and their procedures safe.
Advance testing by some regional BTCs, and their different
policies following the 1972 Maycock recommendations,
illustrate the semi-autonomy of the regions which is such a
striking characteristic of many services within the apparently
centralized British NHS. Universal screening of all blood
donations was achieved within a few months of the Maycock
report, but choice of tests used, and which donors to exclude,
varied. From two points of view, scientific and financial, a
greater degree of central co-ordination might have had
advantages. Had evaluation of tests been organized centrally,
large-scale results could have been amassed and assessed
D. S. Dane, interview, 6 August 1992.
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rapidly. Since antibody testing added to costs, a more rapid
recognition that it was superfluous could have saved money.
But the entrenched system of local control by the consultant
in charge of ward or laboratory extended to the BTCs; central
policy here, as in other areas, laid down guidelines for
safety and left much leeway for local initiative.
This is not to belittle the achievements of the UK blood
transfusion service in rapidly clearing the blood supply of a
very large percentage of hepatitis B. In some centres,
notably Glasgow and North London BTCs, as well as the central
BPL, considerable effort went into developing improved tests.
Percentage returns diminished sharply, that is, the number of
cases of hepatitis B prevented by improved testing became
fewer with each improvement, so that costs had to be low to
justify research and development expenditure.' 5
 At BPL, a
research scientist and a technician, in alliance with Dane's
Middlesex Hospital team, and North London BTC, evolved a test
that became widely adopted for use in the NHS, reputedly
saving the service £10 million compared with commercial
products.' 6
 The wonder is not that BPL made a successful
test, saving the NHS millions of pounds, but rather that most
tests have been bought in from commercial companies like the
Weilcome Foundation.' 7
 Why does the NHS have to rely so
'5 J. Barbara, Microbioloqy in blood transfusion (Bristol,
London, Boston: Wright-PSG, 1983), pp. 24-5.
16 See Chapter 6 for more detailed account.
Weilcome's 'Hepatest' was developed in collaboration with
some of the researchers involved in the BPL test; see Chapter
6 again.
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heavily on pharmaceutical companies for its requirements?
This question becomes even more urgent when we turn to look at
blood products.
It remains to take this account of hepatitis in the blood
transfusion service through the 1970s by recording that the
Maycock report of 1972 was followed by updates in 1975 and
1981 . 18
 Essentially the second report, in 1975, responded to
refinements in testing and in views of carrier status.19
Donors with antibody were to be retained on the panel, those
with a history of jaundice need no longer be excluded; a
particular type of test was recommended; 2° there was more
emphasis on testing BTC staff; and on extracting specific
anti-hepatitis B immunoglobulin from donors with sufficient
antibody. The central PHLS was asked to supply reagents to
regional BTCs and reference centres. Epidemiological work
under the central PHLS should be supplemented by all testing
centres letting each other know immediately of cases of
hepatitis caused by blood or blood products. Differential
notification of B and other types of hepatitis should be
reconsidered by the DHSS.
The advisory group which prepared the 1981 report, in addition
to a different chairman, had a substantial change In personnel
' Maycock remained as chair for the 1975 group; the group
which reported in 1981 was chaired by W. 1. Jenkins.
19 DHSS, Second report of the advisory group on testing for the
presence of hepatitis B surface anti gen and its antibody
(London: HMSO, 1975)
20 Reversed passive haemagglutination rather than counter-
iminunoelectrophoresis.
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- only four members of the 1975 group remained. 21 Elise
Vandervelde replaced Yvonne Cossart (with whom she worked
closely); Dame Sheila Sherlock, Professor of Medicine at Royal
Free Hospital Medical School, the doyenne of liver function
testing, was an obvious choice; Dr E. A. C. Follett of Glasgow
Regional Virus Laboratory and T. E. Cleghorn of North London
BTC were other additions. For the first time the group
brought out its report using the term 'hepatitis B surface'
antigen and antibody, abandoning the previous 'Australia
antigen' terminology. New standards of sensitivity were set
for tests, indeed a British standard of HBsAg was available to
suitable laboratories. 22 Debates recently opened up in the
scientific community were reflected in negative
recommendations: against screening for the core antigen (it
seemed adequate to screen for the surface antigen only as a
proxy for infectivity); and against the use of liver function
tests for general screening of blood donors. 23 Now, as
concern over non-A, non-B hepatitis was rising, hospitals were
asked to single out suspected cases; research into the extent
of non-A, non-B hepatitis viruses 'should be undertaken in the
21 DHSS, Third report of the advisory group on testing for the
presence of hepatitis B surface anti gen and its antibody,
1981. (Typescript)
22 To be designated as 'suitable', a laboratory had to
demonstrate awareness of the need for safe handling of HBsAg.
23 As Sherlock was the expert on liver function tests and sat
on this advisory group, it can be assumed she supported this
recommendation. Liver function tests could detect raised
transaminase levels which might indicate hepatitis in its
early stages (when it would not be detectable by antigen
testing) but might be due to other causes; some 3 per cent of
donors could be ruled out if these tests were applied, without
appreciable clinical benefit: Third report on testin g for
hepatitis, p. 5.
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UK'. 24 Other fresh recommendations included the setting up of
a panel of experts to assess new hepatitis tests; and training
programmes to be established by the blood transfusion service
for staff who carried out hepatitis testing.25
Haemophillacs and risk factors in blood products
It may be recalled from chapter 3 that haemophiliacs figured
prominently among subjects whose blood contained antibodies
which reacted with Australia antigen in the early experimental
days, when Blumberg and others were fitting together the
pieces of the puzzle. Samples of blood from haemophiliacs
also proved valuable in EM research, when the antigen and then
the virus were visualised. Haemophiliacs were useful in this
way because they received multiple tranfusions, when little
else could be done to counter the bleeding they suffered
from. 2' Many other means of stemming the flow of blood were
tried - for example, there was a vogue for snake venom in the
l940s27 - but there was no really effective treatment until
the isolation of clotting factors: Factor VIII for haemophilia
A and Factor IX for haemophilia B, which became available for
treatment in the 1960s.
24 Ibid, p. 8.
25 This may reflect technicians' protests around 1980 over DHSS
attempts to downgrade the hazard rating of hepatitis B: see
Chapter 7.
26 Multi-transfused patients were likely to have been exposed
to hepatitis B infection; their blood would then carry either
antigen or antibody.
27 D. Bateman, 'The good bleed guide: a patient's story',
Social History of Medicine, 7 (1994), 115-33, esp.124.
155
Clotting factors must have appeared as one of those miracles
of modern medicine that transform an intractable problem
overnight, in this case freeing haemophiliacs from long
periods of hospitalisation, and increasing life expectancy.
It was a great advance in the treatment of haemophilia, but
like many other new medical technologies, it brought new
problems, in this case especially an Intensified risk of
hepatitis infection. As Factor VIII became a home-use,
everyday treatment, the hepatitis risk was further multiplied;
but hepatitis infection was often covert and unrecognized. In
any case, as with other innovations, the gains outweighed the
side-effects, in most contemporaries' view.
Besides the pool size, the social nature of the donation was
another important determinant of safety in the blood supply -
the most important in the view of at least one authority.
Richard Titmuss, in his 1970 study of blood and policy,
discussed the social dimensions of blood and plasma production
at length, but the argument can be summarized simply: was the
donor paid or not? 28 At that time, the rate of hepatitis
associated with blood transfusion was much higher in countries
where many donors were paid, such as the US and Japan, than it
was in Britain, where blood donors were entirely voluntary and
unpaid. 29 Sparse statistics were available in the 1960s, but
rates appeared to be in the order of 10 to 25 per cent in
Japan, compared with under 0.2 per cent in Britain, for whole
28 Titmuss, Gift relationship), p.l57; actually his summary is
not quite so simple.
29 There was a much higher prevalence of hepatitis B in Japan
than in Britain but Titmuss took this into account.
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blood transfusion. 30 Various US studies indicated a much
higher rate where the source of blood was paid donors. Quite
apart from any differences in prevalence of hepatitis carriers
in different populations, Titmuss indicated the sale of blood
was crucial:
These disastrously high rates in Japan have been
attributed almost entirely to the fact that approximately
98 per cent of all blood is bought and sold
"professional blood sellers" - popularly known as "tako"
(octopus) - are said to visit two commercial banks a day,
selling 200cc. at each bank. Before each visit they gulp
a concoction of iron filings in salt water, and eat
spinach and dried sardines, in the belief that this will
thicken their blood.3'
Titmuss noted that the American Ambassador had contracted
hepatitis from blood transfusions in a Tokyo hospital in 1964.
Ironically, the commercialism in the blood supply seemed to
stem from a decision to pay donors in Japan in order to supply
blood to Americans in Korea in 1951; but since then, with
rising commercialization, there had developed a growing
shortage of blood.
Another point of special relevance in the manufacture of blood
products was that plasma donors could make more frequent
donations than those giving whole blood. In plasmapheresis,
blood was taken from the donor, most of the plasma extracted,
and the red cells returned to the donor, in one process. If a
plasma donor carried hepatitis B, then the ability to donate
more frequently increased the chances of passing the infection
to more recipients. But why was the altruistic motive in
° Titmuss, Gift relationshi p , pp. 154-5.
' Ibid. p. 156, with quote from: 'Blood donors in Japan',
Transfusion, 3 (1963), 213.
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giving blood or plasma a safeguard? What happened when giving
blood became a commercial transaction?
In all cases of blood and plasma donation, processing and
distribution, Titmuss argued, the crucial factors are trust
and truthfulness: trust must be displayed by those taking,
buying or receiving the blood or blood product, and in return
they expect truthfulness from the donor, salesperson or
medical personnel giving the blood or blood product. At each
stage, trust and truthfulness could be compromised by a
commercial transaction. The switch from an altruistic motive
for giving blood to one of financial gain attracted a higher
proportion of indigent people, less healthy and perhaps more
secretive about their health record than most voluntary
donors. Similarly, companies promoting sales of blood
products were sometimes dishonest concerning the origins of
the blood, and more willing to overlook slack health checks on
donors. In the States, the growing number of profit-making
hospitals often paid less attention to quality and safety
controls than to the price of commercially-produced blood
products for which they provided an expanding market - as
evidenced by the higher rates of post transfusion hepatitis in
such hospitals.32
With the introduction of Australia antigen testing, the
situation changed dramatically for whole blood, but not for
blood products. Titmuss, though aware of the possibility of a
32 For an expansion and updating of this argument with data on
the US, see: P. Hagan, Blood: gift or merchandise? (New York:
Alan Liss, 1982)
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test for serum hepatitis, was unsure of its close imminence
when he wrote in 1970:
The absence of a scientific check on quality and safety
means that the subsequent biological condition of those
who receive blood constitutes the ultimate test of
whether the virus was present in the donation; in effect,
therefore, the patient is the laboratory for testing the
quality of 'the gift'.33
The advent of a test for hepatitis B, albeit initially a
rather unreliable one, made possible a shift in the site of
the laboratory from the patient's body to the blood
transfusion centres, blood banks in the US, or reference
laboratories. Both in the more commercial environment in the
US, and in the UK, this was achieved rapidly with central
policy being drawn up on the basis of expert advice, then
imposed throughout the system.
If we looked at a graph of the number of hepatitis B carriers
found among blood donors, or cases of post transfusion
hepatitis B, in the 1970s and 1980s, we would observe a rapid
fall after the introduction of testing in 1972 and a gradual
whittling away of the residue thereafter. 34 Does this mean
that Titmuss's emphasis on trust and truthfulness was
bypassed, dismissed into irrelevance by the laboratory test
which removed the risk from the previous test site, the
patient's body? No, on at least two counts. First, patients
still needed to trust the doctor or nurse administering the
transfusion or blood product, and behind them the whole array
of laboratory technicians, manufacturers of tests, and
" Titmuss, Gift relationship, pp. 142-3.
Barbara, Microbioloqy in blood transfusion, pp. 25, 42.
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suppliers of blood products. Second, a hepatitis risk
remained: a minimal risk of hepatitis B, since samples from a
donor in the early stage of incubation might test negative but
still carry infection (a risk magnified by pooling); and a
larger risk of non-A, non-B hepatitis, which was still
untestable. As one problem was brought under control, another
problem emerged, or so it seemed: of course, non-A, non-B
hepatitis had been there all along and was merely revealed by
the new mastery over hepatitis B. And as we now know, by the
late 1970s or early l9BOs (depending which area you consider)
a further problem was lurking in the blood supply: HIV/AIDS.
Safety, cost and convenience in choice of blood products
For technical reasons already explained (removal of multiple
donations from donors by plasmapheresis, combined with pooling
large numbers of plasma donations to make plasma fractions)
blood products such as Factor viii were much more liable to
transmit hepatitis (B or, more likely, non-A, non-B), than
simple blood or plasma transfusions. Thus, for recipients of
blood products, donor and manufacturer truthfulness remained
especially important. Yet, in the US, the use of paid donors
remained legal for plasmapheresis, probably because of the
high degree of involvement of commercial blood banks and
pharmaceutical companies in manufacturing blood products. Paid
donors meant an increased risk of hepatitis in the product.
Companies trawled third world countries for the raw materials;
plasma was imported into Europe and the US from countries with
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a high rate of hepatitis. 35 In the UK, where all blood and
plasma donors were unpaid, home-produced blood products
afforded a safer supply than imported, commercially produced
products - though the degree of safety was debatable, because
of the large pool size used in manufacture. In any case,
hepatitis risk was not at the forefront of policy concerns:
other factors were to decide whether Britain opted for use of
imported blood products.
At the beginning of the 1970s, when it was still a relatively
new treatment, Britain used mainly home-produced Factor
VIII. 36
 Concerns over safety focussed on pool size and method
of manufacture, rather than whether the donor was paid or not.
Besides safety, there was concern to predict the amount and
type of Factor VIII likely to be needed by haemophiliacs as
the treatment became routine; and to find ways of stepping up
production. There was also a strong movement towards enabling
haemophiliacs to use Factor VIII at home, rather than limit it
to hospital use.
These issues are reflected in the report of an MRC committee,
which sat between 1969 and 1972, looking at the use of Factor
VIII made from various sorts of concentrate in the UK. 37
 The
Bateman, 'Good bleed guide'; Hagan, Blood: gift or
merchandise?
36 This was mainly cryoprecipitate, given in hospitals;
increased home treatment led to greater demand for freeze-
dried concentrate, imported when UK supplies were inadequate.
R. Biggs, C. R. C. Rizza et al, 'Factor VIII concentrates
made in the United Kingdom and the treatment of haemophilia
based on studies made during 1969-72', Report of the MRC's
Blood Transfusion Research Committee Working Party on the
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group came to the conclusion that: '... within the next few
years a great effort should be made to increase the amount of
plasma which is fractionated in the United Kingdom.' 38 They
saw a need to boost the amount of one type of concentrate
(freeze-dried) as opposed to another (cryoprecipitate), to
facilitate home treatment - the former being easier for the
haemophiliac to reconsitute and self-administer. The working
party thought that the incidence of jaundice depended more on
dose than on the type of donor or size of pool, and noted that
antigen testing should in any case reduce the danger of
hepatitis infection. The rationale for stepping up UK home
production of Factor VIII (and other blood products) was thus
one of cost, not of safety.
The cost-reduction argument was later supported by two
Scottish studies, published in the British Medical Journal in
1976. A group from Glasgow, arguing for changes to allow more
home treatment of haemophiliacs, mentioned among factors that
might reduce the cost of home treatment: ... most of the
freeze-dried concentrate used in the United Kingdom is
imported and it is forecast that supplies produced in this
country will be cheaper'	 An Edinburgh report pointed out
the paradox of failing to invest in home production of blood
Cryoprecipitate Method of Preparing AHF Concentrates, British
Journal of Haematoloqy, 27 (1974), 391-405. Rosemary Biggs,
Director of Oxford Haemophilia Centre, chaired the Working
Party: Maycock and Cleghorn were members.
38 Ibid, 404.
F. Carter, C. D. Forbes et al, 'Cost of management of
patients with haemophilia', British Medical Journal, 1976 (2),
467.
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products: 'Unless the blood transfusion services receive
increased amounts of money and reappraise their functions and
operation, it seems likely that they will have to rely
increasingly on commercial (and costly) sources for the major
plasma fractions.' 40
 The problem can be characterized as one
of tension between central investment versus regional current
expenditures - as well as a lack of political will to
reorganize the system, to ensure adequate supplies of plasma
reached the centre from the regions. To 'reappraise their
functions and operation' proved more feasible in Scotland,
with its more centralized blood transfusion service, than in
England and Wales where each regional BTC was semi-autonomous.
Through the late 1970s, while Scotland headed towards self-
sufficiency in blood products, 4' imported blood products
occupied an increasing share of the increasing amount of
Factor VIII administered south of the border.
Rising imports of commercial Factor VIII and a promise of
self-sufficiency
Cost was only one of several possible considerations
determining policy on blood products. The purity and safety
of the product was another, hypothetically perhaps worthy of a
good deal of expenditure. There were debates in the l970s,
and thereafter into the AIDS era of the 1980s, over the degree
40 j D. Cash and M. Spencely, 'Haemophilia A and the blood
transfusion service: a Scottish study', British Medical
Journal, 1976 (2), 682.
' See: Cash and Spencely, 'Haemophilia A', for view that
Scotland was virtually self-sufficient by 1980/81.
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to which the use of paid donors increased the likelihood of
hepatitis transmission. For example, an international
haemophllia symposium held in Glasgow in 1980 discussed data
on hepatitis, among other problems. 42 An increase in the
incidence of both B and non-A, non-B hepatitis had been noted
in 1974 and 1975, following the use of imported commercial
freeze-dried Factor VIII from Europe and the US, to make up
for the shortfall in NHS supplies. Other commercial
concentrates were licensed for UK use in 1976; by 1980, six
brands were in use altogether, of which four were made in the
US from large pools of plasma obtained by plasmapheresis from
paid donors, one was made in Austria, and the sixth was NHS
Factor VIII, made using large pools of plasma from volunteer
donors. Craske, virologist at the PHLS laboratory at the
Withington Hospital, Manchester, responsible for this survey,
was reluctant to commit himself on the question of whether the
NHS product was less likely to transmit hepatitis than the
commercial products, emphasizing the large pool size in the
NHS process.43
In America, where commercial products were more widely used,
the transmission of hepatitis B to haemophiliacs was clearly
enormous. According to a 1983 report:
Approximately 85% of all patients with clinically severe
42 j • Craske/ Public Health Laboratory, Wlthington Hospital
Manchester, 'The epidemiology of factor VIII and IX associated
hepatitis in the UK', in C. D. Forbes and G. D. 0. Lowe (eds),
Unresolved problems in haemophilia (Lancaster: MTP Press,
1980), pp. 5-14; and pp. 14-17, discussion of paper.
The safety advantage of voluntary donations for whole blood
was much clearer: Craske, 'Epidemiology of factor VIII and IX
associated hepatitis', p. 6.
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haemophilia needing frequent transfusions with
concentrates of Factor VIII or IX have serologic evidence
of previous exposure to hepatitis B antigen (HBsAg), and
up to 10% will be HBsAg carriers. The incidence of liver
dysfunction is high, and liver biopsies from patients
with haemophilia have shown a spectrum of liver diseases,
from mild focal inflammation to chronic active hepatitis,
cirrhosis, and even hepatic malignancies.44
In England and Wales, as the use of imported commercial
clotting factors increased, incidence and levels of hepatitis-
associated morbidity among haemophi 1 iacs undoubtedly
increased, though hepatitis was seldom recorded directly as
the cause of death. Hepatitis was responsible for only two of
the total of 89 deaths among patients with haemophilia A and
18 with haemophilia B during the period 1976-80.
Overall, between 1968 and 1988 the consumption of Factor VIII
in the UK increased ten-fold; between 1971 and 1980, the
proportion of the demand met by imported commercial Factor
VIII increased from zero to over 60 per cent. The rise in
hepatitis among haemophiliacs at the same time as the rise in
imported products does not prove a causal link - the NHS
product could have been equally, or more, responsible - but
there was a strong suspicion that imported Factor VIII carried
a greater hepatitis hazard.4'
G. C. White and H. R. Lesesne, 'Hemophilia, hepatitis and
the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome', Annals of Internal
Medicine, 98 (1983), 403.
C. R. Rizza and R. Spooner, 'Treatment of haemophilia and
related disorders in Britain and Northern Ireland during 1976-
80: report on behalf of the directors of haemophilia centres
in the United Kingdom', British Medical Journal, 286 (1983),
929-33.
" This view could have been partly due to the Influence of
Titmuss, as my colleague Virginia Berridge has pointed out.
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The whole issue of trade in blood and blood products was
becoming more and more highly politicized. A Granada
television 'World in Action' two-part programme in 1975
brought the trade in blood and plasma to public attention, and
spotlighted the increased hepatitis risk from imported blood
products. 47 Directors of UK haemophilia centres made
representations to government, and in 1976 Dr David Owen as
Secretary of State for Health announced at the third European
Regional Congress of the World Federation of Haemophilia, held
in London, that the central Blood Products Laboratory would be
upgraded with the aim of achieving self-sufficiency in UK
production of Factor VIII by mid-1977. 48 However, despite
embarrassment caused to successive government by concern over
imported blood products, the upgrading of BPL was repeatedly
delayed; first under a Labour government and then after 1979
under a Conservative government.
As well as pressure from the haemophilia lobby, there was
pressure on the government from health unions, especially over
the sale of whole blood collected within the NHS to overseas
purchasers. Equally worrying were moves to sell blood to
private companies in the UK. The union which represented most
blood laboratory technicians responded angrily when it got
wind of moves to open up the market in British blood, under
the first Thatcher Conservative government:
ASTMS would be totally opposed to any involvement of
'Blood money', Granada TV, 1975: I ani grateful to Professor
A. J. Zuckerman, who acted as adviser for the programmes, for
alerting me to this production.
" P. Jones, Personal record (see n. 58, below)
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private drug companies in blood products manufacturing in
the UK. The raw material having been donated voluntarily
and freely by the population, it was immoral to involve
commercial enterprises in the utilisation of that raw
material for prof it.49
This tersely worded response to the threat of private
enterprise in blood product manufacture in the UK offers an
absolute moral stance, rather than an assessment of relative
safety of commercial versus voluntary products. The union was
probably correct to assume that donors who gave their blood
free of charge would prefer it not to be bought and sold. It
is quite refreshing to have this moral position iterated,
independently of considerations of cost and safety.
Meanwhile the delays in implementing the plan to upgrade the
Blood Products Laboratory continued. The will to allocate the
necessary capital sum - which kept increasing the longer the
scheme was delayed - was lacking, while the DHSS continued to
displace responsibility for purchasing policy onto regional
BTCs and haemophilia centres. According to one account, the
plan for a new BPL was suspended almost as soon as it had been
aired, in the first round of NHS cuts following intervention
by the International Monetary Fund;" the irony was, the
calculations which prompted the Chancellor to seek assistance
were based on faulty Treasury forecasts.51
" D. 0. G. Craig, 'Blood products - the battle against private
enterprise goes on', Medical World, 119, 9/10 (Sept/Oct 1981),
p . 15.
° Bateman, 'Good bleed guide', 131.
D. Healey, The time of my life (London: Michael Joseph,
1989), p. 381: 'If I had been given accurate forecasts in 1976
I would never have needed to go to the IMF at all' - budgetary
requirement estimate for 1976 was £2,000 billion too high.
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The problem of rebuilding BPL was not only one of costs but
also of organization, with the need to ensure that adequate
supplies of plasma flowed from the regional BTCs. Very little
was done to increase this flow, right through to the 1980s.52
There was also a question over who should run the Blood
Products Laboratory. Until 1978, the MRC and the Lister
Institute were jointly responsible for BPL. 53 When the Lister
Institute was closing down in 1978, the North West Thames
Regional Health Authority agreed to take over management of
BPL for six months, since It fell within its area. In the
event, North West Thames Regional Health Authority ran BPL for
four years while the government decided (or failed to decide)
what to do about it: whether to operate It as a separate
health authority, as part of an existing health authority, as
a trust or as a commercial concern.
The advent of AIDS changed the picture dramatically. Panic
about the possibility that AIDS might be transmitted in blood
and blood products threatened to impede the functioning of the
blood transfusion service: donors showed reluctance to come
forward, while patients were clearly alarmed about possible
52 j • Cash, 'The blood transfusion service and the National
Health Service', British Medical 3ournal, 295 (1987), 617-9;
but see also: E. L. Harris, Chair of Advisory Committee on the
National Blood Transfusion Service, 'The blood transfusion
service and the National Health Service', (Corr.), British
Medical Journal, 295 (1987), 722-3, for claim that his
committee set targets for plasma production from the regions
to ensure full self-sufficiency of the new BPL in 1988.
" The Lister Institute had been set up In 1891, by voluntary
effort, as a bacteriological research Institute parallel with
the Pasteur Institute in Paris and the Koch Institute In
Berlin. See: H. Chick, M. Hume and M. Macfarlane, War on
disease. A history of the Lister Institute (London: Andre
Deutsch/ The Lister Institute, 1971)
168
contamination of transfused blood. In September 1983,
following consultation with directors of regional BTCs, the
DHSS produced a leaflet on AIDS and blood donors. Kenneth
Clarke, then Minister of Health, announcing the leaflet's
publication, said: 'It has been suggested that AIDS may be
transmitted in blood or blood products. There is no
conclusive proof that this is so.' 54 However, the fear was
recognized and, since no test was yet available, the leaflet
asked that anyone who thought they might have AIDS should
refrain from giving blood.
This was scarcely the stuff to quell all qualms; nor did
further information supplied to the press inspire great
confidence. Massaging the figures a little, the DHSS claimed
that: 'Half the Factor VIII used for the treatment of
haemophilia in this country is produced here and the remainder
imported from the USA'. Realising that the latter source was
suspect, they added that the US Food and Drug Administration
had laid down requirements intended 'to exclude donors from
high risk groups from plasma donation' - presumably (though
they did not spell it out) donors considered at high risk from
AIDS, such as gay men and IVDUs. Implicitly admitting that US
imports were recognized as hazardous, the press release
offered a commitment already seven years old at the time of
this 1983 press release:
The Government is committed to making Britain self-
sufficient in blood products - the National Blood
Transfusion Service already meets the demand for whole
blood - and is redeveloping the Blood Products Laboratory
DHSS Press Release: 'AIDS - and blood donation', 1 Sept
1983.
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at Elstree over the next 3 years."
The timescale was a little overoptimistic: it was another four
years before the upgraded BPL was opened in 1987, and full
functioning was not attained until mid 1988.'
The debate over infection of UK haemophiliacs with AIDS
The debate over liability for infection of many of the 5,000
or so haemophiliacs in the UK with the AIDS virus is analysed
in detail elsewhere. 57 Peter Jones, Director of the Northern
Regional Haemophilia Centre at Newcastle, who has been
extremely active in the National Haemophilia Foundation, has
given an insider's account, setting out the debates over
treatment and dates at which shifts in understanding or policy
took place. 58
 Critical debates, in retrospect, centre on the
timing of the introduction of two innovations: testing of
individual donations - delayed in this country from March to
October 1985 while a British test was developed - and heat
treatment of Factor VIII concentrate. Each of these measures
might help to render the product safer with regard to HIV
(though not hepatitis) and it has been argued that there was a
" Ibid.
56 The foundation stone was laid by Norman Fowler, then
Secretary of State for Health, in March 1984, and the new
building was opened by the Duchess of Gloucester on 29 April
1987; the name was changed to 'Blo' (as opposed to 'Blood')
Products Laboratory c. 1990. Thanks to staff at BPL for this
information.
" Berridge, History of the present.
58 am extremely grateful to Dr Jones for permission to read
and use this confidential account, and to my colleagues
Virginia Berridge and Janet Foster for drawing it to my
attention.
170
culpable delay which resulted in the infection of many more
haemophiliacs with HIV than might otherwise have been the
case.
The products which were safe for HIV could still transmit
hepatitis; indeed the recommended switch from cryoprecipitate
(used as an interim alternative to the more heavily infected
concentrate) to heat-treated concentrate might increase
transmission of non-A, non-B hepatitis. Towards the end of
1985, when the switch was recommended, although there had been
AIDS deaths among haemophiliacs and alarm was growing, it was
still not clear how much greater the AIDS threat was than that
of hepatitis, which caused few deaths but considerable long-
term liver damage among severely affected haemophiliacs.
The other strand of argument, connected with the thread
running through this chapter, concerns the origins of plasma
products. On the one hand we have Jones' view, tentatively
expressed in 1983, that the pool size of NHS concentrate had
increased to the point (over 3,500) where the benefits of
using only voluntary donors might have been lost." It was on
this basis that, having had a haemophilia patient die of AIDS
in November 1984, and in view of accumulating evidence on the
value of heat treatment, Jones in December 1984 switched all
his patients from NHS concentrates, which were not yet heat-
treated, to commercial heat-treated concentrates.'°
" P. Jones, 'Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, hepatitis and
haemophilia', British Medical Journal, 283 (1983), 1737-8.
'° P. Jones, Personal record, letter to colleagues explaining
decision, 13 Dec 1984.
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On the other hand, in spite of his patients having apparently
been infected with AIDS by NHS blood products, Jones still
believes that self-sufficiency in blood products in the 1970s
could have prevented many British AIDS deaths. Jones notes
that US companies were obtaining and processing plasma in
African countries and Mexico, where American rules did not
apply, then taking them through their US plants for re-export
to Europe. The import and license controls in the UK, he
suggests, were inadequate: the Chief Medical Officer of Health
had no knowledge of the use of extra-US plasma sources by US
companies." Of course with AIDS, as with hepatitis, high
endemicity could be as much a feature of some US source groups
as of African populations; Jones' point is that the British
authorities were ignorant of the perils they were allowing
into the country. Yet the importation of plasma from
developing countries was common knowledge in the haemophilia
community in the early 1970s.'2
Conclusions
In presenting the post-1970 history of hepatitis in the blood
supply, this chapter has shown the introduction of testing to
be something of a watershed for safety in whole blood
transfusion, but not in the use of blood products. Testing
all blood donations was a massive operation in terms of
organization, and imposed extra costs on the transfusion
' Jones, Personal record, pp. 70-1.
' Ibid, p. 72, referring to Bulletin 9 of the World Federation
of Haemophilia and papers of 10th Congress 1975.
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services; rapid, universal uptake cannot be assumed to be the
inevitable course. Again, as with the application of testing
in the renal unit outbreaks, we see a balance between local
initiative and central co-ordination. One example was the
North London Blood Transfusion Centre decision that testing
for antibody and excluding those found to carry it was
unnecessary; although the central advisory group did not
follow this policy at first, it later prevailed. There Is
another parallel with the renal unit situation (where the PHLS
played a crucial role) in the importance of certain allied
structures: the central Blood Products Laboratory as a
reference centre and producer of tests, and the regional blood
transfusion centres in implementing as well as creating
policy.
In describing and analysing the very different history of
hepatitis in blood products, I have chosen to emphasize the
failure to upgrade the Blood Products Laboratory to allow
England and Wales to achieve the self-sufficiency in blood
products which Scotland prided itself on by 1980. Use of
imported factor VIII was partly explained for the 1970s in
terms of factors other than safety, but insufficiency of the
home supply meant that imports were bound to increase. Not
only were the origins of commercial products suspect, so too
was their regulation. But the debate over culpability for the
infection of haemophiliacs with HIV/AIDS is complicated, and
some interpretations would place more emphasis on delays in
testing and in using heat-treated products, arguing that the
wish to use British tests and products militated against the
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best interests of haemophiliacs. The case of French
haemophiliacs infected with HIV, due to a lengthy delay in the
introduction of testing, would seem to support this view.
A recent German scare over HIV in the blood supply gives a
rather different slant. Here, testing was farmed out to
private companies by a government tranfusion service that
could not cope with the task alone. Two of these firms were
found to have skimped on testing procedures to maximise
profits - a totally unethical practice which led to infection
and deaths among recipients of blood transfusions. These
firms seem also to have bought blood from donors who would not
be accepted in a voluntary system.' 3 Here, the Titmuss theory
seems to have been borne out, and paying for blood yet again
led to disaster, as the profit motive supplanted altruism. If
we look at blood donation as an instance of organ donation,
this message is further reinforced.
Ruth Richardson has argued in relation to the supply of bodies
for anatomical dissection in the nineteenth century, and the
supply of organs for transplantation in the twentieth century,
that payment by recipients or intermediaries invariably tends
to produce malpractice in procurement: grave robbing and
murder in the supply of corpses; exploitation, coercion and
murder in the case of organs.'4 Blood, as a replaceable
63 
'When fear flows like blood', report by Steve Crawshaw, The
Independent, 18 Nov 1993, p. 23.
" R. Richardson, 'Spurning the gift, presuming upon consent or
bargain & sale - which path for transplantation?', talk for
'Doctors and the state' seminar, Welicome Institute for the
History of Medicine, London, 20 Oct 1993.
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tissue, may not call forth such extremes, but its extraction
as a market commodity from the poor and desperate, whether in
underdeveloped or developed countries, clearly tends to
involve exploitative relationships. If the line of argument
followed in this chapter is correct even in part, then blood
impurely obtained has wreaked a terrible revenge, carrying
hepatitis and AIDS in preventable channels.
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CHAPTER 6: HEPATITIS RESEARCH IN THE 19705, INFORMAL NETWORKS,
AND EXPERT COMMITTEES [l970-1980s]
The discovery of the Australia antigen, and the recognition of
the virus and core particle of hepatitis B by electron
microscopy, described in Chapter 3, opened up enormous new
possibilities for research on the disease. Turning to policy,
Chapters 4 and 5 centred on renal dialysis units, and the
blood supply, two areas where hepatitis B figured prominently
around 1970. Policies in the renal unit and blood arenas
aimed at solutions using a combination of testing and raised
standards of hygiene: the latter alone were stressed for most
health care workers, as Chapter 7 will show. While there
appeared to be no further notable outbreaks of hepatitis B
after the early 1970s, the unknown carrier population posed a
lingering public health hazard both within the health care
setting and for the general population.
How far did the concerns of policy makers set an agenda for
research in hepatitis B after 1970?1 Rather than follow
public health concerns, hepatitis research seems often to have
been shaped by the agenda of the clinical and academic
settings in which it was located. The first section of this
chapter traces the outlines of burgeoning hepatitis research
in the 1970s: as with any topic, there were different levels
of research. The main areas of 'applied' research were test
development and vaccine research; there was very little on the
1 In the 'rational' model of the relation between research and
policy discussed in Chapter 1 above, policy questions call for
research to provide a logical basis for policy decisions.
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carrier state and how best to manage it. Most hepatitis
research, while not necessarily 'pure', was directed towards
scientific questions, at one or two removes from policy -
although, as In the case of wide ranging epidemiological
studies, such research could carry policy implications. Using
the newly available test, many researchers examined the mode
of transmission of the virus, and how widespread it was within
populations and sub-groups. Others studied its behaviour in
the human body - the 'natural history' of the virus and the
disease it caused - including the complexities of the immune
response. Certain difficult undertakings, particularly tissue
culture, a staple of virological research, consumed much
effort but produced mainly negative findings. A review of the
range of research will be given in the first part of this
chapter.
How research gets done used to be something of a mystery,
Inadequately illuminated by personal accounts; but for the
past two decades a growing analytical literature on the
sociology of laboratory work and the construction of
scientific 'facts' has built up a more complex and convincing
picture. 2 Prompted partly by this literature, partly by
themes which emerged from a number of interviews, a more
anthropological approach will be used in the middle section of
this chapter, to trace a particular aspect of the research
process: that is, networks of exchange between groups of
2 For useful reviews, see: Lowy, 'Recent historiography of
biomedical research'; and M. Nicolson, 'Heterogeneity,
emergence and resistance: recent work in the sociology of
laboratory science', in G. Lawrence (ed.), Technologies of
modern medicine (London, Science Museum, 1994), pp. 111-19.
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researchers in London, here interpreted as an informal means
of co-ordination of research. This section looks at different
styles of research and researchers: sites of research, types
of technical skills employed, and exchanges between them. Of
special interest for the next section is the growth of
expertise and the emergence of recognised experts in the
field.
A third section looks at more official coordination, chiefly
MRC backing for research in this field through the 1970s and
into the 1980s. Individual project funding by the MRC can be
seen as one facet of policy on scientific medical research,
while sub-committees dealing with aspects of hepatitis B are
another. This is the location where we might expect the
interface between research and policy to emerge most visibly,
as occurred during the war when the MRC Jaundice Committee
bracketed the Ministry of Health, MRC and armed forces in
forming research policy. Yet another strand of committees has
been more directly involved in recent health policy-making:
that Is, advisory groups to the Department of Health. These
too have close links with research, since their composition
has closely mirrored the MRC committees. Although It is
difficult to find out what happens in confidential advisory
groups, it is worth asking about the selection and role of
'experts'. How far do they conform to the model of the type
of scientific researcher favoured by the MRC? Or perhaps such
semi-secret groups reflect the informal networks discussed
here, and also Include 'outsiders' who have achieved a
reputation for expertise. Certainly we should weigh up the
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part played by informal as well as formal structures in
shaping experts, who then form a link between medical research
and policy making. Finally, although again it has been
difficult to find evidence for this, there is the perhaps pre-
eminent role of medical civil servants who filter the advice
received from experts, and finally decide policy.
Confi gurations of hepatitis research in the 1970s
The availability of the antigen test stimulated a wide variety
of studies of hepatitis B during the 1970s. Investigators no
longer needed close clinical study of patients - for many
purposes it was sufficient to estimate the presence of antigen
or antibodies In serum. The immunodiffusion test was simple
and cheap, within the capacity of third world laboratories as
well as the main medical centres. The largest category of
published work was epidemiological, using the antigen test on
serum from groups or populations to find rates of hepatitis B
and suggest routes of spread. Hundreds of clinicians with
access to cases of hepatitis added to the literature, rapidly
dispelling the idea that this was a disease of needles and
syringes only.
Many epidemiological studies were carried out by authors who
only published once or twice on hepatitis B. These were
oriented towards clarifying routes of transmission: needles
and blood were frequently invoked, but in a wide range of
situations. Besides post-transfusion hepatitis and
intravenous drug use, there were detailed studies of antigen
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rates among health workers; and associated with tattooing,
ear-piercing, and acupuncture. 3 Following the observation
that hepatitis B tended to spread among members of the same
household or within mental institutions, 4 there was interest
in whether the antigen could be found in body fluids other
than blood, especially saliva. 5 Allied to this were studies
indicating sexual spread of the disease - both among
homosexuals and heterosexuals.' Another concern was the
possibility of insect transmission, as a tentative explanation
for the much higher rate of the disease in warmer climate
countries .
For example: N. A. G. Mowat et al, 'Outbreak of serum
hepatitis associated with tatooing', Lancet, 1973 (i), 33-4;
E. H. Boxall, 'Acupuncture hepatitis in the West Midlands,
1977', Journal of Medical Viroloqy, 2 (1978), 377-9. Studies
of occupational hazard were legion; surgeons and dentists
attracted perhaps most attention. Patients were studied in
settings where hepatitis was a known hazard (renal units,
MHIs) but for an unusual study of patients in Ireland, see: G.
R. Fitzgerald et al, 'Hepatitis-associated-antigen-positive
hepatitis in a tuberculosis unit', Gut, 16 (1975), 421-8.
This began with the MRC wartime study, and was expanded by
the Wlllowbrook study described In Chapter 2.
R. Ward et al, 'Hepatitis B antigen in saliva and mouth
washings', Lancet, 1972 (Ii), 726-7. The query over the role
of saliva In hepatitis B transmission was unresolved by the
late 1970s, causing heated debate in New York court cases over
infected carriers in schools; see: Muraskin, 'Controversy over
integration of retarded hepatitis B carriers', esp. pp. 85-8.
' K. W. M. Fulford, D. S. Dane et al, 'Australia antigen and
antibody among patients attending a clinic for sexually
transmitted diseases', Lancet, 1973 (1), 1470-3; J. Heathcote,
C. H. Cameron and I). S. Dane, 'Hepatitis-B antigen in saliva
and semen', Lancet, 1974 (1), 71-3; W. Szmuness et al, 'On the
role of sexual behaviour in the spread of hepatitis B
infection', Annals of Internal Medicine, 83 (1975), 489-95.
Two contrasting methodologies appear in: A. M. Prince et al,
'Hepatitis B antigen in wild-caught mosquitoes in Africa',
Lancet, 1972 (ii), 247-50; and a study on laboratory-bred
insects: N. A. Byrom et al, 'Role of mosquitoes In
transmission of hepatitis B antigen', Journal of Infectious
DIseases, 128 (1973), 259-60.
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The outbreaks of hepatitis B In renal units, which might have
been expected to generate an enormous research interest, were
subjected to only moderate epidemiological scrutiny, possibly
because they were often reported in unpublished form.8
Prevalence in renal unit patients and staff, and possible
routes of transmission, were reported. Some studies were
speculative, for instance the antigen was Injected into
laboratory cockroaches; others were empirical, for example
one which found the antigen in situ on stainless steel
surfaces but not on textiles. 9 British studies looked not
only at prevalence but also at means of prevention, and were
linked to the Rosenheim enquiry. By the mid-1970s the UK
Public Health Laboratory Service was able to report that
hepatitis B was on the retreat in kidney units.'° No 'harder'
science than the immunodiffusion test had been required to
achieve this result.
One set of epidemiological studies looked at the varying
prevalence of markers of hepatitis B in different populations
around the world; these studies had begun with Blumberg's NIH
team almost before the Australia antigen-hepatitis B link was
established. 1' They found a relatively low prevalence of
• The Rosenheim Report has information on unpublished as well
as published outbreaks.
' H. Zebe, R. Sanwald and E. Ritz, 'Insect vectors in serum
hepatitis' (Corr.), Lancet, 1972 (i), 1117-8; M. Favero et al,
'Hepatitis-B antigen on environmental surfaces', Lancet, 1973
(ii), 1455.
10 s• Polakoff, 'Hepatitis B in retreat from dialysis units in
United Kingdom in 1973', British Medical Journal, 1976 (1),
1579-81.
" See Chapter 3, section on Bluntherg.
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Australia antigen in North American and European populations
(under one per cent) and a much higher rate (over five per
cent) in Africa and Asia.' 2 Mother to child transmission at
or soon after birth accounted for early acquisition of the
disease and a higher chance of developing carrier status in
high prevalence countries.' 3 Hepatitis B carrier status was
linked with primary liver cancer, a form of cancer rare in
wealthy countries but common in poor countries with a high
prevalence of hepatitis B.' 4 This link would have complex
policy implications once a vaccine became available. The
saving of life in relation to chronic diseases, particularly
liver cancer, would be far greater than for hepatitis B alone,
but the long-term effects required careful analysis if
overstretched health care systems in Africa and Asia were to
fund mass vaccination.'5
Much research, especially in the UK, focussed on developing
more sensitive tests, with the aim of reducing false
negatives. There was a commercial incentive since the most
successful tests would sell in enormous numbers for blood
donation testing. Research and development of tests in
12 A. M. Prince, 'Prevalence of serum-hepatitis-related antigen
(SH) in different geographic regions', American Journal of
Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, 19 (1970), 872-9.
' But in some areas, especially Africa, environmental
transmission during infancy seems more important.
' A useful overview is provided in: London and Blumberg,
'Comments on role of epidemiology in investigation of
hepatitis B'.
" A. Hall et al (The Gambia Hepatitis Study Group), 'The
Gambia hepatitis intervention study', Cancer Research, 47
(1987), 5782-7.
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pharmaceutical company laboratories, often in collaboration
with health service or university laboratories, exemplifies
the science/industry interf ace.' 6 Despite the size and
expense of electron microscopes, some tests used EN techniques
for diagnosis by direct visualization of infective particles.
However, most tests built on the principle of immune reactions
utilized in the early tests, improving on sensitivity through
the introduction of electricity (immuno-electrophoresis) or
radioactive isotopes (radioimniunoassay).' 7
 All tests required
prior separation of material by more or less rigorous
fractionation and centrifugation. There was initially no
standardisation; laboratories freely developed and used their
own tests, meeting varied requirements as to sensitivity
versus ease and speed of preparation, depending on the amount
of samples they had to process. A public health laboratory
would test only a handful of samples for hepatitis B in a year
(although many samples being tested for other diseases might
actually carry hepatitis B), whereas a blood transfusion
centre had to test every donation and therefore required mass
processing methods.
Evaluation of commercially produced tests and comparison
16 For example, the Welicome Foundation's Ian Cayzer under the
direction of John Beale developed 'Hepatest' in conjunction
with workers at the Middlesex Hospital, London, using sera
from the North London Blood Transfusion Centre; see: I.
Cayzer, D. S. Dane et al, 'A rapid haemagglutination test for
hepatitis-B antigen', Lancet, 1974 (1), 947-9.
17 Radioimmunoassay, for example the commercial 'Ausria' test,
was regarded as much more sensitive than counterimmunoel.ectro-
phoresis; see: H. J. Alter, P. V. Holland et al, 'The Ausria
test: critical evaluation of sensitivity and specificity',
Blood, 42 (1973), 947-57.
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between efficiency in using tests was undertaken by some
research laboratories. A 1974 study compared the proficiency
of 40 blood screening laboratories in different countries,
using the same test (counterimniunoelectrophoresis), and found
only two succeeded in matching the results set by reference
laboratories. With low titre samples (containing little
antigen), proficiency ranged from 15 to 85 per cent.'8
Other research fell within the disciplinary boundaries of
immunology, virology and hepatology. Much of the work
depended heavily on antigen and antibody testing, combined
with standard immunological techniques and liver function
tests, to study variations in immune responses and liver
pathology, establishing the natural history of the disease in
both its acute and chronic form.' 9
 Advances in understanding
depended on the new-found ability to detect antigen at
different stages in the development of the illness, linking
fluctuations in antigen and antibody levels with clinical
manifestations. At least three antigens were identif led: the
surface, core and 'e' antigens. 2° The antigens themselves
were subjected to biochemical processes of purification and
analysis, as was the whole virus or 'Dane particle'.
18 B. P. L. Moore, D. Meade et al, 'An international
proficiency survey for the detection of hepatitis B antigen
and antibody in blood donations by counterimmunoelectro-
phoresis', Vox sanguinis, 26 (1974), 128-32.
' See for example, from King's Liver Unit: A. L. Eddleston and
R. Williams, 'Inadequate antibody response to HBsAg or
suppressor T-cell defect in the development of active chronic
hepatitis', Lancet, 1974 (ii), 1543-5.
20 See Purcell, 'Hepatitis B' for review: identification of 'e'
as a marker of high infectivity was a prolonged process.
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As well as providing clinical material for studies in
pathology, immunology and virology - yielding blood, serum and
tissue samples for analysis in laboratories - patients with
hepatitis B were also the location for treatment which, at
this stage, was experimental. There was some indication of
success with interferon, although progress was tentative and
side-effects could be unpleasant. 2' Prevention by active or
passive immunization offered more promise. 22 Immediate
passive vaccination showed some evidence of obviating the
worst impact of needlestick injuries where there was a known
risk of hepatitis B Infection. 23 Active vaccination, while
offering no direct succour to patients with hepatitis B, would
(when introduced) protect the close contacts of carriers,
allowing them to live more normal lives. 24 But hepatitis
remained through the 1970s a potentially lethal disease for
which there was no prevention and no cure.
21 Group B (a self-help group of gay men with chronic
hepatitis), interview, 12 May 1991.
22 Active vaccination: a vaccine (with antigenic material)
stimulates the body's immune system to produce antibodies,
giving longterm protection, e.g. smallpox vaccination, measles
immunization. Passive immunization: a serum fraction
containing antibodies is given to combat infection in the
short term; this may be general, e.g. gamma globulin, or
specific, e.g. hepatitis B specific immunoglobulin, prepared
from serum of donors with antibodies to hepatitis B.
23 j • E. Maynard, 'Passive Immunization against hepatitis B: a
review of recent studies and comment on current aspects of
control', American Journal of Epidemioloqy, 107 (1978), 77-86.
24 This Is apart from its obvious and enormous public health
potential. Active vaccine was first approved in US after trial
among New York gay men; see: W. Szmuness et al, 'Hepatitis B
vaccine: demonstration of efficacy in a controlled clinical
trial in a high-risk population in the United States', New
England Journal of Medicine, 303 (1980), 833-41.
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London networks of hepatitis B investigations in the l970s
So far, the broad outlines of hepatitis B research in the
1970s have been sketched: this section will look more closely
at several London workers involved in hepatitis B research - a
mixture of clinicians and scientists, from different
specialities and types of institutions. Sites where research
took place in this period either had close connections with
sources of clinical material, as in virology departments of
teaching hospitals, blood transfusion centres, reference
centres and the Blood Products Laboratory, or else they
secured links with such sources, as in the case of
pharmaceutical companies. Many of those engaged in research
also had practical functions to perform - often, checking
samples for presence of antigen, either to give opinions on
particular patients, or to ensure that blood and blood
products were free of hepatitis B. On the other hand, there
were scientists who received material from clinicians and
worked exclusively in a research capacity.
Let us take first of all a technique that appears prominently
in hepatitis B research: electron microscopy (EM), the
preserve of technical specialists in a variety of bio-medical
specialties and institutions, which entered virology in the
late 1950s when negative staining revolutionised the scale of
micro-organisms that could be seen, bringing viruses within
view. More than one investigator thought of applying this
technique to hepatitis, since the difficulties of tissue
culture closed off more established avenues of access to the
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virus. We have seen (in Chapter 3) how David Dane, clinician
and virologist at the Middlesex Hospital in London,
successfully used EM in 1969, together with colleagues Cohn
Cameron and Moya Briggs. They were the first to identify the
virus, which became known for some time afterwards as the
'Dane particle'. 25 In Dane's account the timing of this
discovery was contingent on his department's acquisition of an
electron microscope (funded by the Weilcome Trust), and also
on his professor's unrelated request that he check a blood
sample using the new Australia antigen test. Dane transcended
the original request to conduct the test, and applied EM
technique - with the aid of his colleagues, Cameron and
Briggs. It was Dane, however, who was required to defend the
finding, as controversy simmered over the nature of the Dane
particle and whether it could indeed be regarded as the virus.
Dane's case was, in part, establised by the work of another
worker with greater EM technical expertise, June Almeida, also
discussed above (in Chapter 3). Almeida's moves from Toronto,
to London, with Waterson - first at St Thomas's and then the
Hammersmith - were accompanied by a further breakthrough in
the scale of visibility, with the technique known as immune
electroscopy, allowing antigen particles to be seen. Contact
with Zuckerman launched Almeida on an EN investigation of the
antigen-virus complexes and viral structure of hepatitis B. In
1970, she revealed the core of the Dane particle, enhancing
25 The relative roles played by each member of the team cannot
be verified either from the oral record or later published
accounts, but see: D. S. Dane, 'Discovering the virus of
hepatitis B', Transfusion Microbioloqy Newsletter, 11 (1991),
16.
187
the case for identifying the particle as the hepatitis B virus
and opening avenues for further research. Soon after this,
Almeida left the Hanuuersmith to join the Weilcome Foundation
laboratories at BecJcenham; her EM expertise was eminently
transferrable •26
The crossover between the public sector and industry noted in
Almeida's career appears again in the case of John Beale, a
clinician who one might say was remoulded as a scientist, with
microbiological rather than EM expertise. After working on
tuberculosis in the Royal Air Force and on influenza in a
public health laboratory, Beale moved to Toronto in the early
1950s. This was just before the change that made electron
microscopy an exciting tool for virology. Beale learned
tissue culture methods, and helped produce the Salk polio
vaccine on a large scale. Back in the UK, he joined the
pharmaceutical company Glaxo, where he became head of vaccine
production when the previous head - who had also been at
Toronto - resigned, following the discovery of live polio in
the killed vaccine. 27 Looking for someone to test the polio
vaccine further, Beale contacted Dane, beginning a long and
fruitful collaboration. In 1969, Beale moved to the Welicome
laboratories at Beckenham where his brief included diagnostic
reagents as well as vaccines; thus he oversaw Australia
antigen testing for Welicome. Beale's contact with Dane
26 Interviews, J. Almeida, 29 January 1993 and J. Beale, 26
February 1993.
27 Beale, interview. The finding was made in safety tests in
the laboratory; there was no question of a threat to those
receiving this vaccine, but the head of production felt
obliged to resign.
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possibly aided Welicome's recruitment of Almeida.28
Zuckerman, the clinician and researcher who made hepatitis B
his life's work, began his career like Beale with the Royal
Air Force; he was seconded to Colindale in 1960 to work on
viral hepatitis because of the continued outbreaks among
service personnel. 29 The problem arose when syringes used for
mass inoculations were inadequately sterilized - a finding
already made during the war by the Jaundice Committee, but
evidently needing to be rediscovered. As early as 1971
Zuckerman was recommending that drug clinics issue clean
syringes to clients to reduce the spread of hepatitis B. 3° In
a sense, even before the Australia antigen discovery,
Zuckerman had become a hepatitis B expert, a position on which
he ably capitalised. His greatest skills appear to have been
those of co-ordination; he sat on most of the UK and
international committees, read everything published on
hepatitis B, and became the central reference resource for
28 In 1972, soon after Almeida's arrival, Bluntherg visited the
Weilcome laboratories to promote his serum vaccine, which
Beale and Almeida regarded it as scientifically weak. Other
companies (Merck in the US) produced a serum-derived vaccine;
Weilcome tried to develop an alternative vaccine, ultimately
without success. In 1992 Weilcome closed their vaccine
production division at Beckenham, largely due to the failure
of their hepatitis B vaccine development: Beale, interview.
29 A. J. Zuckerman, interview, 8 June 1992: his location was
the Epidemiological Research Laboratory, Central Public Health
Laboratory, Colindale, London. See: A. 3. Zuckerman, 'The
epidemiology of acute hepatitis in the Royal Air Force',
British Journal of Preventive and Social Medicine, 18 (1964),
183-8.
30 j • Hunter, M. Carella et al, 'The Australia (hepatitis-
associated) antigen amongst heroin addicts attending a London
addiction clinic', Journal of Hygiene of Cambrid ge, 69 (1971),
565-70; Zuckerman was a co-author.
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WHO, based at LSHTM in London. Zuckerman offered a focal
point through the reference centre at LSHTM, providing
material and validation for many other researchers, all of
whom were indebted to him to some degree. His co-ordinating
role was both national and international.
Hepatitis B research in the LSHTM virology department was
promoted by Zuckerman's recruitment of Cohn Howard, a
virologist who joined the department in 1971 after completing
a master's degree in virology at Birmingham. 3' Howard brought
scientific expertise, later demonstrated in his doctoral
thesis on the biochemical structure and behaviour of the
surface and core antigens of hepatitis B, as well as other
work. 32
 He collaborated with Zuckerman in hepatitis B
projects, including an attempt to develop a 'micelle' vaccine
as an alternative to Blumberg's serum based vaccine. Howard
developed a second field of research interest, in the
arenaviruses, but hepatitis B remained a major interest.
Zuckerman also recruited another virologist, Kwesi Tsiquaye,
to his team. 33
 As we have seen, Zuckerman's access to
scientific expertise was not confined by the walls of his
laboratories in the LSHTM. He produced collaborative work
with colleagues both locally, as in the case of Waterson and
31 Under a virologist called Peter Wildy from Glasgow - the
rival centre to London; C. Howard, interview, 25 November
1992. The London-Glasgow rivalry was also important for AIDS.
32 C. Howard, 'Studies on the nature of hepatitis B antigen',
PhD thesis, University of London, 1976.
" Tsiquaye remains at LSHTM; Zuckerman left in 1989 to become
Dean of Royal Free Hospital Medical School, London; Howard
left in 1990 to become Professor of Microbiology and
Parasitology at the Royal Veterinary College, London.
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Almeida, and abroad, especially the US. His name appears on
over nine hundred publications Including standard texts on
viral hepatitis.34
If the LSHTM reference centre was a node of research
expertise, and one type of 'sample bank', there were others:
the central Blood Products Laboratory (BPL), and certain blood
transfusion centres. In the mid-1970s, Tom Cleghorn, head of
North London Blood Transfusion Centre (NLBTC), recruited a
scientifically trained virologist, John Barbara, with a view
to utilising his expertise in research as well as service
capacities. Transfusion screening for hepatitis B, as Barbara
has pointed out, offered enormous scope for research: it could
be viewed as the most massive microbiological sampling ever
undertaken. Probably because their service role was dominant,
and they had no research tradition, few blood transfusion
centres capitalised on this golden research opportunity; NLBTC
and Glasgow were leaders, and 'friendly rivals', In the
enterprise. 35 Detection of different antigens in donors'
blood enabled Barbara and colleagues to look at incubation and
inapparent infection. Follow-up allowed them to discover at
what point, If ever, donors who were carrying the 'e' antigen,
a marker of high infectivity, seroconverted to 'e' antibody.
They supervised the plasmapheresis of high-titre carriers -
those with a high concentration of antigen in their blood - to
produce the raw material Zuckerman and Howard needed for their
'micelle' vaccine project.
For example: Zuckerman and Howard, Hepatitis viruses of man.
" 3. Barbara, interview, 13 July 1992.
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So Barbara's expertise was used in a routine capacity in the
transfusion service; in a research capacity to look at the
natural history of the disease; and to provide specialist raw
material for others' research and development. The serum used
to develop Welicome's Hepatest was provided by Cleghorn and
Barbara of the NLBTC. 3' The NLBTC team also played a role in
the standardisation of microbiological purity of material for
transfusion; they provided plasma from one of their donors for
the British, and later international, standard on hepatitis B
surface antigen. This became the basic measure which defined
whether any other sample was to be cleared for use, the
'Go/NoGo' quality control. 37 In developing his research
roles, Barbara was able to build on longstanding contacts with
Dane at the Middlesex Hospital and BPL at Elstree.
At DPI,, Brian Combridge, a laboratory technician, worked under
Sir William Maycock on blood products including specific
immunoglobulin, and then from 1970 on successive hepatitis B
tests. 38
 He developed a radioimntunoassay in collaboration
with Dane and Cameron at the Middlesex, and Barbara at NLBTC,
which reputedly saved the National Health Service ten million
pounds. 39
 Combridge, who remained humbly at the same bench
for forty years, received little acclaim for his work. He
represents a type of technique - highly skilled assay work -
36 Beale, interview.
Barbara, interview.
38 B. Conthridge, interview, 19 June 1991.
" D. S. Dane, personal communication, 19 Aug 1992; Dane had
estimated the saving at £20m but revised this to LiOm after
consulting John Barbara.
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at a type of sample bank - the BPL - which became a nodal
point for exchanges with other workers despite this particular
worker's relative immobility in terms of career and
networking.
Which of the people whose careers have been outlined in this
account, all of whom had some degree of technical expertise,
emerged as 'experts'?4° Two figures emerge as authorities
consulted by central government and marked out by peer
recognition: Zuckerman and Dane. 11 Zuckerman is probably more
closely identified with hepatitis B than anyone else in the
UK: he is also a leading international expert. Dane appears
both as an expert authority and someone whose technical
expertise was recognized by others, but less recognized in
academic terms. His networks were extensive but far more
local than Zuckerman's - with Cleghorn and Barbara at North
London BTC, with Maycock and Combridge at BPL, with Beale and
Cayzer at the Welicome laboratories, with Polakoff and
Vandervelde at the PHLS viral reference laboratory - all
within striking distance of his base at the Middlesex. As an
expert on the advisory committees that decided about screening
policy, for example, Dane was probably influenced more by the
consensus of colleagues with a public health orientation than
° For a fuller discussion of types of expertise, see: Stanton,
'Blood brotherhood'.
' A clinician with research interests in hepatitis B,
interviewed 11 Nov 1992, listed as the 'big four' of hepatitis
B in Britain: Zuckerman, Roger Williams (Institute of Liver
Studies, King's College Hospital), Howard Thomas (Professor of
Medicine, St Mary's Hospital) and J. Banatvala (Professor of
Virology, St Thomas's Hospital); another frequently cited
authority is Dame Sheila Sherlock, lately of Royal Free
Hospital. These are all London teaching hospitals.
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by the latest ripple of excitement on the scientific hepatitis
B front. Through his extensive networks of contacts, Dane
facilitated interactions of other workers, including exchanges
of materials.
The transfer of samples of blood or serum often appeared at
significant points in people's accounts, as the 'liminal
actions' that shifted them into hepatitis research (e.g.
Almeida, Barbara, Combridge, Dane); 42 the supply of material
was clearly important in continuing research. The often
mentioned exchange of materials represents an informal form of
co-ordination. The nature of the material leads to a notion
of 'blood brotherhood' between investigators; a sort of tribal
effort of altruistic scientists. The apparent generosity of
sharing should not mislead us, since sharing samples of serum
could establish indebtedness, of the recipient to the gif t-
giver. 43 The gift might be given to someone with special
skills appropriate to a line of enquiry, which in a sense they
then lend to the giver. In the case we are dealing with here,
hepatitis B in the 1970s, clinicians could act as brokers,
since they had unique access to the research material. They
were nodal points, thus they become experts. 44 But they
needed scientists or technicians with special expertise to
manipulate the material they had gathered. To some extent it
42 See: J. Stanton, 'Hepatitis research and career
trajectories', talk given to Health Matters Symposium, Science
Museum London, 5 March 1993.
Mauss, The gift.
This would change with the development of animal models and
genetic engineering, which enabled scientists to become more
independent of clinicians.
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was a symbiotic process.
Another element of 'blood brotherhood' emerged from some of
the interviews. There were stories of carrying vials of blood
in a briefcase on the tube, or receiving samples from abroad
by post (not always in bubble-pack envelopes) - tales which
seemed, perhaps subconsciously, intended to alarm the lay
person conducting the interview. Such accounts speak of
danger and excitement, but above all of the special quality of
being an insider, one of a group of initiates. Those within
the group are not all equal, and terrific strains existed
between some of them, especially those vying for primacy.
There was competition, too, between centres, as for example
between London and Glasgow BTCs. But all shared a community
of experience, in handling the danger of hepatitis B in
infected blood and serum with confidence - and with science,
another mysterious realm which excludes non-experts.
Official co-ordination: committees and the role of 'experts'
Official structures which co-ordinated information emerging
from scientific and epidemiological research on hepatitis B
appear to have followed a similar pattern at national and
international levels. In Britain, the MRC set up a working
party on hepatitis under its longstanding transfusion research
committee, just as WHO discussed hepatitis in association with
blood transfusion. According to Zuckerman, it was he who
instigated the first MRC hepatitis committee in 1966, which is
possible given that he was already conducting research in this
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field by then. On the other hand, an MRC working party on
post-transfusion hepatitis, with Zuckerman as secretary, first
appears in the published record in 197O/71.' Clearly, this
was closely allied with the Maycock advisory group on testing
for Australia antigen, but the MRC group had a more general
brief to oversee research.
In April 1971, a 'conference of experts' was called together
jointly by the MRC and the DHSS to review hepatitis research
with special reference to dialysis and transfusion, to feed
into the Maycock and Rosenheim committees' deliberations.4'
In addition to collating existing research, the conference
made recommendations regarding future lines of enquiry:
they included the extension of epidemiological studies on
Australia-antigen-positive subjects and their contacts,
and further studies on the pathogenesis of serum
hepatitis (with particular reference to the role of the
immune response) and the possible prophylaxis of the
disease in those at risk.47
How far were these research aims realised? As we have seen, a
large proportion of research through the l970s consisted of
epidemiological studies, more often looking at prevalence in
certain populations or groups rather than tracing contacts of
antigen-positive individuals. The working of the disease
within the body was also a subject of research, but much
virological work was hampered by the difficulty of tissue
Medical Research Council, Annual Report for 1970/71, p. 112,
under 'Blood Transfusion Research': Working Party on Post-
transfusion Hepatitis with Dr W. d'A. Maycock as Chair and Dr
A. J. Zuckerman as Secretary.
' Medical Research Council, Annual Report for 1971/72, p.24;
the location of the conference and names of experts invited
are not given.
Ibid, p. 25.
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culture. If 'prophylaxis' might be taken to mean vaccination,
then that too was a central line of enquiry in the 1970s. But
it is hard to trace a direct line from the conference quoted
above, to these and many other branches of research into
hepatitis B, conducted in a wide variety of NHS and academic
settings; such research seems to have flourished under an
Impetus which was not largely generated by the MRC.
An area in which the MRC most speedily attempted to promote
research involved prophylaxis with specific immunoglobulin, a
different matter from vaccine development. This was based on
earlier experience with specific serum, and with general
immunoglobulin, for various diseases. 48 It was a project with
a contentious background in the period of the first Maycock
committee of 1970-72. When Dane suggested that blood with a
high level of antibodies to hepatitis B might be used to make
specific immunoglobulin (HBIG), the majority of committee
members argued that both antigen and antibody-positive blood
should be discarded, as potentially dangerous:
Zuckerman and the other virologists on the Committee
thought my suggestion was wrong and dangerous and they
were dismissive of the whole idea. If they had accepted
my explanation of the nature of Australia Antigen (HBsAg)
and its relaton to the virus, which I had published
shortly before, they might have been more sympathetic,
but they did not.49
There was room for uncertainty, since some antibodies are not
48 See Chapter 3 for recognition of problems associated with
pre-war measles convalescent serum and wartime use of mumps
convaiscent serum, both of which caused outbreaks of
hepatitis; see also: MRC, Annual Report, 1972-73, p. 37.
' D. S. Dane, 'Hepatitis B immunoglobulin', personal account
(typescript), end, with letter to author, 30 Nov 1992, p. 2.
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protective but only indicate the presence of the virus." But
clearly in the conflict between expert opinions, that of Dane
who had the most intimate knowledge of the virus weighed less
than that of more established virologists. It should be
recalled that Dane together with Cleghorn of the NLBTC held a
minority view on the safety of strongly antibody positive
blood. While other centres were discarding such blood, Dane
and Cleghorn were collecting the plasma with a view to getting
a trial batch of HBIG made at the Blood Products Laboratory.
By the end of 1971, majority opinion had shifted in the light
of further evidence from the US on the utility of specific
inununoglobulin; and there was particular concern to provide
some safety net for health workers involved in needle-stick
accidents, which in settings such as renal units carried a
high risk of infection with hepatitis B. The MRC committee
was briefed to 'consider the feasibility of producing high-
titre immunoglobulin that would be specific against Australia
antigen and suitable for use in clinical trials'. 5' The
chairman, Dr J. H. Humphrey, a well-known immunologist, wrote
to ask Dane if he had any suggestions:
I do not think he can have been told that until a few
months before I was the isolated advocate and driving
force behind the HBIG project! It was not for me to tell
him. I can remember Dr MacCallum coming to see me on his
way to the first meeting to be briefed on the subject. I
was very conscious of being excluded.52
50 Currently the best-known example is HIV: the antibody is a
marker for the presence of the virus but apparently affords no
protection against AIDS.
MRC, Annual Report, 1972/73, p. 37.
52 Dane, 'Hepatitis B immunoglobulin', p. 3.
198
Excluded from the inner circle, Dane was nonetheless used as a
supplier, for the next ten years according to his account, as
the Middlesex! North London BTC axis continued to test for
antibody and persuade high-titre donors to give extra plasma
by plasmapheresis. 53 Dane was disgruntled at being treated
like 'a grocer' without encouragement or feedback, and years
later he tried to find out the reason for his exclusion from
the HBIG committee, but was told that 'no useful purpose would
be served' by going into the matter. 54 For whatever reason,
Dane apparently was not an 'MRC type' researcher.
Co-ordination of research was achieved by the MRC in general
terms, not by organizing or funding multiple research
programmes, but by surveying the whole field of research
conducted on hepatitis B from time to time, and disseminating
reviews of research through MRC annual reports. In some ways
this operation closely reflects the functioning of WHO
committees dealing with viral infections: 55 it is probable
that Zuckerman, who sat on the WHO committees, was the author
of the MRC contributions. 56 In addition to his research,
" Most blood transfusion centres ceased testing for antibody
once they were no longer required to discard antibody positive
donations. In his account, Dane emphasised that the MRC
committee and BPL did not ever stipulate how much plasma they
wanted or what titre of antibody they considered suitable.
Ibid, p. 4.
Notably the WHO Expert Advisory Panel on Virus Diseases
(from 1974).
See: MRC Annual Re ports, 1972-73, pp. 68-74 ('Research on
liver disease: a review'), esp. 'Australia antigen and liver
immunology', pp. 72-3; and 1975-76, 'Viral hepatitis', pp. 76-
8, which ends with mention of Zuckerman, Almelda and Dane,
without stipulating their sources of funding.
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Zuckerman headed the WHO Viral Hepatitis Reference Centre, set
up in 1974 at LSHTM. 57 As discussed in the previous section,
he was able to build up an enormously varied sample bank,
acting as a centre for information and a research source. He
continued to survey the literature minutely and published a
volume of abstracts in 1980.58
While successive MRC reports record few grants for research on
hepatitis B, awards were made in 1979-80 to Zuckerman, to
Sheila Sherlock at the Royal Free, Mortimer and Vandervelde at
the PHLS Viral Reference Centre at Colindale, and Craske at
the PHLS laboratory in Manchester, for research on non-A non-B
hepatitis. 59 This was in response to a request from the DHSS,
in the light of alarm over outbreaks associated with Factor
VIII and also in a dialysis unit in London. At that time,
Craske sat on a PHLS sub-committee on hepatitis, Zuckerman,
Sherlock and Vandervelde on the latest DHSS advisory group on
screening blood for hepatitis B.'° This pattern suggests a
feedback from expert committees to research, which (like the
route from research to expert committees) was channelled
through a few select individuals. Then in 1981-82, a report
on the work of the MRC Committee on the Development of
Vaccines and Immunisation Procedures included brief mention of
" The reference centre was attached to the expert rather than
the institution and moved with Zuckerman to the Royal Free
Hospital Medical School when he became Dean there in 1989.
58 Zuckerman, Decade of viral hepatitis: a resource I found
invaluable in composing the first section of this chapter.
" NRC, Annual Report, 1979-80, p. 35.
'° I am unsure of the date when the PHLS sub-committee was
established.
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possible vaccines against hepatitis B."
By this time, a confidential Advisory Group on Hepatitis (AGH)
had been set up by the DHSS.'2
 This expert advisory group,
established in 1980, was derived from two others: that on
blood (the Maycock committee and its successors), and another
which advised on hepatitis in dentistry in 1979.63 The
function of the post-1980 AGH will be discussed In Chapter 7.
It is Introduced here to demonstrate a striking continuity of
institutional and personal affiliations, which can be found by
tracing its links with previous advisory groups. This is a
rather convoluted process, because it has not been possible to
ascertain the group's membership in 1980, and therefore lists
of members in 1992/3 have been used to give some indication of
its earlier composition.'4
One member of both the source groups who remained on the AGH
61 MRC, Annual Report, 1981-82, p. 57.
62 Precise lineage and title of group varies according to
source: one informant said it was the hepatitis sub-committee
of the D0H Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunization: J.
Kurtz, interview, 20 Feb 1992; but the medical civil servant
who dealt with hepatitis B gave blood/dentists committee
derivation described in text and referred to It as Hepatitis
Advisory Group: J. Hilton, interview, 30 Sept 1992.
63 The latter will be discussed in the next chapter.
64 Kurtz, interview, provided a list on the basis of a phone
call he made during the interview to an unnamed colleague; I
am grateful for this information. There were a dozen named
members and two others the informant could not recall. Kurtz
himself, a virologist at the Public Health Laboratory at the
John Radcliffe Hospital, Oxford, was a member of the PHLS sub-
committee on hepatitis. A nine-name list of AGH members is
given in: UK Health Departments, Protecting health care
workers and patients from hepatitis B, Recommendations of the
Advisory Group on Hepatitis, August 1993 [l7pp booklet, no
publisher, printed for HNSO], p. 13.
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in 1992/3 was Zuckerman. Dr R. Lane, now Director of the BPL,
and Craske of Manchester PHLS, who both sat on the 1979-81
blood screening committee, were also members of the AGH in
1992/3. The central Public Health Laboratory was represented
on the dentistry group by its Director, Professor Sir Robert
Williams, and by Sheila Polakoff; and on the blood committee
by Yvonne Cossart and later by Elise Vandervelde; while the
1992/3 AGH featured J. Heptonstall of the CDSC.' 5 Maycock,
Director of the blood transfusion service and BPL, provided
input in both the earlier groups, but in the 1992/3 AGH the
transfusion service was represented by M. Contreras, Director
of NLBTC. Certain renowned 'experts' - professors in London
teaching hospitals - appear on the 1992/3 AGH: besides
Zuckerman of LSHTM, Banatvala of St Thomas's in the chair,
Roger Williams of King's Liver Unit, and Thomas of St
Mary's. 66 Dane, who sat on all three advisory groups on
testing blood, was also a member of the AGH in the early
1980s.'7
Conclusions
This chapter opened with a survey of the wide field of
research on hepatitis B during the 1970s, when the new tool of
' Plus two others in the Kurtz 1992 list: S. Young and N.
Gill; but these do not appear in the 1993 source (see previous
note).
66 See n. 41 above for details.
67 Dane's potted CV supplied with letter to author, 10 Nov
1993, gives '1970-1985: Member DHSS Hepatitis Advisory Group',
expressing view of successive groups on testing for antigen
(1972, 1975, 1981) feeding into hepatitis advisory group.
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the antigen test opened up possibilities for clinicians to
contribute small pieces of research, often epidemiological,
while more scientifically oriented work was conducted by
clinical researchers and scientists in a variety of settings.
Much research was basic, but areas like test development which
had a conunercial application saw collaboration between
service, academic and industrial sectors. Epidemiologica].
research revealed patterns which might have informed policy,
but drug use and sex as means of transmission were relatively
neglected, while the construction of hepatitis B as a hazard
in certain health care settings contined to dominate policy
agendas. This is not surprising, as the Department of Health
had responsibility in those areas. However that still leaves
open to question the manner in which experts were chosen by
the Department to interpret research findings and give advice
on policy.
The section on London networks of researchers further explored
the notions of varying sites and techniques of research,
focussing on the antigen test and electron microscopy, showing
how these featured in the research careers of a small number
of researchers. One striking theme that emerged from this
material was the role of reference centres as sample banks,
and the exchange of samples of blood and serum between those
engaged in different aspects of research work. Exchanges
between those with special technical expertise, and those with
reference expertise, built up networks which could be seen as
an informal type of co-ordination of research. It was
suggested that researchers located at reference centres were
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in a stronger position to incur obligations and tended to
become recognized as 'top' experts.'8
The third section looked at more formal structures involved in
co-ordinating research and policy. MRC committees surveyed
research rather than forming policy, but there was overlap
between these and DHSS committees in terms of personnel. The
case of immunoglobulin was used to demonstrate how a leading
researcher could be marginalized and treated as a technical
resource, rather than influencing policy. By contrast, 'MRC
type' experts carried weight as opinion leaders. If we take
the more public advisory groups discussed in Chapters 4 and
5 - the Rosenheim and Maycock committees - together with the
MRC committees that dealt with hepatitis, the dentistry group,
and the later DHSS (and PHLS) hepatitis groups, there is clear
continuity. Some members were chosen primarily because of
their institutional position, such as head of BPL, others
because of their expertise as medical scientific researchers.
This chapter has tried to elaborate the means by which some
researchers become experts with a policy role. These are the
people in a position to mediate between research and policy.
68 A further clue may be provided by a 'Hepatitis Peer Group'
established by Zuckerman in the 1980s, which is said to
consist of a 'Who's Who' of hepatitis experts in the UK:
anonymous informant, interview, 12 July 1991. Membership is
unknown but the very existence of the group demonstrates that
a select band of experts had emerged from the wide field of
research and service work on hepatitis B in the 1970s.
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CHAPTER 7: HEALTH AND SAFETY [1975-1990]
As chapters 4 and 5 showed, the test for hepatitis B impacted
most immediately on two areas where the disease appeared as an
urgent priority: the new problem of hepatitis in renal units,
and the older problem of hepatitis in the blood supply. But
the test presented a much wider opportunity, and a threat, for
a whole range of workers in the health care sector and beyond.
Prevalence studies - mentioned in Chapter 6 as a large part of
the research application of the test - looking at groups of
workers, such as surgeons, or blood laboratory technicians,
established a higher rate of exposure to hepatitis B than in
the population at large, opening the possibility for such
workers to demand compensation for work-related attacks. On
the other hand, routine screening (not anonymous as for
prevalence studies) would reveal individuals who - previously
unknown to themselves and employers - were hepatitis B
carriers, exposing them to the risk of discrimination and loss
of livelihood. There was a potential clash between the public
health interest, perhaps best served by universal screening
for health workers (as in renal units or the blood transfusion
service), and the right of the individual to choose whether or
not to undergo screening. And, as the previous chapter
pointed out, policy on these matters was heavily influenced by
the views of a limited circle of hepatitis 'experts', mainly
doctors, themselves members of an occupational risk group.
Tensions between individual rights and the public health
interest have been analysed for hepatitis B in the US by
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William Muraskin, particularly in the cases of integration of
retarded children who were known carriers into normal schools
in the late 1970s, and the adoption of Asian children by
American families, when the authorities failed to pass on
information of carrier status of adopted children. 1 In those
cases and in the broader arena of hepatitis B among health
care workers, 2 Muraskin concludes that individual rights
prevailed over the public health interest (in the schools
case, in courtroom battles), to the possible detriment of
numbers of people exposed to hepatitis B in the late 1970s and
early l980s. More important, in Muraskin's view, the policy
of keeping quiet over hepatitis B meant that the public were
deprived of an opportunity to debate issues that were later,
more urgently, raised by AIDS: whether or not to test, whether
or not to segregate, and so on. He blames the lack of action
over hepatitis B on health care workers, as a high risk group
which was able to exercise leverage on reporters who might
otherwise have alerted public concern.
Muraskin's interpretation, being post hoc, is open to the
benefits and the pitfalls of hindsight. The special hindsight
provided by our current knowledge of AIDS is difficult to
avoid, and It may be valid to ask (as Muraskin does) how the
public and policy response to AIDS would have differed from
what we experienced, if the public and policy response to
hepatitis B had been different. But that is not the aim of
1 Muraskin, 'Controversy over the integration of retarded
hepatitis B carriers'; Muraskin, 'Problem of Asian hepatitis B
carriers in America'.
2 Muraskin, 'Si lent epidemic'.
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this thesis. In this chapter it will be shown that in the UK
in the l970s and 1980s, groups of health workers were the
chief source of pressure to take action on hepatitis B, as
well as the main target of policy making after Rosenheim and
Maycock. Their policy concerns were different from those
Muraskin has discussed, and they may well have wished to avoid
compulsory screening, but they kept hepatitis B on rather than
of f the policy agenda. Their struggles were over recognition
of the danger of hepatitis B to health workers, compensation
for those infected, and preventive measures to avoid
infection. Such measures, which might be tedious, time-
consuming and costly, were a matter for sometimes tendentious
negotiations between laboratory workers, their bosses, and the
Department of Health.
Finally, by way of introduction on the issue of individual
rights versus the public health interest, it is instructive to
look at two articles by Blumberg, separated by a decade. 3 In
the earlier of these two pieces, Bluinberg marshalled the
available evidence and concluded that compulsory screening, of
health workers or others, would be inadvisable. Tests would
show which individuals carried the surface antigen, but it was
becoming clear that not all carriers were equally infectious,
and there was still no means of identifying those who were
particularly infectious. Carriers would be stigmatized, might
lose their jobs and suffer insurance problems, but could not
B. S. Bluntherg, 'Bioethical questions related to hepatitis B
antigen', American Journal of Clinical Pathology, 65 (1976),
848-53; B. S. Blumberg, ' The Daedalus effect: changes in
ethical questions relating to hepatitis B virus', Annals of
Internal Medicine, 102 (1985), 390-94.
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be helped medically. Perhaps they could be instructed how to
avoid passing the virus on to family members, but even this
area was riddled with uncertainties. The drawbacks for the
individual far outweighed the benefit to others, at this
stage. In the later paper, Blumberg sees greater benefits in
testing, chiefly because further differentiation was now
possible; those carriers of the surface antigen who also
tested positive for the 'e' antigen were likely to be more
infective. With the additional tool of the 'e' antigen test,
and the advent of a vaccine for hepatitis B, the scales had
swung in favour of wider testing - though not necessarily
universal testing of health workers. There was still no
treatment and still the risk of stigmatization; along with
issues of testing for AIDS and other infectious diseases, the
argument over hepatitis B testing remained unresolved.
Hepatitis as a laborator y hazard
In hospital laboratories, blood traditionally enjoyed a
favourable image: compared with other bodily products which
laboratory workers had to analyse, such as faeces or vomit,
blood was regarded as relatively sterile. Even as the renal
unit outbreaks were making their dramatic Impact, a report
from a clinical chemistry laboratory reflects the enduring
power of this image:
it is remembered that few diseases are transmitted by
contact with blood and that the incidence of serious
disease such as serum hepatitis, although a recognized
hazard of laboratory work in hospitals, Is undoubtedly
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low •
Conditions for handling blood were uneven, varying from one
laboratory to another depending on the consultant pathologist
or bacteriologist in charge, and on the local staff ethos.
One informant gave a graphic account of poor attention to
safety prior to the renal unit outbreaks:
Standards of handling blood were awful in pathology
throughout the country. I think that people must have
thought that blood was not a source of infection. The
types of containers that were used, the stoppers that
were in them, I mean they leaked •.. it was impossible to
open them without getting stuff all over your hands.
People didn't wear gloves, so it was very common for them
to be getting blood and serum on their hands... It wasn't
uncommon for somebody, some lazy bod, to send the blood
specimen in the syringe with the needle still on the
end.5
The renal unit hepatitis outbreaks changed matters
drastically. The same informant described the increased
interest in safety with regard to hepatitis B, following the
renal unit outbreaks:
People began to take an interest in safety and I think
the first things that happened were we improved the blood
collection tubes, and people got containers that didn't
leak, and they got them with lids that didn't splatter
the specimen all over your hands when you took it off.
I mean, there were actually some where you had to get
your nails inside to get them [off] ... it was just
impossible not to get the blood on your fingers.'
In this passage describing the improvements, the informant
returned to the previous poor conditions, which clearly
haunted him. He also commented that it was still (in 1991)
common practice for technicians to work without gloves in some
I. W. Percy-Robb, J. Proffitt and L. G. Whitby, 'Precautions
adopted in a clinical chemistry laboratory as a result of an
outbreak of serum hepatitis affecting hospital staff', Journal
of Clinical Patholoqy, 23 (1970), 752.
B. Gee, interview, 21 June 1991.
' Ibid.
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laboratories. 7 There seemed to be a view that microbiology
laboratories had tighter controls than biochemistry or
haematology laboratories, while the morbid anatomy or
pathology laboratories carried higher risks because of the
nature of their work.
This impressionist view was supported by a series of surveys
under the auspices of the Association of Clinical Pathologists
throughout the 1970s, which indicated that the risk of
hepatitis B in clinical laboratories was greatest for
biochemistry and haematology technicians; it was suggested in
1975 that there was room for improvement in safety standards
in these areas. 8 By the end of the decade, a fall in rates
led Grist, the author of these surveys, to conclude that
safety standards had improved and the risk of hepatitis was
now small. Indeed Grist remarked with regard to the range of
infections possibly transmitted by laboratory work:
the case of malaria gives a salutary reminder that
hepatitis is not the only infection which workers risk
from parenteral exposure. Overpreoccupation with the
risk of hepatitis may be dangerous if it diverted the
attention away from a broader vigilance.'
Some laboratory workers were incensed by the underplaying, as
they read it, of the hepatitis risk. The pathologists'
With some reason; apparently gloves can cause skin problems
if worn all day. In some laboratories, gloves were not
necesssarily worn, even when serum specimens were 'bright
yellow': personal communication from former laboratory
technician, 12 Oct 1991.
B N. R. Grist, 'Hepatitis in clinical laboratories: a three-
year survey', Journal of Clinical Patholocw, 28 (1975), 255-9.
N. R. Grist, 'Hepatitis and other infections in clinical
laboratory staff, 1979', Journal of Clinical Patholo qy , 34
(1981), 658.
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surveillance had been undertaken by postal questionnaire
asking for reports of cases of hepatitis (and subsequently
other diseases also) in laboratory workers: workers were not
screened for markers of hepatitis B infection, current or
past. Among the long-term risks associated with hepatitis B
(which usually went undetected), were cirrhosis and cancer of
the liver. The conclusions of the Association of Clinical
Pathologists' survey were to some extent undermined when a
clinical pathologist died of liver cancer at just the time
when colleagues were suggesting that hepatitis B was no longer
a problem in clinical laboratories.' 0 In the view of
laboratory technicians, the disease remained a highly
dangerous hazard, whether or not rates of work-related cases
fell due to careful safety precautions.
The union which represented most blood laboratory technicians,
the Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs
(ASTMS), successfully campaigned in the mid-1970s for
hepatitis B to be scheduled as an industrial disease.' 1 Cover
was limited to those who worked in close and frequent contact
with blood and blood products, or in close and frequent
contact with patients who might be carriers of viral
hepatitis.'2
 This 'close and frequent' proviso, inserted
'° Gee, interview; the link with hepatitis B in this case could
not be proved but had apparently entered the folklore.
" J. Williams, 'Viral hepatitis: prescription first result of
continuing campaign', Medical World, February/March 1976, pp.
12-13; Williams was a member of ASTMS National Executive
Committee.
12 DHSS, Viral Hepatitis, Report by Industrial Injuries
Advisory Council in accordance with Section 141 of the Social
Security Act 1975 on the question whether viral hepatitis
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because it was often impossible to identify accurately the
source of a particular infection (bearing in mind the long
incubation period of hepatitis B), excluded many health
workers and also groups outside the health service, like the
police or other service workers, who were concerned about
contracting the disease in the course of their duties.'3
However, it could in theory apply to many doctors, dentists
and nurses, as well as laboratory workers who handled blood.
During the second half of the 1970s, the struggle over safety
in laboratories centred on microbiological hazards. As a
result of a combination of the 1974 Health and Safety at Work
Act, and the Working Party on Laboratory Use of Dangerous
Pathogens, the DHSS established an expert working party under
the chairmanship of Sir James Howie (head of the PHLS) to
produce a code of practice for the prevention of infection in
clinical laboratories.' 4
 Health unions would have preferred
that such a group fall under the Health and Safety Executive,
since there had been a long history of the DHSS failing to act
should be prescribed under the Act (London: HMSO, 1975), p.12.
' Telephone engineers servicing telephones for patients on
home dialysis were mentioned by Rosenheim as an instance of
'people whose duties take them into the houses of such
patients' and who were worried about contracting hepatitis.
Rosenheim commented that risks were very small, advice and
information was available from the director of the dialysis
unit concerned, and for added reassurance patients could
install 'plug-in' phones which could be removed for servicing:
Rosenheim Report, p.40.
" DHSS, Code of Practice for the Prevention of Infection in
Clinical Laboratories and Post-mortem Rooms, Department of
Health and Social Security, Scottish Home and Health
Department, Department of Health and Social Services Northern
Ireland, and Welsh Office (London: HMSO, 1978) ('Howle Code'];
p.iil gives lineage of this working party.
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on its own reports. When the Howie Code (as it came to be
known) was finalized, laboratory workers first welcomed it,
and then became incensed with the delay in publication, which
they attributed to the usual DHSS reluctance to commit itself
to anything that might incur expenditure, coupled this time
with opposition from some professional interests. So the
draft report was published in Medical World, the journal of
the Medical Practitioners' Union which had joined ASTMS.'5
This move, together with an incident when smallpox escaped
from a laboratory, apparently prompted the official
publication of the Howie Code.1'
According to the union, DHSS concern over costs coincided with
the outrage of laboratory bosses 'when HSE [Health and Safety
Executive] inspectors started to give them a few basic lessons
in safe systems of work', leading to a further attack on the
Howie Code. 17 An attempt to reduce the hazard status of
hepatitis B (from category Bi or B2, high risk, to C, low
risk), was interpreted by ASTMS as a means of undermining the
' 'The prevention of infection in clinical laboratories',
Medical World, 115, 2 (Dec 1977), 5-12; 'The prevention of
infection in clinical laboratories (2)', Medical World, 116, 1
(Jan 1978), 7-11; 'The prevention of Infection in clinical
laboratories (3), Appendices', Medical World, 116, 2 (Feb
1978), 7-10. See also: 'The Howie Report', Medical World, 116,
2 (Feb 1978), 6, for comment on publicity for the report.
16 Dane and Gee, interviews; the latter mentioned a case of
smallpox at St Mary's as precipitating the publication of the
Howle Code, while others have mentioned an escape of smallpox
from a laboratory at LSHTM.
' ASTMS Health and Safety Office Special Report, The risk of
hepatitis to laboratory workers: the case against the attempt
to downgrade safety standards in laboratories testing
hepatitis B virus specimens (London: Association of
Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs, 1980), p. 7.
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Howie Code. The union fought back with a detailed case
against downgrading hepatitis B, 18 as a counter to the case
for downgrading put forward by a Joint Working Party headed by
Zuckerman.' 9 As an example of the linkage between hazard
classification and expenditure, the union reported from their
members' response to consultation on the debate: 'The rumour
of reclassification has already led to the cancellation in one
Area Health Authority of a number of safety cabinets for B2
work'. 2° There was anger over the expert committee's use of
falling numbers of hepatitis cases among laboratory staff to
justify downgrading the hazard: 'Nobody seems to be arguing
that because smallpox is no longer the cause of disease among
laboratory staff (except in unsafe laboratories) we can argue
that it should be reclassified' - a telling jibe, in view of a
number of cases of escape of smallpox from laboratories, with
sometimes fatal consequences.2'
One of the union's proposals urged that: 'Any action that
needs to be taken should henceforth be the responsibility of
Ibid; this is a 37 page document, with four appendices.
19 Ibid, Appendix 1, Stated case for downgrading hepatitis B
virus specimens (B2) to cate gory C, paper prepared by the
Joint Working Party of the Association of Clinical
Biochemists, Association of Clinical Pathologists, Institute
of Medical Laboratory Scientists, and Royal College of
Pathologists, 29 April 1980, lOpp. including references and
tables. Members of the Joint Working Party were Zuckerman,
Waterson, Banatvala, Vandervelde (mentioned in previous
chapters), and Dr S. Clarke, Consultant Virologist, Public
Health Laboratory, Bristol. According to ASTMS, many of their
members who belonged to the Institute of Laboratory Medical
Scientists disagreed with the Joint Working Party's views.
20 ASTMS, Risk of hepatitis to laborator y workers, p. 34.
21 Ibid, idem.
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the Health and Safety Commission not the DHSS'. 22 The union
felt it was contrary to the best interests of promoting health
and safety, that the DHSS should retain control over matters
like the safety categorization of a biological hazard. Such
decisions should be removed from the DHSS, with its overriding
concern over cost-cutting in the NHS, to the Health and Safety
Commission, argued the union. Under the Health and Safety at
Work Act of 1974, the Howie Code was implemented with proper
inspection, but the Control of Substances Hazardous to Health
Act (billed in 1988, enacted in 1990) and the removal of Crown
Immunity again stirred Departmental unease. The end of the
1980s witnessed the DoH delaying publication of a revised
version of the Howie Code, probably for similar reasons of
anxiety over cost as in 1978. Although there were two D0H
observers at the Health Services Advisory Group which revised
the Howie Code, they insisted on consultation throughout the
Department prior to publication, a lengthy rigmarole which
delayed progress for two years from 1989 to 1991.23 Union
views that the D0H, as employer, should not have the final
word on health and safety appeared to be vindicated.
Health workers in contact with patients
Although there was never universal screening of health staff,
various studies, in the UK and elsewhere, had shown that
22 Ibid, p.36.
23 Gee, interview; the Health Services Advisory Group was a
tripartite body composed of employers (health authorities),
employees (trade unions, RCN and EMA), and the Health and
Safety Executive.
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surgeons and dentists ran a risk of contracting hepatitis B
from patients and transmitting it to patients. 24
 However, the
issue of hepatitis B and health service staff, including
nurses, remained shadowy throughout the 1970s. Infection
control guidelines, produced in response to renal unit
outbreaks, could be applied to any situation where a risk of
hepatitis transmission seemed likely - but the problem lay in
identifying that risk. Even in mental health institutions
(NHIs), perhaps the most notorious loci of institutional
infection, there seems to have been little policy initiative
to stamp out infection from patients to staff or vice versa.25
Within the hospital setting, renal units came to be seen as a
special case; elsewhere in the hospital, in wards and
operating theatres, life returned to normal although the
aftermath of the renal unit outbreaks continued to resonate
for a while.
In a few instances, there is evidence of the tendency to
'blame others' especially characteristic of responses to
sexually transmitted diseases (syphilis, AIDS) or of major
epidemics (plague, cholera). It seems perhaps anomalous that
24 Zuckerman, Decade, gives 59 abstracts under the heading
'occupational hazard', of which about 15 appear to originate
from the UK; many of these are by Grist on the clinical
laboratory risk. At this date there were few studies linking
surgery and hepatitis B; on dentistry, see: H. D. Glenwright,
H. D. Edmondson et al, 'Serum hepatitis in dental surgeons',
British Dental Journal, 136 (1974), 409-13; G. F. Goubran, H.
Cu]lens et al, 'Hepatitis B virus infection in dental surgical
practice', British Medical Journal, 1976 (2), 559-60.
25 Notorious because of the Krugman experiments (see Chapter
2); through the 1970s, there was uncertainty over possible
modes of transmission in the MHI setting, with debates over
presence of virus in saliva, given that biting was
commonplace.
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this pattern should appear in relation to hepatitis B in the
health service setting, with only a limited number of cases,
and transmission known to be mainly via blood. Yet in Cohn
Douglas' book, the agent of transmission in the fictional
Edinburgh hospital was a nurse who had slept with several
junior doctors: the promiscuous female as angel of death.2'
Probably many dentists and surgeons were more alarmed over the
risk of transmission from patient to practitioner than the
contrary risk. Since patients were not screened, certain
categories such as 'drug addicts' were seen as a potential
hepatitis hazard and avoided by some practitioners. The few
accounts given by patients who were known hepatitis B carriers
suggest that avoidance was an unwritten policy among dentists
in the 1970s.27
At the higher levels of the dental profession, there was
concern that certain patients might become 'dental lepers',
more often due to unconfirmed suspicion that they might be
hepatitis carriers rather than known carrier status. A report
by an expert group to the Chief Medical Officer and Chief
Dental Officer in 1979 sought to ensure that all patients
would receive appropriate treatment. 2' Paradoxically, known
carriers could continue to be treated in normal practices,
with the use of precautions such as gloves, masks and careful
26 Douglas, Houseman's tale; see discussion in Chapter 4.
27 Mr X, interview, 9 Feb 1993 (see 'A surgeon's tale' below);
Zuckerman files, London School of Hygiene and Tropical
Medicine, account by female patient.
2$ DHSS, Hepatitis in Dentistry. Membership was drawn from
university dental departments, reference laboratories, blood
services and the central PHLS.
217
disinfection to avoid contamination with the patient's blood
and saliva. These known carriers would include blood donors
who had been Informed that their blood carried the hepatitis
surface antigen. On the other hand, the report recommended
that certain categories of patients should be treated In
hospital dental departments. In addition to those with
apparently Infective jaundice, those with renal failure on
dialysis, and those receiving immuno-suppressive therapy (for
instance, transplant patients), the list included categories
that had appeared in the literature repeatedly. These were
haemophiliacs, patients in Institutions for the mentally
handicapped, and known drug addicts. 29
 Clearly, the concept
of 'risk groups' was operating, de facto though not in name.
There Is a curious aspect to this division - a division which
seems to reflect the prejudices of dentists that led to the
setting up of the working party In the first place. Dentists
could be referring certain patients to hospital departments on
the basis of their supposed membership of a 'risk group',
while continuing to treat known carriers of hepatitis B (with
caution) in their surgeries. In normal practice, it was
recommended that dentists leave hepatitis carriers to the end
of a day's list, and disinfect equipment thoroughly
afterwards. 3° Where carriers were treated in hospital dental
29 Ibid, p. 2; 'known drug addicts' referred to those
registered with a doctor or clinic for prescriptions of
heroin. It seems to have been assumed that members of the
medical and dental professions could share knowledge of a
patient's imputed hepatitis B status; confidentiality was
scarcely discussed.
30 Ibid, Idem.
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departments, extremely careful precautions might be employed,
as in Cardiff's 'dental isolation unit'. 3' Here, disposable
instruments were used as far as possible, high speed aerosol
producing drills avoided, and no ordinary assistants allowed
in the isolation unit. Two dental surgeons took turns at
acting as operator and assistant, wearing paper gowns, masks
and hats, protective spectacles and two pairs of rubber gloves
- and no doubt terrifying the patients. Even a modified
version of this regime would be expensive and troublesome for
the average dentist, yet they were urged to treat all patients
as potential hepatitis risks.
When we turn from the risk presented by patients, to the risk
of dentists and surgeons transmitting hepatitis B to patients,
the story throughout the 1970s is chiefly one of denial: this
was supposed to be a rare or non-existent occurrence. In the
1970s, Dane and Polakoff gradually established that surgeon-
to-patient transmission must have been the cause of certain
cases of hepatitis B in patients (often attributed to infected
blood transfusions). As described in Chapter 6, two DHSS
advisory groups, that on testing of blood and that on
hepatitis in dentistry were reformed into a new, unitary
Advisory Group on Hepatitis in 1980; this was a concentration
of expertise on blood, virology and epidemiology. 32 One of
the first tasks of this expert advisory group was to make
recommendations on how to deal with the potential problem of
31 D. Adams and R. Zwink, 'Treating Australia antigen positive
patients: practical experience', British Dental Journal, 141
(1976), 341-3.
32	 Hilton (Department of Health), interview, 30 Sept 1992.
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carriers within the health service. The resultant guidelines
on hepatitis B and NHS staff issued by the Chief Medical
Officer of Health on the last day of 1981 were reassuring.33
Health authorities were advised that staff in departments
other than renal units should not be barred from work if they
were found to be hepatitis B carriers; they should be given
advice on how to avoid transmitting the infection, but
otherwise their work need not be limited. Only if they had
actually transmitted the disease should their work be
curtailed:
In the very rare instances where a member of staff who is
a carrier appears to have been the source of hepatitis B
infection in patients, that individual should perform
only those activities in which the possibility of further
transfer is remote; surgeons should not carry out
operations but may continue non-operative work with
patients, including taking blood or giving injections,
using suitable precautions.34
Since health staff were not routinely screened, the number of
carriers among them was subject to speculation; here, it was
suggested that several hundred would be involved. Presumably
the AGH foresaw great problems if they counselled a policy of
screening staff and removing such a significant number of
carriers from 'hands-on' work in the NHS. They recommended
against screening either patients or staff.
The AGH felt these cases were rare, and only occurred when the
surgeon in question was a highly infective carrier, involved
DHSS circular letter CMO (81) 11, from H. Yellowlees, Chief
Medical Officer to Regional Medical Officers and Area Health
Medical Officers &c, 31 December 1981, 'Hepatitis B and NHS
Staff', with attached 2-page memo, 'Guidance on hepatitis B
surface antigen carriers among NHS staff'.
DHSS, 'Guidance on hepatitis B ... carriers among NHS
staff', p. 1.
220
in surgery deep in the abdomen or chest where needle pricks
and scalpel nicks were more common - gynaecological or cardiac
surgery. Had they demanded that such surgeons be screened,
the surgeons in turn might have demanded the screening of all
patients, which would be costly and perhaps politically
embarrassing. Dane records:
In my experience most surgeons did not hold back from
operating on HBsAg positive [i.e. hepatitis carrier]
patients or patients in 'high risk' categories. I could
see that this attitude might not remain if regular
screening of surgeons was introduced and they were
threatened with loss of their professional life as a
result of a blood test. I sensed the attitude of
surgeons to be: "We will put up with the substantial risk
of contracting hepatitis B from our patients if they will
put up with the very small risk of being infected by a
carrier surgeon before he is identified as a
transmitter"
In the light of subsequent cases of transmission from surgeons
to patients, Dane was slightly defensive in his recollections
about the position taken by the group, but he felt that it was
a reasonable position to take at that time, knowing what they
knew then.
Developments in the l980s following the introduction of the
hepatitis B vaccine will mainly be discussed in the next
chapter, but it seems appropriate to mention here a review of
hepatitis B linked with surgery, covering the period 1975 to
1990, i.e. before and after the vaccine became available.3'
According to this 1991 survey, the vaccine made little impact
D. S. Dane, letter to author, 22 Oct 1992, p. 5.
36 j • Heptonstall, 'Outbreaks of hepatitis B virus infection
associated with infected surgical staff', Communicable Disease
Report, 1,8 (19 July 1991), R8l-R85. This includes reference,
among others, to: S. Polakoff, 'Acute hepatitis B in patients
in Britain related to previous operations and dental
treainent', British Medical Journal, 293 (1986), 33-6.
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on the frequency of outbreaks of surgery-associated hepatitis
B, which averaged about one per year throughout the period
under review: two outbreaks detected in 1990 had prompted the
review. Most outbreaks had been reported in medical journals,
others had not received published notice, but in any case the
data received by the Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre
allowed further details to be elucidated. Twelve outbreaks
were detailed (11 involving surgeons and one involving a
perfusion technician), affecting 91 patients and four contacts
- but as the report pointed out, cases without jaundice were
only traced in three of the more recent outbreaks, via
serological surveys; thus the true total of cases was possibly
nearer to 200. Almost certainly there were other, unreported,
instances of surgical transmission of hepatitis B during this
period. The majority of the outbreaks surveyed arose either
in gynaecology, 37 or cardiothoracic surgery, but general
surgery was implicated in some cases.
Three out of nine surgeons identified as carriers with the 'e'
antigen had received all or part of a course of vaccine,
presumably after they had already, unknowingly, become
carriers. Testing for hepatitis-related antigen was not
usually conducted before vaccination; conversion to antibody
seropositivity was not always checked afterwards. 38 Testing
" Apparently including obstetrics, as there is mention of
forceps deliveries in two cases.
Testing prior to vaccination could have saved about 9 months
in the process of discovering those rare instances where a
surgeon was positive for the surface and maybe also 'e'
hepatitis B antigens; but it was not carried out, probably
because (a) it might seem to contravene the 1981 guidelines
and (b) it might inhibit staff from coming forward for
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unrelated to vaccination still followed the pattern laid down
in the 1981 guidelines: workers were not tested until patients
had developed jaundice following treatment. Strenuous efforts
appear to have been made to trace other patients operated on
by the surgeon implicated in the initial cases, but testing of
the surgeon could still be delayed:
In most of the outbreaks reported here, specimens were
not requested from surgical team members until two or
more patients had developed acute icteric HBV [hepatitis
B virus] infections within six months of surgery and the
association between them had been recognised. Many
patients with a history of surgical exposure have also
received blood transfusions, and it has been usual to
exclude transfusion acquired HBV infection before
investigating the possibility of HBV transmission from an
infected health care worker.39
To allow more rapid detection and reduction of hepatitis B
transmission, the 1991 survey proposed that whenever a patient
developed hepatitis B within six months of surgery, all
members of the surgical team involved should be asked to
undergo testing. Such investigations should be initiated
where only one patient showed signs of infection; previously,
at least two cases had to be observed before action was taken.
But Dr Julia Heptonstall, author of this survey, while
encouraging universal vaccination for all surgeons, stopped
short of recommending testing for this group. The problem
would then remain: what to do about those individuals who
failed to respond to the vaccine because they were already
carriers?
As matters stood during the 1980s and into the 1990s, the co-
vaccination: D. S. Dane, letter to author, 30 Nov 1992.
Heptonstall, 'Outbreaks', R83-4.
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operation of health workers who might be a source of infection
was crucial In containing hepatitis B in the health sector.
This Is clearly revealed In an internal inquiry conducted by a
hospital which discovered in 1990 that two of their patients
had developed hepatitis B following cardiothoracic surgery.4°
A newly appointed surgeon (a registrar) claimed that he had
received hepatitis B vaccine, but tests by the Occupational
Health Department revealed that he had not developed immunity
and was in fact a carrier of the 'e' antigen. By the time his
test results came through the surgeon had already taken part
in one operation which resulted in the patient acquiring
hepatitis B (later cleared) - but nobody knew of this
infection until later, due to the long incubation period of
the disease. The surgeon withdrew consent to further tests,
as he was entitled to do under the 1981 guidelines, which were
still in place; the Director of Occupational Health relayed
this decision to the Consultant In Virology, who Interpreted
it as requiring confidentiality. The surgeon's carrier status
was therefore not revealed to anyone else for a period of five
months.
Against the advice of an outside consultant whom he saw, the
surgeon continued to operate, believing that careful adherence
to safe procedures (including double gloving) would prevent
transmission of the virus. He was unaware that he had already
infected one patient: subsequently he infected a second. The
'Report of the internal inquiry Into the hepatitis B
incident', typescrIpt, 1990. As this internal Inquiry was
made available to me confidentially, I am following normal
practice in not revealing the location of the hospital.
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fact that these two cases had occurred only came to light at a
meeting called on another issue; the hospital's Control of
Infection Committee had had no knowledge of the second case.
The Director of Occupational Health revealed the surgeon's
carrier status, which had been kept confidential, and the
surgeon was suspended pending investigation. The hospital's
internal inquiry panel found that D0H guidelines had been
adhered to, but had clearly proved inadequate: therefore they
recommended review of these guidelines by the Doll as soon as
possible.
The case just cited illustrates the effect of the 1981
guidelines on hepatitis B and NHS staff, nearly a decade later
- what clearly appeared to the inquiry panel as a mistaken
weighting of the balance in favour of the rights of the
individual surgeon to keep his carrier status confidential,
against the public health interest. 4' It should be stressed
that in all these cases, where two or more patients had
developed jaundice, efforts were made to trace infection,
either to a transfusion source or (if that failed) to the
operating surgeon. A surgeon's rights to avoid testing and to
deny knowledge of his carrier status to colleagues most
closely concerned, such as the control of infection officer,
could no longer be protected when such an outbreak had
occurred. Although patients who had been infected received no
redress other than an apology, future protection of other
patients became paramount once a surgeon had proved infectious.
41 The same balance was observed in relation to testing health
workers for HIV: Berridge, History of the present, shows
professional self-regulation was relied on for AIDS.
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A surgeon's tale
Tracing of a carrier surgeon did not mean loss of all rights
to confidentiality: when cases were published, names and
locations were not mentioned. 42
 One carrier surgeon agreed to
be interviewed for this study, on condition I adhered to the
same strict code of confidentiality. Mr X learned in August
1978 that he was hepatitis B positive. Seven patients who had
either developed jaundice or were diagnosed as hepatitis B
positive had been operated on by Mr X in a six-month period,
presumed to be the period when he was himself incubating the
disease; no patients had been infected during the six months
before and six months after the incubation period, despite his
involvement In similar numbers and types of operation. Mr X
had probably acquired hepatitis B during an operation on an
infected patient, and then passed it on to others. 43 But he
was told by a senior officer at the Department of Health that
'the only victims in this are the patients'. 44
 At area,
regional and departmental levels, he felt, officials were all
'watching their backs', fearing that patients would sue. The
local Medical Officer of Health wrote to the General Medical
Council asking for Mr X to be struck off the Medical Register;
though this was not taken up, it registered as a bitter blow.
42 Again, this parallels the new recall procedures for AIDS, as
Berridge has pointed out.
In the opinion of experts such as Zuckerman, Polakoff and
Almeida: Mr X, interview. He quoted Roger Williams' (King's
Liver Unit) calculation that the risk of a doctor acquiring
hepatitis B from a patient was 22 times greater than that of
transmission from doctor to patient.
" Mr X, Interview.
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Unlike other surgeons caught in the hepatitis B trap, Mr X
refused to give up operative work entirely and demanded the
right to follow a normal career path. Once identified,
hepatitis carrier surgeons were encouraged by employers and
the D0H to switch careers, away from patient contact, to
research or administration. Against great opposition, Mr X
carried on as a surgeon, developing a sub-specialty which used
non-invasive techniques. Only after a protracted legal
struggle, with backing from the British Medical Association
(BMA), did Mr X gain some job security, in the shape of a
personal senior registrar post. From 1985 to 1991 he battled
to persuade his employing authority to establish a personal
consultant post for him. This was finally secured with
intervention at the highest level, involving a friend in the
House of Lords, and ministerial dispensation. 45 Mr X had
survived as a clinical practitioner in his chosen specialty,
creating a precedent not only for other hepatitis B carriers
in the NHS but for AIDS sufferers too. It had been a long and
exhausting journey. Mr X compared dealing with the Department
of Health with 'walking through treacle'; he said he found
officials defensive, not entrepreneurial or imaginative, more
afraid of the press than of wasting a doctor's career.
Elements in the personal side of the surgeon's story, such as
problems over mortgages and life insurance, are fairly
representative of the experiences of other victims of
The Secretary of State dispensed with the requirement to
advertise the post (a power which was rarely used), in case
someone else was appointed, using up the money set aside to
pay Mr X.
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hepatitis B. Other aspects were affected by his professional
status. For example, when hepatitis B vaccine became
available, a course from the first batch of thirty doses in
the UK was given to Mrs X, who was not a hepatitis carrier;
and the two children born subsequently were both immunized at
birth. Mr X was offered interferon when its use for hepatitis
B was still very experimental, but declined, preferring not to
become 'a laboratory animal'. Ten years after his initial
infection he experienced a bout of illness, which simulated
some of the effects of interferon treatment, and he was then
found to have converted from 'e' antigen to 'e' antibody
positivity, with lowered surface antigen levels. Now a mild
rather than an infective carrier, he could 'do anything other
than give blood'.46
The extreme bitterness which this surgeon evinced over the way
that he had been treated presumably reflects the high career
expectations which the long training and professional ethos of
hospital medicine inculcates. Although Mr X received backing
from the BMA, it came belatedly; meanwhile, fellow doctors in
his immediate vicinity, such as the local Medical Officer of
Health, as well as his employers, wanted to get rid of him.
The fraternity of hepatitis experts suported him, but even
with their help, his battle with the authorities lasted
thirteen years. This case lends support to the view that
carriers tend to be victimized, perhaps more so in the case of
health workers since they are liable to lose their job. On
46 Dane had predicted this conversion when Mr X was first
diagnosed as a carrier, and had told him it would happen in
about ten years time: Mr X, interview.
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the other hand, great sympathy and understanding was shown
towards the carrier by the experts who perhaps identif led with
his plight. Whether this case influenced decisions over the
handling of health workers with AIDS Is uncertain.
Precautions and emergency action
Much of this chapter has been concerned with debates over
screening, but there has been mention of other preventive
measures. In laboratories, on wards and in operating theatres
and special dental units, wherever there was an enhanced risk
of hepatitis B transmission, precautions were supposed to be
taken by health staff. Those who handled blood samples
suspected of containing the virus, or those who cared for
patients thought to be incubating or carrying the disease,
could protect themselves to some extent by the use of physical
barriers, and could protect others by meticulous cleaning and
disinfecting of contaminated implements and surfaces. 47 How
far such measures offered real protection is open to question.
White coats, or elastoplast over cuts, scarcely constituted
serious barriers to a microorganism as persistent as the
hepatitis B virus, but they served as a reminder of the
worker's vulnerability and perhaps reinforced the need to
observe a series of other, much stricter, precautions.
Laboratory workers, as we have seen, were often in the
vanguard of these tighter hygiene measures. For example, a
See: COHSE (Confederation of Health Service Employees)
Factsheet, 'Hepatitis B: Ensuring health staffs are protected'
(No date, c.1988)
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group from the clinical chemistry laboratory at the Edinburgh
hospital affected by the renal unit outbreak of hepatitis B
drew up their own list of hygiene measures in 1970, adapting
and amplifying those proposed in the 1968 PHLS guidelines.4
The Edinburgh procedures included careful labelling and
packaging of samples, use of pipettes with rubber suction
bulbs rather than mouth pipettes, techniques to avoid creation
of aerosols during cetrifugation, and careful disinfection of
the automatic analyser. Gloves were worn all day except for
meal and tea breaks which were taken outside the laboratory.
Procedures for reporting accidents were improved: these, and
the observation of safety measures, were underwritten by the
appointment of a safety officer from among the ranks of
laboratory technicians.
We can trace a reciprocal interaction between laboratories and
the centre, from the 1968 PHLS guidelines, through the 1972
Naycock and Rosenheim recommendations, to the Howie Code of
1978 and beyond. Bodies of experts drawing up codes of
practice relied heavily on the 'best practice' examples
currently on offer around the country, whether or not they
were published as in the Edinburgh case. Implementation
varied widely, probably depending at first on distance from
foci of infection such as renal units. Standards gradually
shifted through the 1970s and 1980s, though not without a
rearguard action from some laboratory bosses and the
DHSS/DoH .
48 Percy-Robb et al, 'Precautions adopted'
' See discussion on wrangles over the Howie code, above.
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Tighter precautions made demands on doctors requesting tests;
on individual laboratory workers and safety representatives;
on clinical laboratories which had to provide extra resources;
and on waste disposal services. The greatest individual
responsibility for safe handling of samples, possibly infected
with hepatitis B, was undoubtedly placed onto laboratory
workers. The reduction over this period in the number of
cases of hepatitis B among such workers may indicate
successful adoption of stricter hygiene precautions - measures
which to a large extent the workers fought for and defended -
supported by the safety representatives' role.
At a local level, enquiries about hepatitis B received by
virologists working in public health laboratories ranged from
anxious requests from GPs concerning the differentiation of
hepatitis A from B, through to hospital control of infection
officers asking where to obtain immunoglobulin for a health
worker involved in a needlestick injury, a common accident in
the health service setting. 5 ° Specific immunoglobulin,
developed in the early 1970s, continued to be recommended as
an emergency treatment for accidental exposure to hepatitis B
right through into the period when vaccine became available."
Its efficacy was very much a matter of debate at first, as we
have seen, 52 but as the only possible salvation in case of
" From papers of J. B. Kurtz, Public Health Laboratory, John
Radcliffe Hospital, Oxford; I am grateful to Dr Kurtz for
loaning me these papers. No specific cases will be cited.
51 Kurtz papers, including minutes of several PHLS hepatitis
sub-committee meetings.
As discussed in Chapter 6.
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accidents, it gradually won backing from the DHSS. It also
came to be recognised as an effective means of reducing the
chance of a baby born to a hepatitis B carrier mother
acquiring the disease at birth, and with it the high risk of
liver cirrhosis or cancer in early adult life. 53 For those
unfortunate enough to have become carriers, the only medical
solution on offer was interferon, used experimentally for
hepatitis B from 1982 onwards, with uneven results. 54 From
1982, a vaccine was available, but this failed to transform
the health and safety picture for at least the first decade,
as the final chapter will show.
Interim guidelines brought out by the D0H in 1990 linked
precautions against hepatitis B with those against HIV in a
clinical setting. 55 However, the D0H finally updated the 1981
guidelines on hepatitis B and NHS staff only in 1993, in a
substantial booklet drawn up by the Advisory Group on
Hepatitis. 56 Reference to 'a number of well-documented
outbreaks of hepatitis B following transmission from health
S. M. Wheeley, E. Boxall and M. J. Tarlow, 'Prognosis of
children who are carriers of hepatitis B', British Medical
Journal, 294 (1987), 211-13.
Group B, interview; for the earlier history of interferon,
see: T. Pieters, 'Interferon and its first clinical trial:
looking behind the scenes', talk given to Wellcome Trust
Twentieth Century Medical History Group at the Royal College
of Physicians, London, 11 Feb 1992.
Department of Health, 'Guidance for clinical health care
workers: protection against infection with HIV and hepatitis
viruses' (London: HNSO, 1990)
' UK Health Departments, Protectin g health care workers and
patients from hepatitis B, Recommendations of the Advisory
Group on Hepatitis, August 1993 [l7pp booklet, no publisher,
printed for HNSO]
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care workers to their patients' 57 perhaps indicates that
production of the booklet was partly prompted by Heptonstall's
1991 report, which drew together published and unpublished
cases that had come to the notice of the CDSC. 5 ° Heptonstall
was a member of the Advisory Group on Hepatitis in 1993.
Leaving aside recommendations on immunization, which will be
discussed in the next chapter, a main emphasis of the 1993
guidelines is the high risk of an 'e' antigen carrier
infecting patients, and conversely the low risk of a carrier
who does not have this antigen infecting patients. 59 Despite
the low risk in all but the tiny minority of cases, 'routine
infection control measures' must always be followed by all
health care workers.'° Special restrictions on 'exposure
prone' work are ruled for those who carry the 'e' antigen, but
surface antigen carriers are relieved of such restrictions,
including those previously in force for work in renal units."
In the careful advice on handling of cases of health workers
found to be hepatitis B carriers, with great emphasis on
Ibid', p.3, para. 1.3.
" Heptonstall, 'Outbreaks', discussed earlier in this chapter.
" Cf: Blumberg, 'Daedalus effect'; the 'e' antigen, discovered
in 1972, was gradually linked with high infectivity.
60 UK Health Departments, 'Protecting health care workers', p.
4.
" 'Exposure prone' is defined as 'where there is risk that
injury to the worker may result in the exposure of the
patient's open tissues to the blood of the worker', ibid, p.5;
where the hands are inside the patient's body, cannot be fully
seen, and there are sharp instruments or splinters of bone or
teeth around - thus gloves are no protection.
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confidentiality, there is evidence of the 1993 guidelines
feeling a way forward from the 1981 position, influenced by
criticisms such as those levelled by the 1990 internal inquiry
in a hospital that had suffered an outbreak.' 2
 Recourse in
difficult cases is offered to a UK Advisory Panel for health
care workers infected with blood borne viruses, an extension
of a panel which gave advice on HIV infected health workers;
but at the date of writing this did not appear to include a
hepatitis B expert.'3
The 1993 guidelines offer a reassuring picture of the
containability of hepatitis B in health care settings,
stressing that with proper hygiene precautions the risk of
transmission is very slight. But of course safety depends on
the co-operation of health care workers. The dilemma is
illustrated by the recent case of an 'e' antigen carrier
surgeon who concealed his carrier status, until he was found
to have transmitted hepatitis B to 19 patients. This doctor
was condemned of causing a public nuisance and sent to prison
for a year, under an interpretation of the law which was last
used in 1815, against a woman who wheeled her smallpox-
infected baby around the streets.'4
 There seems evidence of a
62 Discussed above, pp. 223-4.
' UK Health Departments, 'Protecting health care workers', pp.
11, 17; the panel covered anaesthetics, dentistry, general
practice, HIV disease, midwifery, nursing, obstetrics and
gynaecology, occupational health, surgery, virology; future
appointments will cover 'expertise on viral hepatitis and its
epidemiology'.
" C. Elliott and C. Mihill, 'Prison for surgeon who carried
hepatitis', Guardian, 30 Sept 1994; see also: R. Duce,
'Hepatitis doctor jailed for "terrible" deception', Times, 30
Sept 1994.
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harsher response now than in the past, although this case was
exceptional in that the doctor deliberately deceived his
employers over his hepatitis B carrier status. In general,
moves to publicise transmission from doctors to patients have
been stepped up, both for AIDS and for hepatitis B, in the
past two or three years.
Conclusions
This chapter has concentrated on health and safety issues
around hepatitis B in the health setting, which figured most
prominently on the policy agenda, initially allied with the
perception of the disease as a hospital infection. During the
1970s, through the activities of health workers and hepatitis
experts who were often themselves health professionals,
hepatitis B was increasingly constructed as an occupational
disease of health workers. Though hepatitis figured In other
workplace settings such as prisons, there was little parallel
concern about these workers.'5 Epidemiological evidence
played only a relatively small part In such constructions: far
more important were struggles over compensation and safety
measures for laboratory workers, and health authorities'
liability as employers versus their responsibilities to
patients.
" Though the workers themselves were concerned: letter from
Assistant Secretary of Prison Officers' Association to ASTMS
health and safety representative, on 'Viral Hepatitis! Penal
EstablIshments 1 , 9 March 1983, followed by 'Case for extending
the prescription of viral hepatitis as an industrial disease
to prison officers' [typescript, 6pp.] I am grateful to Brian
Gee for letting me see this; he was influential in drawing up
the document: B. Gee, interview.
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Different groups of workers had different agendas, for example
laboratory technicians campaigned for compensation while
dentists showed great concern over possibly infectious
patients. But the resultant policy moves could have wider
implications: in the case of the prescription of hepatitis B
under industrial injuries legislation (1975), the ruling on
'close and frequent contact' with patients or blood thought to
carry a risk of hepatitis B meant that not only laboratory
workers, but many other categories of health workers, were
covered. In the case of dentists' guidelines (1979), the
expert group set down categories of patients regarded as
risky, a listing that was to hold over into the vaccine era as
we shall presently see.
There is no evidence of lobbying by surgeons to avoid
screening, though that does not mean it did not occur behind
the scenes: but in any case, professional solidarity of the
experts with other medical professionals may largely explain
the guidelines on hepatitis B and health workers (1981), which
allowed carriers to continue working until and unless patients
developed jaundice. Changes in guidance were probably brought
about by a sequence of events: an outbreak in a London
hospital in 1990, resulting in a thorough internal inquiry
which called for review of the 1981 guidelines; a survey of
surgery-associated outbreaks of hepatitis B conducted by the
responsible CDSC officer, published in 1991; familiarity of
several members of the expert advisory group with the case of
Mr X, which showed that even a highly infectious carrier could
conduct non-invasive surgery safely. When revised guidelines
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were produced in 1993, none of this was mentioned and changes
were predicated on notions around the 'e' antigen. This was
hardly new;' 6 what had altered in the last few years was
visibility of the problem at the centre (in particular the
CDSC) following noise at the periphery (in hospitals affected
by outbreaks).
In Chapters 4 and 5 we saw safety measures against the spread
of hepatitis B using the new antigen test in the areas of
renal dialysis and the blood supply. In this chapter, the
test has scarcely figured, until the refinement of testing for
various antigens provided a means of identifying the most
infective carriers. Instead, it appears almost as though a
deal was negotiated, imposing strict safety precautions on
health workers in return for allowing them to avoid screening.
But health workers themselves pushed for preventive measures,
while compulsory screening for all health workers was both too
expensive and too controversial for the authorities to
contemplate. Thus, to return to Muraskin's terminology, if
the balance of individual rights (not to be screened) versus
the public health interest (to know which workers are
carriers) swung in favour of individual rights, it did so at
the centre, for pragmatic reasons, not as a result of a
conspiracy of health care workers. On the other hand, the
various strands in this chapter demonstrate the power of
professional Interests to define strategies.
" See Chapter 6, n. 20.
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CHAPTER 8: VACCINE POLICY (1982-1993]
The introduction of a vaccine for hepatitis B in 1982 might be
expected to spell the end of public health problems in
relation to a disease which, though it affected relatively few
people, caused considerable embarrassment to the DHSS from
time to time. As this chapter will show, this was simply not
the case; uptake of the vaccine was limited throughout the
1980s. Explanations can be offered using the literature on
state Interventions in the medical arena, and on the history
of vaccination more specifically. The first part of the
chapter looks at some of this literature, and considers how
far hepatitis B in the UK fits these sorts of explanations and
scenarios. It shows that a limited uptake of the vaccine,
which followed central policy, cannot be explained simply by
factors such as cost and demand. Other elements are
important, such as commercial interests, people's trust in the
safety of the vaccine, the devolution of responsibility for
decisions on giving the vaccine to regional authorities,
together with divisions within the medical profession over its
applicability.
The second and third parts of the chapter trace debates and
eventual changes in policy on the vaccine during the 1980s and
into the 1990s. Several of the factors identified in relation
to other vaccines can be seen to operate, with peculiarities
due to the time and place: thus fear of the vaccine is related
to fear of AIDS; high cost is particularly a problem when
cost-cutting In the NHS is the rule of the day, and so on.
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This story Illustrates a number of themes that have recurred
in this thesis: the lack of fit between policy and research
findings ( here, epidemiological evidence on main risk groups;
evidence on the safety of the vaccine); and divisions between
branches of the medical and health professions. Again,
policy-making at the centre seems to follow, rather than lead,
developments at the peripheries, despite the leading role of
hepatitis experts in policy formation.
Background and context of vaccine policy debates
Success stories in terms of mass vaccination programmes have
tended to involve viral diseases transmitted through droplet
infection such as measles, diphtheria and polio. When
Hollingsworth discusses vaccines as low-cost, high-demand new
technologies, this is the range of diseases invoked, along
with smallpox which is a rather different case, but likewise
originally widespread.' By contrast, the Incidence of acute
cases of hepatitis B in the UK Is low, with only a handful of
deaths. 2
 Similarly, carrier prevalence, under one per cent of
the UK population, is low in global terms. When the first
vaccine for hepatitis B was introduced in 1982, the high cost
(over £60 a course) undoubtedly acted as a deterrent to
widespread use, from the viewpoint of central policymakers.
Potential recipients sometimes voiced a different reservation:
1 Holllngsworth et al, State intervention in medical care,
p.125.
2 s• Polakoff, 'Acute viral heptitis B reported to the Public
Health Laboratory Service', Journal of Infection, 20 (1990),
163-8.
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a fear of contamination of the vaccine, a fear that might have
been overcome by a strong policy of vaccine promotion.
Instead, a limited policy remained in place through most of
the 1980s.
For the UK, hepatitis B vaccine appears as a high-cost, low-
demand technology, so that the weak or restricted central
policy of the 1980s seems unsurprising. But epidemiology and
cost-benefit do not adequately explain policy. When a 1983
cost-benefit analysis favoured wider use of the vaccine for
gay men, policy did not change. Yet in the 1990s, despite the
background of a lower incidence, there are moves towards
universal childhood vaccination against hepatitis B. The
apparently 'pure' facts of epidemiology were constructed and
reconstructed according to social forces, most immediately
medical power relations.
Division of opinion on vaccination policy has a deep history,
with the earliest clash perhaps falling within the general
frame of 'individual liberty versus the public health'. In
the nineteenth century, when smallpox vaccination became one
of the first areas where state control was extended into the
arena of Individual health behaviour, public health medicine
favoured compulsory vaccination, introduced in Britain in
1853. Anti-compulsory-vaccination alliances sprang up,
involving some sections of the medical profession allied with
other groups convinced on religious or philosophical grounds
that the compulsory element should be removed. In a
compromise solution, a conscience clause was Introduced in
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1898, but it has been argued that by this time the anti-
vaccinationists had lost their ideological war, based on older
Chadwickian ideals of public health as a sanitary and
environmental exercise. 3 The newer preventive medicine sought
to employ the tools of the bacteriological revolution, to
attack each particular disease through destroying or
neutralizing its causative agent. Retrospectively, doctors
see the case for smallpox vaccination as totally vindicated by
the worldwide eradication of smallpox, officially achieved by
1976 - an impressive victory for scientific preventive
medicine. 4 Yet the sanitary and environmental approach looms
large in the handling of problems presented by hepatitis B,
both before the vaccine - the era of screening in the 1970s -
and after the vaccine was introduced in the l980s.
Immunization was to be a key weapon in the new preventive
armoury of twentieth century public health medicine. However,
its use was extremely variable, even when it seemed clearly
possible to prevent huge numbers of deaths from infectious
disease. As with smallpox vaccination, arguments about
efficacy and possible complications could often be rallied on
either side. In the case of diphtheria, Lewis has shown that
Britain in the inter-war period had a much lower immunization
D. Porter and R. Porter, 'The politics of prevention: anti-
vaccinationism and public health in nineteenth-century
England', Medical History, 32 (1988), 231-52.
H. J. Parish, Victory with vaccines. The story of
immunization (Edinburgh: Livingstone, 1968); for more critical
discussion on the role of variolation and vaccination in
reducing smallpox mortality through a long run from the
eighteenth century, see: P. Razzell, The conquest of smallpox
(Fine, Sussex: Caliban Books, 1977)
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rate than Canada despite Its longer-established public health
network, a situation only altered with the emergency situation
of wartime. 5 Widespread use of diphtheria toxoid in Canada
was favoured by unified medical opinion, a centrally
orchestrated campaign, and a reliable supply of high quality,
cheap toxoid. In Britain, with medical opinion divided and
supplies available from disparate sources with less certainty
of quality, the lack of a strong central policy was crucial -
local health authorities were wary of supplying the toxoid
lest they had to bear the cost. All of these factors,
particularly the last, resonate with the case of hepatitis B
vaccine in the 1980s. However, It should be noted that
following wartime changes, Immunization policy in general in
Britain shifted to strong promotion of immunization for the
common 'childhood' diseases, with the aim of achieving as near
as possible universal childhood immunization.'
Hepatitis B seemingly presents a different set of problems
from Infectious diseases spread by droplet transmission, such
as measles, diphtheria, whooping cough and polio. Transmitted
by body fluids, it was regarded in this country mainly as an
adult disease restricted to certain risk groups. As we have
seen, the perception of which groups were most at risk changed
over time, and did not necessarily fit the evidence, as health
J. Lewis, 'The prevention of diphtheria In Canada and
Britain, 1914-1945', Journal of Social HIstor y, 20 (1986),
163-76.
' See successive issues of DHSS/Department of Health,
Inimunisation against Infectious disease (London: HMSO).
Measles, diphtheria, whooping cough and tetanus immunizations
are given during the first year of life and polio at age five
to most children; parents may opt their child out.
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workers dominated the policy agenda. But in general, this
pattern of acquisition of hepatitis B via blood, drugs or sex,
mainly in adult life, is associated with a low or intermediate
prevalence of the carrier state in the population, below five
per cent. 7 That seemed to be the pattern for most of the
developed countries.
But in many parts of the world hepatitis B is acquired in
infancy and ten per cent or more may remain hepatitis B
carriers, with an enhanced risk in adult life of liver disease
including cancer. For this reason, vaccine trials are being
conducted in which hepatitis B vaccine is appended to the WHO
extended programme of immunization for infants in areas of
West Africa. 9
 In south-east Asia, especially Japan and China,
where primary liver cancer is a severe problem, widespread
hepatitis B immunization has already been introduced, with
low-cost vaccines produced in the region.' 0 Thus, for both
high prevalence countries and low prevalence countries,
hepatitis B vaccination appears to have conformed with
Hollingsworth's model: it diffused rapidly where there was a
high demand and low cost, and vice versa.
But this high/low prevalence division in vaccine policy was
Zuckerman, Decade of viral hepatitis, pp. 7-23. The
prevalence of markers of hepatitis B infection in the healthy
blood donor population in the UK is low, at about 0.1-0.2 per
cent, but this is thought to be an unrepresentative sample.
London and Bluinberg, 'Comments on role of epidemiology in
investigation of hepatitis B'.
' Hall et al, 'Gambia Hepatitis Intervention Study'.
Bluniberg, interview, 5 March 1992.
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apparently not a permanent fixture. With this sort of
contemporary history, the situation can change before one's
eyes. There have recently been moves towards hepatitis B
inununization for all children in America, a lower prevalence
country, and in Italy, an intermediate prevalence country.11
This was a shift from a policy of selective immunization of
risk groups, similar to the policy in the UK. There are now
indications that the UK policy may soon change to universal
hepatitis B vaccination, probably at puberty as with rubella
immunization.' 2 All through the 1980s there were calls for
wider use of the vaccine in the UK, while central policy
seemingly favoured the brake rather than the accelerator.
If the limited size of the perceived problem is one part of
the explanation for a restricted UK response, the cost of the
vaccine is another. With the price for a course of three
doses over £60 through most of the 1980s, cost was clearly an
issue for those deciding vaccine policy. The curious fact is
that a vaccine was produced for use in Asia, in the rnid-1980s,
for around $1 a course.' 3 Further study is required, of WHO
input and the arrangements by which pharmaceutical companies
are licensed to manufacture and sell their vaccines in
different countries, in order to explain this remarkable price
' On the US, Muraskin says: 'Universal vaccination for
hepatitis B is now [1993] on the agenda at the CDC [Centers
for Disease Control]': Muraskin, 'Hepatitis B as a model',
p.130, n. 29; for Italy, see: S. Garattini, 'Italy: Compulsory
hepatitis B vaccination' (Corr.), Lancet, 1991 (1), 228.
12 
'Liver disease jabs "for all at 12"', The Guardian, 14 Oct
1991.
13 Blumberg, interview, 22 Nov 1990.
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differential which has been maintained over many years.
In addition to low prevalence of the disease and high cost of
the vaccine, a third factor can be seen as inhibiting its
deployment: consumer resistance. The vaccine available in the
UK from 1982 onwards used as its raw material the plasma of
donors with chronic hepatitis B. Rumours circulated that
these donors included gay men. At the time when fear of AIDS
was growing, but a test for HIV/AIDS in blood and blood
products was not yet available, some of those to whom the
vaccine was offered were unwilling to accept it. This appears
to have been the case in fact even after an HIV test was
introduced. A new genetically engineered vaccine which was
marketed from 1987 proved more acceptable in the UK.
Dangers associated with immunization appear frequently in the
history of other vaccines, and entered into the debate on
their use. There could be a fear of pollution, associated
with the source of vaccine material: cows, for smallpox
vaccine; horses for diphtheria anti-toxin; gay men, for
hepatitis B vaccine. Or there could be a fear of 'accidents'
arising from a failure to modify or purify the vaccine
sufficiently in manufacture: well-known instances occurred in
the case of diphtheria and polio when live vaccine caused
outbreaks of disease. Less well-known were deaths associated
with measles convalescent serum, given to children in parts of
Britain in 1937/8 - these deaths were later realized to have
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been due to hepatitis B which contaminated the serum.' 4 In
the case of hepatitis B vaccine derived from human serum, fear
of contamination was doubly present, both in terms of the
hepatitis B virus (was it killed?) and the putative AIDS virus
- and, some might argue, what other unknown dangers? - despite
assurances, from the manufacturers and hepatitis experts, that
dozens of careful steps in the preparation of the vaccine had
unquestionably removed all noxious elements, and in
particular, HIV.
Another issue arose in earlier debates, exemplified in the
struggle over smallpox vaccination: the right of the
individual to choose his or her own method to protect their
health, versus the state's obligation to ensure the
maximization of the public health. This would not at first
glance appear relevant to the question of hepatitis B
immunization, when the state was reluctant to offer the
vaccine to any but a chosen few, and compulsory immunization
was off the agenda. However, a similar theme emerges from the
immediate prehistory of hepatitis B vaccination, as we have
seen in the previous chapter, in debates around screening.
For screening entails detection of carriers, and what Blumberg
called 'a conflict between public health interests and
individual liberty'.' 5
 In the UK during the 1970s, a
compromise had been reached, between intervention in
demarcated areas of especial danger (renal units, blood
' MRC 2181/lOg/2, record of informal meeting on 'Jaundice
following administration of homologous serum', 13 Aug 1942.
' Blumberg, 'Bioethical questions related to hepatitis B
antigen', 852.
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laboratories), and reliance on individual responsibility
elsewhere. The vaccine would be received Into this pre-
existing policy context, with established experts to advise on
its application.
Policy and debate on the hepatitis B vaccine, 1982-1987
In the previous chapter we saw how a 1981 circular, based on
advice from the Advisory Group on Hepatitis, addressed the
problem of hepatitis B carriers among NHS staff: or rather,
skirted around it. Then in 1982, the first hepatitis B
vaccine was given a UK licence; this was a plasma-derived
vaccine, manufactured by Merck Sharp and Dohine. DHSS
guidelines were issued in October 1982, offering advice on the
new vaccine. 16
 They pointed out that the vaccine would only
be available in very limited quantities initially, that it was
expensive and that NHS resources were stretched. The circular
stressed that hepatitis B occurred at a low rate in the UK,
with only about 1000 overt cases a year, although the risk of
becoming a chronic carrier from asymptomatic infection was
mentioned. These provisos set the tone for restricted
recommendations on vaccine use, reasonable enough when
supplies were limited. However, while the guidelines remained
In place essentially unaltered until 1988, supplies rapidly
expanded, and during the mid-1980s the rate of acute hepatitis
' DHSS circular CMO(82)13/CNO(82)1]., from Henry Yellowlees,
Chief Medical Officer and Mrs A. A. B. Poole, Chief Nursing
Officer, to General Medical Practitioners, District Medical
Officers and District Nursing Officers, 15 October 1982, on
'Hepatitis B vaccine: guidance on use', letter with 2pp.
attachment.
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B increased to 2000 a year, before falling back to previous
levels.' 7 This increase in the disease after introduction of
a vaccine constitutes a paradox, undermining vaccine policy.
The 1982 vaccine guidelines concentrated on two major
categories: (1) health service staff and (ii) patients and
family contacts. Staff in mental handicap institutions were
prioritized, as were those in contact with known carriers or
haemophiliacs - though prioritization by no means meant the
vaccine was actually delivered. Other than these categories,
the guidelines mention laboratory workers handling infected
material, and staff sent abroad to areas of high hepatitis B
prevalence. Patients entering mental institutions, renal
dialysis patients, and spouses or other sexual contacts of
known carriers were also priorities. The list does not
include surgeons, dentists or nurses, nor does it mention
'lifestyle' risk groups such as gay men and drug users. The
closest precedent seems to be the list of high-risk groups
mentioned in the report on hepatitis in dentistry:' 8
 this is
logical, given that the dental group had been amalgamated into
the Advisory Group on Hepatitis.
Through the 1980s, there was pressure for the extension of the
hepatitis B guidelines to include more occupational and
'lifestyle' groups. For those who wanted the vaccine to be
made generally available to the group they belonged to, or to
' Polakof 1, 'Acute hepatitis reported to PHLS', graph, 164.
18 DHSS, Hepatitis in Dentistry, p. 2.
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client groups, the guidelines appeared restrictive.' 9
 They
were open to a degree of interpretation by health authorities,
but judgement of particular doctors in particular cases was
the chief arbiter. Since there was no Item of service payment
attached to the vaccination, a persuasive case had to be made
by individual doctors wishing to use the vaccine more
widely.2°
One member of the Advisory Group on Hepatitis with a global
perspective on the problem, Zuckerman, published regularly on
vaccination policy. In 1982, six months before the DHSS
guidelines caine out, Zuckerman wrote on the priorities for
hepatitis B immunization in the British Medical Journal -
mentioning for Britain the categories selected by the DHSS but
more specifically on the patient care side:
medical and laboratory staff of hepatitis reference
centres and staff engaged In the development and
production of hepatitis B vaccine; staff of liver units
and gastrointestinal units with an interest in the liver;
staff of surgical intensive care units; dental surgeons,
dental nurses, and ancillary staff of units where dental
care is provided for known hepatitis B carriers •••21
These were subsumed in the 1982 guidelines under the rubric of
'personnel directly Involved in patient care over a period of
time, working in units giving treatment to known carriers of
'9 Anonymous informant in touch with many such groups,
interview, 12 July 1991.
20 Across the country, doctors' ability to use the vaccine
varied according to the line taken by their local Family
Practitioner Committee (FPC); see for example Cheshire FPC
standing by its policy of paying item of service fees for
hepatitis B vaccinations in the face of DHSS oppposition: 'FPC
stands firm on hep B fee policy', General PractItioner, 3
April 1987, p. 10.
21 A. J. Zuckerman, 'Priorities for immunisation against
hepatitis B', British Medical Journal, 284 (1982), 686.
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hepatitis B infection'. However, there was good reason for
dentists in normal practice as well as those in special units
to wish for vaccination, and some would argue, for their
ancillary staff as well. Otherwise, Zuckerman's list
pinpoints those working closest to the 'coal face' in research
or clinical settings likely to involve contact with the
hepatitis B virus.
In the same article, Zuckerman introduced a group which was
not subsequently covered in the DHSS guidelines in October:
Male homosexuals are another group at high-risk of
hepatitis B and an important reservoir for transmission
of infection because of their considerable promiscuity.22
At this time - mid to late 1982 - AIDS was only just beginning
to be recognized, and few major studies of 'gay lifestyle'
linked with the new disease had appeared. 23 But the first
recognition of the higher risk of hepatitis B associated with
male homosexual behaviour had been published in the UK in
1973,24 followed in 1975 by a large US study. 25 Appreciation
of the link had gradually grown in the UK, especially amongst
those working in inner London genito-urinary medicine clinics
with a high proportion of homosexual men among their clients,
22 Ibid, 687.
23 For a discussion and evaluation of papers in this field see:
Oppenheimer, 'In the eye of the storm', section on 'The "life-
style" hypothesis: experimental work', pp. 275-80.
24 Fulford, Dane et al, 'Australia antigen and antibody among
patients attending a clinic'. This and another paper
mentioned in Chapter 6, n. 6, substantiate Dane's claim of a
British 'first' for recognition of sexual transmission.
25 Szmuness, Much et al, 'On sexual behaviour in the spread of
hepatitis B'.
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but it was not widely accepted for some while.2'
Awareness grew among gay men themselves, possibly ahead of
many in the medical profession, that a new disease had been
added to the spectrum of sexually transmitted diseases:
unusual in that it was untreatable. As on the American West
Coast, so also in London, the gay community learned about
hepatitis B through the 1970s. In 1982, a number of gay men
in London formed a group for chronic hepatitis B sufferers -
those who had failed to clear the antigen, and therefore
remained infectious - calling themselves 'Groups B'. 27 Some
had been advised by their doctors to abstain from sex and
alcohol, but received little other advice. Others had found
difficulty in obtaining information on long-term prognosis,
and implications for employment. One of the group's aims was
to exchange information. Another aim of Group B was mutual
support, in view of stigmatization and difficulties associated
with carrier status. A third aim in the early days was social
interaction with other gay men who, as hepatitis B carriers,
would not be at risk if a sexual relationship ensued: this
aspect was particularly encouraged by some doctors. But the
common ground of sharing the same disease proved to be rather
a party killer, especially when the ban on alcohol was taken
seriously. With the growing recognition of AIDS, this social
26 Doubt was thrown on this link by colleagues in the blood
transfusion field: 'I raised it at meeting after meeting and
they said I was obsessed by sex': Barbara, interview. A CDSC
reference virologist decided not to publish her survey of
hepatitis B patients because she could not understand why so
many were single men: Vandervelde, interview.
27 Group B, interview, 12 May 1991. The remaining points in
this paragraph are based on this group interview.
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function rapidly tailed away.
For the homosexual group who were already carriers of
hepatitis B, vaccination was not a solution, excepting as a
protection for a steady partner in some cases. 28
 But there
were arguments for promoting widespread screening and
vaccination among the gay community, expressed perhaps most
succinctly in a 1983 article by Adler and others on the costs
and benefits involved. 2' Even without considering the costs
of chronic sequelae of hepatitis B carriage - in other words
only looking at the acute form of the disease - Adler's group
from the Middlesex genito-urinary medicine department
concluded that offering vaccination to homosexuals could save
the national economy several million pounds a year. Their
point was not taken up by the DHSS for some time to come,
although Zuckerman in 1984 again included 'promiscuous male
homosexuals' in his list of target groups for immunization.30
In fact, this 1984 article is instructive as a marker in the
development of opinion with regard to hepatitis B vaccination,
bearing in mind that the author was a dominant figure in both
British government and WHO policy making. With no reference
to the 1982 DHSS guidelines on hepatitis B vaccination,
28 An alternative solution was interferon treatment, tried on
hepatitis B carriers including several members of Group B in
the early 1980s with low success rates: according to Group B
this experimental treatment caused daunting side-effects.
29 M. Adler, R. M. Belsey et al, 'Should homosexuals be
vaccinated against hepatitis B virus? Cost and benefit
assessment', British Medical Journal, 286 (1983), 1621-4.
30 A. J. Zuckerman, 'Who should be immunised against hepatitis
B?', British Medical Journal, 289 (1984), 1243-4.
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Zuckerman listed six main groups to be targetted in Britain:
(1) detailed categories of health care personnel; (ii) mental
institution, haemophilia, renal and certain surgical patients;
(iii) sexual partners of hepatitis B patients; (iv) infants of
carrier mothers; (v) immigrants or refugees from high
prevalence areas such as South East Asia, promiscuous
homosexuals, prostitutes and narcotic drug abusers; (vi)
'lower risk' groups such as long term prisoners, prison staff,
ambulance and rescue service workers, and selected police
personnel. 3' The fifth, rag-bag group includes those at risk
because of country of origin, sexual behaviour and drug-
injecting. Perhaps in drawing attention to these groups,
Zuckerman was testing the climate of opinion among the medical
profession, for a possibly controversial expansion of the
vaccination programme. Although he claims to have found the
DHSS co-operative, 32 there was no sign of their willingness to
revise the vaccination guidelines at this point.
Besides expansion of the immunization programme, Zuckerman
expressed a second strong theme: a counterattack against all
those who expressed doubts about the safety of the plasma-
derived hepatitis B vaccine. Arguments against the vaccine
were 'emotional, vociferous, and Indeed irrational'. 33 This
outburst followed a meeting at which Sheila McKechnie, ASTMS
safety officer, annoyed Zuckerman by stating that she would
31 Terms are those used in original article; numbers have been
added by present author.
Zuckerman, interview.
Zuckerman, 'Who should be linmunised?', 1243.
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not recommend the vaccine for her members (including many
laboratory workers) in the light of Its possible association
with AIDS. To reinforce the evidence on the safety of the
vaccine, Zuckerman used the analogy of hepatitis B specific
immunoglobulin - also prepared from pooled plasma - which he
claimed was delivered to 20 million recipients in one f our-
year period without mishap.34
The pharmaceutical company which marketed the plasma-derived
hepatitis B vaccine in this country, Merck Sharp and Dohme,
undertook an active campaign to increase support for the
vaccine in the medical and nursing professions. Some sectors
were more favourably inclined than others: notably dentists,
and opinion formers in the nursing profession. The Royal
College of Nursing (RCN) expressed willingness to advocate
vaccination for all nurses as early as 1982, when RCN Labour
Relations Officer John Goodlad 'forcefully declared that
"there is nowhere near enough (vaccine] to meet the urgent
need of nurses"' for hepatitis B vaccination, while Assistant
Nurse Adviser for the RCN Society of Psychiatric Nursing
Robert Macrowan called for nurses working with mentally
handicapped patients to receive priority, because bodily
contact, bites and scratches from patients and 'immense
problems of staff shortages' made them the highest risk group
among health professionals." But the RCN still had to
convince the bulk of their members, as well as to secure
Ibid.
" 'New campaign for hepatitis vaccine', Nursing Standard, 19
Aug 1982.
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health authority interest.
Persuasion was conducted by a combination of agencies, through
the nursing press, conferences and publications. In November
1984, the LSHTM Department of Community Health hosted a
conference on 'Hepatitis B - who should be immunised?'. Three
hundred doctors, nurses, trade union representatives, medical
technicians and students attended, to hear Professor Zuckerman
eniphasise the safety of the vaccine, and Roger Williams of
King's College Hospital Liver Unit advocate immunization of
all health staff. 36 In 1986 a conference on nursing and
hepatitis B in the UK supported by Merck Sharp and Dohme
attracted over seven hundred nurses - so many that the
organisers had to change the venue at the last moment to the
Wembley Conference Centre. 37 But despite the efforts of
Zuckerman and colleagues such as Elizabeth Fagan of King's
Liver Unit who pronounced the vaccine 'deader than dead than
dead', the 'dangerous vaccine' label stuck, for some groups at
least, until it was withdrawn from sale.38
For a clear illustration of the resistance to hepatitis B
vaccine, we can turn to a publication from the 1986
conference, featuring articles by leading British names in the
field, with an underlying theme of the need for more
36 
'At risk of hepatitis B', Nursin g Standard, 22 Nov 1984.
" Anonymous informant, interview.
38 Ibid. Fagan possibly borrowed the quote from Zuckerman;
see: RCN Safety Representatives Conference Co-ordinating
Committee, 'Hepatitis B and nursing in the UK. Report from the
Wembley Conference', April 1987. The plasma-derived vaccine
was withdrawn in 1988.
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widespread vaccination. 39 One report in this booklet, from a
London hospital, described the sort of risks run by staff:
we are specially concerned about the risks of
hepatitis B because the hospital is situated in a part of
Central London where there are many male homosexual
patients in the community and increasing numbers of drug
addicts. Many of these have hepatitis B and present to
our casualty department, often with various kinds of
trauma problems, road traffic accidents and so on.
Indeed we have had the problem once of having had
admitted to us an unconscious patient who retrospectively
was found to be incubating hepatitis B and had undergone
major surgery and caused an outbreak of hepatitis B in
our operating theatre and intensive care unit staff.4°
Between 1983 when the hospital bought 100 courses of the
vaccine, and 1986 when the microbiology department undertook a
survey, only ten members of staff had taken up the vaccine.
Interest was high in the intensive care unit and higher still
in the accident and emergency unit, no doubt as a result of
the previous outbreak. Staff on the AIDS ward were not
interested, despite education:
The reason is probably that these staff are demoralised
at seeing young men die so frequently. The fear of AIDS
has terrified them, and even though we have reassured
them these staff still at the moment are not accepting
the vaccine easily.4'
The fear of AIDS transmission was the commonest reason for
refusal to accept the vaccine among all staff; but many had
not previously been aware it was available. And of the staff
circulated with the vaccine questionnaire (240 nurses and 124
doctors), a high proportion of nurses replied but only 20 per
' R. Short and G. Jones (eds), Hepatitis B in the UK,
proceedings of a conference at the Royal Society of Medicine,
Oct 14 1986 [48-page publication sponsored by Merck, Sharp and
Dobme] (London, 1986)
° D. Shanson, 'Attitudes of staff [to] vaccination in a London
hospital', in Short and Jones, Hepatitis B in UK, p. 42.
41 Ibid, p. 43.
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cent of the doctors.42
Some sections of the medical profession were more willing to
press for extended coverage: where hospital doctors held back,
pathologists, and those in charge of clinical laboratories,
were more likely to promote vaccination. In the first half of
1987 there was a further flurry of activity on the pages of
the British Medical Journal about hepatitis B vaccination.
Roger Finch, senior microbiologist at Nottingham City Hospital
and University, kicked off with a leading article calling for
promotion of hepatitis B vaccination. 43 He argued that it was
not just a matter of categories, but that there should be
active efforts to offer the vaccine to target groups in the
health service and in the community, given poor uptake rates
to date. Both the high cost of the vaccine and fears about
transmission of AIDS had hampered delivery, but Finch felt
these could be countered. He reiterated the pro-vaccine
lobby's view that the vaccine was proven beyond doubt to be
safe. As for costs of immunization, these should be offset
against those of chronic hepatitis B, Immunoglobulin for
needlestick injuries, and compensation under the Industrial
Injuries Act. 44 Finch also mentioned the study by Adler's
group, Indicating cost-effectiveness for hepatitis B
vaccination of homosexual men, a group which Finch felt could
42 Ibid, p. 42.
' R. G. Finch, 'Time for action on hepatitis B immunisation',
British Medical Journal, 294 (1987), 197-8.
" Finch gave no figures for sums awarded in compensation; my
enquiries at the National Audit Office have so far failed to
bear fruit but the search continues.
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more readily be reached than drug users, though he suggested
logistics for both groups.
Argument in the correspondence pages over several aspects of
Finch's case centred on health care workers, especially the
cost-effectiveness of immunizing all 400,000 nurses in the NHS
with a vaccine then costing £63.50 for a course of three
injections. 45
 A pertinent case was put for immunizing medical
and nursing students against hepatitis B. 46 Sheila Polakoff,
now in charge of a Hepatitis Epidemiology Unit at the CDSC,
and Professor Zuckerman aired their differing interpretations
of figures on acute cases and estimates for chronic cases.47
Misunderstanding about the source of vaccine supplies was
corrected. 48
 In all, this debate and correspondance lasted
from January to June of 1987. By raising the profile of
hepatitis B vaccine in the medical press, it may have
strengthened the hand of those who were campaigning behind the
scenes for greater governmental promotion of the vaccine.
Policy and debate on the vaccine, 1987-1993
A year later, in July 1988, revised guidelines on hepatitis B
vaccine were included in a DHSS circular offering further
Correspondence, British Medical Journal, 294 (1987), 509
(Malcolm S. Gatley); 771 (Arie J. Zuckerman); 975 (J. K.
Anand).
" Ibid, 841 (Mr Perry Board).
Ibid, 771 (Zuckerman); 1031 (S. Polakoff, Hepatitis
Epidemiology Unit; E. M. Vandervelde et al, Virus Reference
Laboratory; both Central Public Health Laboratory Service).
48 Ibid, 1232 (M.P. Shoolman); 1615 (S. Polakoff).
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recommendations on vaccination. Each district health
authority had been asked, In 1985, to appoint an Immunization
co-ordinator, with the aim of improving overall uptake of
vaccines. This co-ordinator was now required to deal with the
new measles, mumps and rubella combined vaccine, but they were
not asked to add hepatitis B to the childhood Immunization
programme. For hepatitis B vaccine, the focus remained on
health staff, with health authorities bearing responsibility
for deciding the order of priority among their employees.
Voluntary workers with drug misusers 'should also be
considered'. Among patients, the Chief Medical Officer drew
attention to two 'lifestyle' groups: 'individuals who
frequently change sexual partners' and 'injecting drug
misusers'. He suggested that counselling about HIV risks could
be offered along with hepatitis B immunization to these
clients.49
This advice, subsumed in a circular dealing mainly with
childhood vaccinations, was probably slow to have much impact,
either in relation to sexual transmission, or drugs use. While
the 1988 circular referred to 'individuals who frequently
change sexual partners', concern centred on male homosexuals.
A 1989 study revealed lack of screening or immunization of gay
men attending genito-urinary medicine clinics. 50
 A London
clinic at the heart of the recognition that homosexuals were
DHSS EL(88)P/125, from R. L. Cunningham of Child, Maternity
and Prevention Branch to Regional and District General
Managers, etc., on 'Immunisation', July 1988.
50 R. Loke, 1. Murray-Lyon et al, 'Screening for hepatitis B
and vaccination of homosexual men', British Medical Journal,
298 (1989), 234.
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at high risk of hepatitis B reported a similar finding, about
itself, in 1991 '
A tale from an Edinburgh community physician is illuminating
on attitudes to drug injectors as clients for vaccination:
The epidemic here in about '84 was very considerable, the
hep B epidemic in drug users, and I remember going to see
my boss and saying: "Do you think we ought to vaccinate
drug users?", and my boss, who was a very level-headed
and sensible chap, said: "You must be absolutely bloody
crazy!" You know, if you're thinking of using this
vaccine which was £120 a course on a group where you
won't even (be able to maintain contact], he was quite
right, quite apart from the benefit of it, you'd probably
not get your three doses into them, you'd waste half of
it.
- So was he doing a sort of cost-benefit analysis?
- Well, I mean, yes, on the back of an envelope.52
This informant calculated that, following the outbreak of
heroin injecting in Edinburgh in the early 1980s, over 90 per
cent of drug-users in the city would have been infected with
hepatitis B; of these, about 10 per cent probably became
carriers who might be infectious. 53
 Nowhere in the UK was
there a concerted policy of seeking out sexual partners of
hepatitis B carriers for vaccination. But the problem had
since been overshadowed by the AIDS epidemic - in Edinburgh,
retropective testing of blood samples from drug injectors with
hepatitis B showed most seroconverted for HIV.54
' N. Bhattj, R. J. C. Gilson et al, 'Failure to deliver
hepatitis B vaccine: confessions from a genitourinary medicine
clinic', British Medical Journal, 303 (1991), 97-101.
52 G. Bath, interview, 20 Aug 1991.
" Ibid; see also: G. Bath and R. A. Carson, Hepatitis B
notifications in Edinburgh - a study by Edinburgh District
Council and Lothian Health Board (Typescript, 33pp., Feb 1986)
Robertson, 'Edinburgh epidemic'.
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A study of hepatitis B screening and vaccination in NHS drug
treatment facilities, published in 1990, showed that about
two-thirds did not screen or offer vaccination. However, half
thought that partners of hepatitis B clients should be
vaccinated, and two-thirds would recommend vaccination for
drug users who continued to share needles. 55 As a national
needle exchange scheme had been introduced in 1987, because of
the AIDS epidemic, hepatitis B immunization for drug users may
have been less urgent than in the early 1980s. As mentioned
earlier, figures for acute hepatitis B in the UK show a clear
peak in 1984 (about 2000) followed by a rapid drop back to
previous levels (below 1000 per annum). 5' The reasons for the
fall are less obvious than those for the rise, but may be
associated with containment of spread by the sexual route in
the light of HIV, rather than dramatic changes in drug
injecting behaviour.
A story from the 1990s returns us to Nuraskin's work on the
conflict between individual rights and public health. At an
inf ant school in Huddersfield, on the first day of term
following the Easter holidays in 1991, parents of about a
third of the 193 pupils kept their children at home, in
protest against the arrival of a new pupil, a seven year old
boy who was a hepatitis B carrier. The parents were not
arguing for exclusion of the carrier boy, but said they wanted
" M. Farrell, M. Battersby and 3. Strang, 'Screening for
hepatitis B and vaccination of injecting drug users in NHS
drug treatment services', British Journal of Addiction, 85
(1990), 1657-9.
" See p. 247.
261
their children to be immunized before they would allow them
back to school. Kirklees council, the responsible authority,
offered reassurance: 'medical advice is that the risk of the
virus being passed on is minimal and vaccinations are
unnecessary'." As the boycott continued, the Health
Secretary, William Waldegrave, speaking in the House of
Commons, urged the 'misguided parents' to end their protest.
The parents were looking for a retired teacher to help them
set up an alternative school. 58 After a few days the
situation was resolved by a visit to the parents from Dr
Judith Hilton, Senior Medical Officer responsible for
hepatitis B in the Medical Division at the DoH, and Dr Julia
Heptonstall, in charge of hepatitis B surveillance at the
CDSC. 59 That two such high-ranking officers should be sent to
convince parents that there was no need for their children to
be vaccinated, even In the presence of a hepatitis B carrier,
indicates strong concern at the DoH to avoid mass hepatitis B
vaccination.
Yet later In 1991, there were hints of a change in policy:
even, as mentioned earlier, towards universal childhood
vaccination. 60 There was no immediate action, however. In
1992, the MRC funded a study to examine hepatitis B
vaccination policy in the UK, with the aim of finding out how
" 'Children kept out of school in protest over virus carrier',
The Times, 16 AprIl 1991.
" 'Hepatitis boycott goes on', Morning Star, 19 April 1991.
" Hilton, interview.
'° 'Liver disease jabs "for all at 12"'.
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current policy actually operates 'on the ground', and
undertaking cost-benefit analyses of various projected
policies for the future." One of the few previous largescale
cost-benefit studies, which looked at health staff in Northern
Ireland in 1988, had concluded that the costs of hepatitis B
vaccination for all health staff outweighed the benef its.'2
The current MRC study appears to have a much wider brief,
perhaps coming closer than most of the research surveyed in
this study to exemplifying policy-stimulated research.' 3 It
was taking place in an atmosphere where universal childhood
vaccination was under consideration, but would represent an
about-turn for UK policy."
Meanwhile, it appears that health authorities were already
expanding their programme of immunization for certain groups
of staff, especially those in mental health institutions, in
the light of changes to safety legislation and especially the
removal of Crown Immunity in 1991. This response was probably
hastened by the death from hepatitis B of a mental health
nurse who had been bitten by a patient, a case which the RCN
61 P. Mangtani, personal communication, 14 Oct 1992.
62 McKee, 'Hepatitis B in Northern Ireland - who should be
immunised?'.
63 This in no way implies that the outcome of the research was
pre-determined; two papers from the study will shortly be
published but were still confidential as of Dec 1994.
64 This thesis was constantly overtaken by events during
drafting, with one informant confidently predicting universal
hepatitis B vaccination in the UK within two years: A. Hall,
personal communication, passing on staircase at LSHTM, 30 June
1993.
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planned to take to court.' 5
 Health authorities around the
country must have been alerted by the implications. Then in
1993, after a number of cases in which patients were infected
with hepatitis B by carrier surgeons, the D0H moved towards
hepatitis B screening for about 100,000 staff involved in
surgery and other invasive procedures." Doctors, concerned
that this might be a first step towards compulsory HIV
testing, opposed the move. A year and a half later, the BMA
voiced opposition to a new policy of screening prospective
medical students for hepatitis B.' 7
 It seems a probable
expansion of immunization is being preluded by an expansion of
screening.
Conclusions
This chapter looked at policy on hepatitis B vaccine in the
1980s and into the 1990s, and argued that factors identified
in this case are shared with other vaccine histories and
perhaps with public health policy more generally. While
'rational' facts established by research, such as the
epidemiology or potency of a disease, may seem to point the
way towards policy, they are often not the chief determinants
of policy. The pattern of transmission of hepatitis B, like
many diseases, has remained fairly constant while policy has
' S. Brewer, interview, 14 Dec 1992; the outcome was uncertain
at that date.
66 
'NBS staff to be tested for hepatitis B', The Independent,
11 June 1993.
' 0. Wojtas, 'Hepatitis B screening queried', Times Higher
Education Supplement, 8 July 1994.
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changed over time and appears likely to change even more
substantially in the future. It is important to recognize,
too, that features of a disease that appear to the experts as
hard 'facts' are the constructs of a given moment.
The chapter analysed the reasons for, and development of, a
limited policy, that avoided active promotion of widespread
vaccination. Although vaccine policy was directed by the
DHSS/D0H, arid analysed mainly at this level, it was
implemented by regional health authorities. As with other
historical examples, the delegation of final responsibility
for decisions about who should receive the vaccine, from the
centre to the peripheries, acted as a very effective brake on
wider uptake of the vaccine." At every level, health
officials sought advice from medical experts who acted as
'gatekeepers' or arbiters, but (again, with historical
parallels) this medical opinion was often divided and unable
to push very strongly In one direction.
There appears to have been a divide between clinicians and
laboratory doctors, with the latter more willing to advocate
wider use of the vaccine. Dentists promoted the vaccine,
surgeons often resisted it. Among nurses there was a
widespread campaign, with enthusiastic leadership from opinion
formers, which created a high profile in the nursing press:
response from the rank and file was uneven. Ideas about which
Compare Halper's analysis of cost containment in the case of
kidney dialysis, where a similar brake mechanism Is identified
for the early years: T. Halper, 'Life and death in a welfare
state; end-stage renal disease in the United Kingdom', Milbank
Memorial Fund Quarterly, 63 (1985), 52-93.
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categories of nurses and technicians should be prioritized for
vaccination often departed from those indicated by apparent
risk: groups which felt they were more at risk, and campaigned
most strongly, were most likely to receive priority.'9
On the supply side, the pharmaceutical companies which
manufactured and distributed the vaccine conducted a
persistent campaign to promote their product. They attempted
to overcome the image problem of the first vaccine with the
support of scientific evidence: there is some indication of
success with dentists and nurses but less with technicians,
who were however a smaller client group than nurses. When a
different company brought out the genetically engineered
vaccine, they had the advantage of the ground having been
broken, their image was safer, and their price was lower. It
is perhaps surprising, then, that a year elapsed before a
change in vaccine policy, and several more years before
distribution to NHS employees was stepped up. 1° Promotion
among the much larger risk groups 'in the community' (gay men,
IVDUs) lagged still further.
The analysis offered in this chapter shows how history helps
to explain the apparent inconsistencies and vagaries of recent
69 Thus operating theatre nurses, who were not at most risk but
thought they were, tended to be prioritized; similarly dental
nurses; while mental health institution nurses and laboratory
technicians lagged behind.
70 A sign of continuing campaigning by the producer may be an
undated, but recent, quasi-journal, Viral hepatitis,
(subtitled Action on hepatitis B as an occupational hazard),
produced by the Viral Hepatitis Prevention Board 'under the
auspices of the Society of Occupational Medicine', supported
by 'an educational grant' from Smith Kline and Beecham.
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health policy. 7' In the cases of smallpox and diphtheria, lay
and medical opinion about the advisability of vaccination was
deeply divided: so it was with hepatitis B. The epidemiology
and natural history of hepatitis B, built up by multiple
research findings, was open to different interpretations.
During the 1970s, in the 'pre-vaccine' era, hepatitis B was
constructed chiefly as an occupational disease of health
workers. The nature of the work itself came to define the
risk, rather than a particular incident. The risk of a health
worker infecting a patient was seen as extremely rare.
Screening all health workers and weeding out carriers was
avoided: there might be too many, and especially too many
among the higher status groups such as surgeons. The unknown
chance of transmission was outweighed by the known distress,
stigma and probable loss of livelihood for those found to be
carriers. In the balance of individual rights versus public
health interests, at this stage there seemed good reason to
favour individual rights.
Although the terms of the balance would seem to have altered
completely with the advent of the vaccine in 1982, pre-vaccine
policy continued to permeate thinking through the 1980s. 72 It
could have been argued - and was by vaccine advocates - that
71 Of course this is not news. In the related field of AIDS
history, see for example: R. Porter, 'History says no to the
policeman's response to AIDS', British Medical Journal, 293
(December 1986), 20-27; Fee and Fox, AIDS: burdens of history;
Berridge and Strong, 'AIDS and relevance of history'.
72 One anonymous commentator asserted that policy on screening
changed with the advent of the vaccine which gave screening a
public health benefit outweighing individual objections; while
logical, this sequence is not supported by my evidence and
analysis.
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it was in both the individual's and the public health interest
to initiate widespread screening and vaccination. But the
centrality of health workers who had been spared screening and
were now the chief targets of vaccine policy kept individual
rights, to avoid screening, at the forefront of the agenda.
Compulsory and universal screening for health workers would
benefit those who had not yet been exposed to the disease and
could be protected by the vaccine, but it would expose those
who were carriers, for whom the vaccine was no solution
whatsoever.
Divisions over screening and vaccination, leading to a limited
vaccine policy, suited the economizing inclinations of the
DHSS/D0H through a period of increasingly stringent cost-
cutting health policy. Cost appears as a dominant factor
inhibiting promotion of the vaccine, until other potent
factors showed that it might be overridden. 73
 From the mid-
80s, there was the AIDS debate: changes which were introduced
because of AIDS could spill over to affect hepatitis B - for
example, needle exchange schemes for IVDUs - gradually drawing
groups other than health workers towards the focus of the
policy gaze. Then, changes in the law, affecting the
liability of health authorities as employers, meant that it
became potentially expensive to fail to vaccinate employees.
Meanwhile, international health bodies and other countries,
including some with moderate rates of hepatitis B, advocated
wider vaccination. These pressures together probably explain
why universal childhood hepatitis B vaccination is now under
" Or perceptions/calculations of cost may have altered.
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consideration as a viable option in the UK.
Perhaps it is dangerous to say that the test of an analysis or
hypothesis is its predictive value, but on the basis of the
argument for a link between policies on screening and those on
vaccination, it could be predicted that the move towards
compulsory hepatitis B screening for hospital doctors
indicates the likelihood of similar HIV screening, to be
followed by a much stronger policy on the AIDS vaccine, if it
should be developed. The other lesson is that universal
vaccination cannot be counted as likely, if an AIDS vaccine
costs as much as the hepatitis B vaccine: it is even less
likely for those poorer countries where prevalence is far
higher
Low cost hepatitis B vaccines available for poorer countries
have been widely used in parts of Asia, as indicated, but not
in many African countries where even a cheap vaccine consumes
a large proportion of the annual health budget per person.
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this chapter is to draw out themes from the
thesis, related to the aim set out in the Introduction: to
throw light on the relationship between medical research and
health policy, in the case of hepatitis B in the past fifty
years. Minor points that have been included in conclusions to
each chapter will not be reiterated here; and for an outline
of the narrative, readers are referred back to the
Introduction.
The main section of this concluding chapter opens with
definitions of policy that informed the study, and discusses
the lack of fit between science and policy which was observed
from the outset. A summary will be given of the main policy
inputs and outputs that have been traced for hepatitis B.
Second, constructions of the disease will be analysed,
enabling policy to be related to changing perceptions of risk
and notions of crisis. A sub-theme here is the frequent
emergence of hepatitis B as a hazard associated with medical
innovations. A third major theme concerns research networks,
arising from contacts between researchers at different levels;
these will be shown to overlap with policy networks. This
links with notions of desired and undesired inputs, which seem
to operate In the filtering of advice by central authorities.
Fourth, a central-local dynamic which was identified in
several areas of policy will be examined, showing that
policies often originate from the peripheries rather than the
centre. Fifth, the idea of the 'Importance of not knowing' -
270
an anthropological concept - will be applied to not knowing
which doctors or patients were carriers. There will be
discussion of the idea that the low profile of hepatitis B in
the public media, compared to that of AIDS, was connected with
health workers' anxieties over publicity.
A separate section makes comparisons between the policy
history of hepatitis B and that of AIDS, beginning with an
alternative explanation for the different media profiles of
the two diseases. Continuities as well as contrasts can be
observed in the pattern of advisers drawn into policy making,
while parallels can be seen in debates over who should be
screened and the use of the test. Muraskin's arguments on
individual rights versus the public health interest are
especially relevant here. It is also interesting to compare
the use of history in debates around the two diseases. Both
from this and from the previous section, ideas about topics
for further research are generated: these will be briefly
discussed in the penultimate section. In the final remarks,
the strongest findings and themes will be underlined again.
General discussion
The idea of looking at the relationship of research and policy
arose in the early stages of this project, when initial
contacts pointed towards researchers as key players in the
policy arena. A survey of literature from policy science and
the history of health policy suggested that it was unsafe to
rely on a model of policy-makers prompting research on areas
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of concern to them, and of research findings then feeding
directly into policy (the 'rationalist' model of the
relationship). It soon became obvious that this was not what
had happened in the case of hepatitis B. There was a striking
lack of fit between research findings on the epidemiology of
the disease and policies on screening and vaccination. The
use of the two major technologies resulting from research
could not be understood simply as 'application' of that
research.
A much more fluid model of policy making, in which research
was utilised very selectively, had to be employed; and
determinants other than the supposedly rational ones of
science had to be sought out. Of course there is an argument
that a lack of fit between science and policy is a good
thing. 1 In an alternative model, research diffuses gradually
through networks or policy communities. These networks will
be discussed presently.
This seems an appropriate point to present in summary form the
inputs that seem to have carried weight in the case of
hepatitis B, given that science was not the dominant input.
It will also be useful to summarise policy outputs, in terms
of reports and guidelines, to inform the subsequent
discussion.
Three important types of input - that is, factors which
1 Collingridge and Reeve, Science speaks to power, especially
Ch. 1: 'Science and policy - an unhappy marriage', pp. 1-6.
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stirred action in the central policy and decision making
machinery of the Department of Health - can be identified:
(1) Acute outbreaks - for example among troops receiving
yellow fever vaccine in 1942/3, or in renal dialysis units in
1965-72 - called forth strong and definite measures, beginning
with the establishment of committees.
(2) Sporadic cases of acute hepatitis B in a health service
setting caused concern, perhaps depending on the overall
numbers. Post-transfusion hepatitis received most attention.
(3) Other instances of 'noise' from concerned groups (e.g.
laboratory technicians) or embarrassment (as in the case of
dentists turning away suspected carriers) also stirred a
response in terms of policy. Groups further away from the
mainstream health forums, such as prison officers or mental
health institution nurses, were less likely to be heard.
Groups altogether outside the health setting received very
little policy attention.
Main policy outputs have been identif led as follows:
(1) During the war, centrally coordinated research led to
policies to reduce transmission In venereal disease clinics
and in the blood supply (probably Ineffective in the latter
case).
(2) Following the Australia antigen finding, central advice
was issued on the use of antigen testing in the blood supply
from 1972; some regional centres were using the test earlier.
(3) At the same time, in view of outbreaks of hepatitis in
renal dialysis units, central advice was issued on hygiene
precautions (based on local practices), and the use of testing
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in renal units; testing was coordinated by the central PHLS.
(4) In 1975, hepatitis B was scheduled as an industrial injury
for workers in 'close and frequent' contact with sources of
possible infection, whether infected patients or blood.
(5) In 1979, advice was given to dentists on which patients to
regard as hepatitis risks, how to treat them, and which to
refer to special dental units.
(6) In 1981, the DHSS issued guidelines for health authorities
on hepatitis B and NHS staff, reinforcing confidentiality and
the worker's right not to be tested unless, following attacks
of jaundice among patients, they were identified as a probable
source of infection.
(7) In 1982, guidelines on hepatitis B vaccination targetted
health workers covered by 1975 legislation, and groups
mentioned in the 1979 dentists' guidelines.
(8) In 1988, vaccine guidelines were broadened to include
'lifestyle' groups (gays, IVDUs), but without resources to
ensure they were reached.
(9) In 1993, guidelines on health workers and hepatitis B
lifted restrictions on HBsAg carriers who were not positive
for the 'e' antigen, and promoted vaccination for all workers
who might face contact with the disease, including students.
Before 1968, the picture of hepatitis B was chiefly based on
outbreaks of acute disease, but after the antigen test became
available, a more complex picture of carrier prevalence in
different populations and sub-groups was established. The
disease had been first noted (but not yet defined) in the
early twentieth century among people undergoing inoculations
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and patients receiving arsenic therapy for venereal disease;
to these were added during the Second World War: transfusion
recipients; family contacts of those with the disease; and
inmates of institutions for the mentally handicapped. In the
postwar period many other categories were added, principally:
IVDUs; doctors, nurses and other health workers in hospitals
and clinical laboratories; homosexual men; haemophiliacs
receiving Factor VIII; and infants of carrier mothers.
As indicated in the summary of policy Inputs, research
findings on risk groups did not determine policy. Nor did new
technologies resulting from research - a test in the 1970s and
a vaccine in the 1980s - necessarily solve public health
problems presented by hepatitis B, although these innovations
made possible certain policy options that were not previously
on the agenda. Throughout this thesis, it has been suggested
that changing constructions of hepatitis B mediated between
research and policy. The perception of diseases, by doctors,
by policy makers or by the wider public, is not solely a
matter of scientific 'facts' (which in any case, as we have
just seen in the case of hepatitis B, may change greatly over
time) but depends also on social attitudes towards the
activities or places associated with spread of the disease.
Thus sexually contagious diseases take on moral overtones (or
undertones); those spread via food or water, through faecal
contamination, arouse anxieties over pollution and corruption
of the wider social fabric; while diseases like typhus which
spread by vectors thought to thrive in filthy conditions have,
in the past, been tied in with theories of social hygiene.
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Hepatitis B could have been constructed as a sexually
transmitted disease, like AIDS, and indeed it has increasingly
been seen that way in the light of AIDS. But through most of
the period dealt with here, hepatitis B was seen as a disease
which was generated by medical interventions (inoculations,
blood transfusions, kidney dialysis, Factor VIII). Concern
over transmission of hepatitis as a side-effect of new health
technologies was never great enough to deter application of
these technologies, each in their turn regarded by clinicians
as valuable life-savers.
Enormous concern was generated at what we can term 'crisis
points', by particularly spectacular outbreaks: during the
yellow fever inoculation campaign in wartime, and during the
early years of long-term renal dialysis for chronic renal
failure, in the late l960s. The first of these spurred the
government and armed forces to back MRC research into
hepatitis, a rare example of direct feedback from technology-
associated hepatitis into research. This did not deeply
affect perceptions of the disease for most of the medical
profession or policy makers, for whom 'serum hepatitis'
remained a mystery, seen chiefly as a serious side-effect of
transfusion. But the renal unit outbreaks led to a strong
construction of the disease first as a hospital infection,
then as an occupational hazard of health workers. This was to
remain the dominant construction through the 1970s and 1980s,
at policy level. Was this due to the Department of Health's
sense of responsibility for containing the hazard on NHS
premises, and keeping its workers safe? Or was it due to
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agitation by the workers themselves? Or was it a result of
the key role played by medical professionals as policy
advisers, their concerns over the health care setting, and
relative insensitivity to the problem outside that setting?
A central theme, elaborated in Chapter 6, has been the
development of networks of researchers - in this study, those
in London, but there are equivalent networks in rival centres
such as Glasgow. Unevenly distributed technical and cognitive
expertise was exchanged through this network: skills, such as
EM technique, special knowledge (gained through scientific or
clinical apprenticeship and practice), or use of samples
collected at reference centres. These sample banks served as
reference points and nodes of exchange and those In control of
them became the most renowned experts. Examples include the
WHO reference centre at LSHTM, headed by Zuckerman; the NLBTC,
headed by Cleghorn; and key figures at the central PHLS and
CDSC. The experts called on to advise the Department of
Health, or the public health laboratories, on scientific and
public health policy in relation to hepatitis B, included not
only those who had published most papers on the subject but
also those recognised by their peers as experts because of
their reference role.
Medical experts played an important part in the policy
process, from the wartime Jaundice Committee to the current
Advisory Group on Hepatitis. Only In the former case have
negotiations within the committee been open to scrutiny.
However, there are hints that other hepatitis committees,
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including the Rosenheim and Maycock committees as well as
later advisory groups, demonstrate much continuity. Common
characteristics include minimal external accountability;
appointment by invitation ('who knows who'); opportunities for
expansion of research opportunites and clinical empires;
reaction to incidents, rather than provision of coherent
overall strategies; powerful elements of surveillance with
minimal feedback to the community surveyed; and a tendency to
concentrate on certain valued groups (soldiers during the war,
health care workers later).
While these advisory groups did not make policy, their
interpretations of research - and their overall constructions
of hepatitis B - were clearly influential. According to one
of the medical civil servants in charge of policy on hepatitis
B, there was a ranking of outside influences on the D0H via
various channels: some were more welcome than others.2
Articles in medical journals and letters from doctors (very
numerous at times) had less impact than input from the CDSC
('bids for ideas', judged as more or less appropriate) or from
ministers (influential but rare). A major event hitting the
media could push hepatitis B up the policy agenda and give
rise to ministerial concern. The most desired input was from
the Advisory Group on Hepatitis. Thus, selected medical
professionals act as 'gatekeepers' between the central policy
machinery and the wider field of researchers and clinicians.
There are echoes here of medical control over technologies,
2 Interview, Hilton.
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where the clinicians' cognitive expertise establishes pre-
eminence over the skills of technicians. 3 Among the varying
types of hepatitis researchers surveyed, (technicians, non-
clinically trained scientists, and clinician researchers with
technical skills), it seemed that experts were set apart from
the rest by their reference role. It would be interesting to
see how far the analysis offered here applies to other policy
areas. A research background was often important in selection
of advisers to the DoH, but the reference role might not
apply, for instance, in drugs policy, where patronage of 'big
chiefs' could be most crucial (the 'Maudsley mafia'). There
is also evidence of genealogies of research in which hepatitis
B was placed between other diseases. Several researchers came
from a background of work on influenza or polao, and some
talked of being 'recycled' into AIDS - and back again into
hepatitis B and hepatitis C.
It seems that the practical content of policy was not
necessarily generated by these central advisers. Instead, as
frequently observed in this narrative, initiatives taken in
local laboratories and clinical units around the country could
be mediated centrally by policy advisers. For example, in the
case of renal units and blood transfusion, local 'best
H. M. Marks, 'Medical technologies: social contexts and
consequences', in W. Bynum and R. Porter (eds), Companion
encyclopaedia of the history of medicine (New York: Routledge,
1994), Vol. 2, pp. 1592-1618; though mainly focussed on
diagnostic and treatment technologies Marks' discussion makes
the telling point (p. 1597) that 'physicians' assertions of
clinical competence are but a sub-set of professionals'
assertions of cognitive expertise', citing on such knowledge
claims: A. Abbott, The system of the professions. An essay on
the division of expert labour (Chicago, Illinois: University
of Chicago Press, 1988)
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practices' were redistributed from centre to peripheries in
the form of guidelines. Some issues appear to have been under
greater central control. The direction of advice on screening
and vaccination tended to be one-way, from centre to
peripheries. Restricted screening policies, adopted towards
health care workers in the 1970s, helped to shape a restricted
vaccine policy in the 1980s. There was, however, a local
component in both cases, in the sense that hospitals which had
suffered outbreaks of surgery-associated hepatitis B pressed
for changes to central guidelines on screening; while calls by
groups of nurses, or some GPs, to expand vaccine availability,
may have helped influence an eventual shift in policy on
vaccination (along with many other pressures).
Costs of screening and vaccination were always part of the
reason for DHSS/DoH reluctance to appply these technologies to
all health workers, let alone the population at large.
Changes in policy, already visible (in 1993-1994) in the case
of health workers, were probably precipitated by changes in
the law, such as removal of crown immunity, and extension of
employer liability. Whenever seriously embarrassing incidents
emerged, however, the DoH was able to hide behind a double
screen. On the one hand, responsibility for implementing its
policies was delegated to regional or local authorities, which
bore the blame, for example if a nurse bitten by a patient
contracted hepatitis B. On the other hand, if central
policies were challenged, the central authorities could argue
that their decisions were based on the best expert advice
available at the time. This happened very recently over
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hepatitis C testing of blood, introduced later in the UK than
in other countries in Europe, leading to an unknown number of
patients being given the virus.4
It may be because such contentious issues are very much alive
that many hepatitis experts were reluctant to be interviewed,
and a cloak of secrecy shrouded the formulation of large areas
of recent policy. It may also, of course, have been partly
due to intense rivalries and tensions between various parties,
which informants hinted at but refused to explicate.
One longstanding tendency can be seen, in issues as diverse as
MacCallum's wartime experiments and screening policies in the
1970s, which it may be helpful to think of in terms of 'the
importance of not knowing'. 5
 In the former case, as in some
recent instances, it was important that the public should not
know: in the case of screening, doctors themselves preferred
not to know about their hepatitis B status (in general). This
made tolerable their own 'not knowing' which patients were
carriers. Perhaps this notion could be extended into the
recent period of vaccination policy, when official policy has
included gay men and IVDUs among target groups, but studies
show that the agencies that might reach out to these groups
have often failed to do so, leaving clients in a state of 'not
knowing' and therefore not demanding the expensive vaccine.
BBC Panorama programme, 'Bad blood', 16 Jan 1995. The
programme was very partisan, benefitting from 20-20 hindsight.
This phrase is adapted from anthropologist Murray Last,
writing about health attitudes of non-Muslim Hausa; see: M.
Last, 'The importance of knowing about not knowing', Social
Science and Medicine, 15B (1981), 387-92.
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It is not clear how important was 'not knowing' in the context
of information passing from the medical press to the public
media. Muraskin's view that health workers kept back
information on hepatitis B, because they were themselves a
risk group and wished to avoid the consequences of public
exposure and debate, seems too conspiratorial; health workers,
particularly the small but high risk category of laboratory
technicians, actively raised the profile of hepatitis B in
their professional journals. A more probable explanation
seems to be that hepatitis B was no more exciting to the
national press than most other diseases, and only received
coverage when there was a crisis, such as the renal unit
outbreaks. This fits with what has here been described as the
'normalizing' tendency of Rosenheim: the renal unit outbreaks
may have left a scar on the collective medical psyche, but
methods of coping were rapidly evolved, in line with
containment of previous hospital infections.
Comparison with AIDS6
Perhaps the most striking dissimilarity between the histories
of hepatitis B and AIDS has been the low public profile of
one, and the huge public profile of the other, despite their
remarkably similar patterns of transmission. Why should we
expect them to have been similarly high-profile and subject to
open debate, as Muraskin suggests? 7 It would have been
' This will involve an impressionistic view of AIDS; I am
grateful to Dr Virginia Berridge for drawing my attention to
many of these parallels and contrasts.
Muraskin, 'Silent epidemic'.
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convenient, perhaps even commendable, if hepatitis B had paved
the way for AIDS through public debate on public health versus
individual rights questions over testing, screening, and care
of patients; but it did not. As indicated above, the fact
that health care workers were a risk group for hepatitis B but
not for AIDS (a distinction now open to question) was only
part of the explanation, though it is the point on which
Muraskin concentrates.
Another, less conspiratorial, explanation for different media
responses arises from the nature of the diseases, plus the
novelty of AIDS. While the epidemiology of hepatitis B and
AIDS is similar, giving cause to make comparisons, their
natural histories have appeared rather dissimilar. In an
apparently haphazard way, hepatitis B provoked a variety of
responses, from fatal, fulminating acute hepatitis, to
inapparent infection resulting decades later in liver cancer -
but in most cases, no lasting damage occurred, and the
fatality rate was low. AIDS, by contrast, initially appeared
as a new, fatal disease, with rapidly increasing numbers of
victims. The knowledge that hepatitis B, in the 1990s, kills
greater numbers of people around the world than does AIDS - a
claim made almost with pride, it seems, by hepatitis experts -
has not shifted general perceptions of the relative threat of
the diseases. For a country like the UK, AIDS is the bigger
killer, though still not a very big one; and it has received
immense policy attention. Hepatitis B is seen as a nasty
disease, but rather on a par with many other communicable
diseases, which rarely enter the public consciousness in a
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sustained manner.
Nuraskin may be right that public debates that could have
taken place over hepatitis B did not occur, and therefore AIDS
debates had to begin with a tabula rasa, but this conclusion
applies only to the public arena, and not for the reason he
gave. On the other hand, in the history of hepatitis B
presented here, there was plenty of less public debate, among
health care workers and policy advisers. Since some of these
policy advisers were (in their own words) 'recycled' into
AIDS, it is unsurprising to find that similar approaches
emerged in the policy history of AIDS. But it should be
remembered that the group of experts drawn Into the policy
community for AIDS was more wide-ranging than that for
hepatitis B: it Included leading figures in genito-urinary
medicine, a previously marginalized specialty, as well as
immunologists who had not worked on hepatitis B.
The predominant pattern in both cases was that the D0H turned
primarily to medical professionals to interpret the disease,
while other groups were given less voice in helping to form
policy. For hepatitis B, one or two civil servants settled
policy in consultation with advisers. For AIDS, politicians
became more involved in policy debates, and there seems to
have been a greater degree of intervention by bureaucrats.
While it seems fair to say that the values of the biomedical
elite were Influential in both cases, the AIDS policy debate
probably reflected broader political forces. In both cases,
central advisory groups used examples of local practices in
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drawing up their policy recommendations. Local responsibility
for implementing policy was also important in both cases, but
money was made available for AIDS work in a way that was
unthinkable for hepatitis B (or for other diseases that affect
much larger numbers of people).
Gay men were belatedly acknowledged as a risk group for
hepatitis B, whereas they were the major focus of attention in
the early days of the AIDS epidemic. Mothers and infants,
already a heavily medicalized category, were subject to policy
for both diseases: vaccination, for hepatitis B; screening,
for AIDS. Haemophlliacs, medicalized in a different way,
became victims of inadvertent transmission firstly of
hepatitis, and then AIDS, through policies which some, in
retrospect, saw as negligent. The biggest 'risk group' for
both diseases, IVDIJs, were marginalized in policies for these
diseases, as they are in society as a whole. Health care
workers, by contrast, were at the centre of the policy agenda,
both for hepatitis B where they formed an acknowledged risk
group, but also for AIDS where their position as a risk group
was denied.
One potential application of a test is for screening, either
populations or risk groups. There has been more open
controversy over this policy issue for AIDS, but it was also a
matter for debate in the case of hepatitis B. Screening for
epidemiological purposes was part of hepatitis B research from
the beginning, but screening of risk groups to find carriers,
with an aim of acting on the findings, was scarcely ever
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implemented. Health care workers were the major group under
consideration for this sort of screening, for hepatitis B, but
they were spared from screening, by and large. In the more
urgent and open debate over screening health workers for AIDS,
health care workers' objections carried weight, maybe partly
due to this precedent as well as the sympathies of policy
advisers who were drawn from the medical profession.
Arguments over the use of tests in the blood service, for both
hepatitis and for AIDS, focussed on the issue of false
positives. The danger that large numbers of blood donors
would be identified as carriers, when in fact they were not,
raised questions of psychological harm to the individual and
harm to the blood transfusion service if many donors were
lost. In the event, a hepatitis B test was introduced for
whole blood very rapidly, possibly more rapidly than would
have been the case had not the renal unit outbreaks created
such a sense of urgency around 1970, when the test first
became available. Blood products were also tested for
hepatitis B, but as we have seen, they were not tested for HIV
with the first available test in 1985. Then in 1990, a
decision was taken against using the first test for hepatitis
C, for whole blood transfusions, presumably on the grounds
that too many false positives were likely.
History was used in the case of renal unit outbreaks of
hepatitis B (though in a very vague manner) to establish
continuity with past examples of successful containment: it
might seem that this is a contrast with the use of history in
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the early days of AIDS, where comparison was rather with
plagues and panics of the past. But in terms of the way that
policy formulation actually worked, a normalizing, 'middle of
the road' strand was dominant In both cases, demonstrating
continuity with past models in the Department of Health.
Cost-cutting, caution and containment - the normative values
of any Whitehall department - were wedded with medical and
scientific values to shape policy on hepatitis B and AIDS.
Topics for future research
Themes raised by this study could be expanded in a number of
ways. A central argument, about the way that 'experts' were
created in the course of research, and then selected as
advisers for central policy making, would merit comparison
across different policy areas: other diseases, or areas such
as policy on addictions. The way that a central-local dynamic
has worked in policy formation could also be studied in other
instances. The history of negotiations between health workers
and employers, issues of health and safety, and control in
laboratories and clinical settings, has been little studied
for the postwar period. The way preventive measures were put
In place, to some extent in return for freedom from screening,
may or may not be reflected in other histories. The pattern
of vaccination policy apparently shaped by these policies on
preventive measures and screening, Identified for hepatitis B,
could be investigated especially for AIDS.
On hepatitis B itself, comparative work looking at its history
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in other European countries would be rewarding: for the US, we
already have Nuraskin's studies. In the UK, issues raised by
hepatitis B in prisons and mental institutions - why it was
widespread, and why it was either denied or ignored - merit
further research. The liver studies strand merits extensive
amplification, with a study of genealogies and hierarchies of
research. The internal dynamics of research in pharmaceutical
companies, their links with academic and health service
research, and efforts to promote company products, could be
elaborated against a background of changing policies on the
role of the market in the NHS. There is contemporary history
in the making, in the battle between researchers to be first
with a test (recently introduced) and then a vaccine for
hepatitis C. Perhaps the greatest challenge would be to write
a history of hepatitis B in developing countries, where the
disease has been a major cause of adult mortality.
Concluding remarks
This study, in tracing hepatitis B research and policy in the
UK from the 1940s to the present, has found that medical
research rarely played a direct role In shaping health policy.
As with many other diseases, constructions of hepatitis B
changed over time: scientific 'facts' about the disease were
not fixed, but were open to varying interpretations. Policy
makers responded most rapidly to crises, more slowly to
ongoing pressures. Factors other than research findings
Influenced policy: for example, cost was an inhibiting factor
for screening, for safety precautions, possibly for testing,
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and certainly for vaccination. But civil servants sought
advice from medical experts in deciding most aspects of
policy.
Investigation of networks of researchers helped to explain the
way that certain researchers came to eminence as 'experts'. A
small circle of mainly research-based experts predominated
over a long period, as policy advisers to the Department of
Health. Both the professional position of such advisers, and
the Department's role as employer, help to explain the policy
focus on health workers. However, an historically important
impetus for the construction of hepatitis B as an occupational
hazard for health workers, a construction which strongly
shaped policy in the 1970s and 1980s, arose from outbreaks of
hepatitis in renal dialysis units in the late 1960s. Removal
of hepatitis B from the blood supply was possibly precipitated
by this crisis, at a time when the first test for the disease
was just available. Once a solution had been found to the
major problem of hepatitis B in blood transfusion, policy on
other public health hazards associated with hepatitis B was a
matter of protracted negotiations. Divisions among health
care workers, central-local interaction, and policies on AIDS
in the past decade, have all played a part in determining
policy outcomes. Constructions of hepatitis B, linking policy
with research, have gradually changed according to these
social, economic and political dynamics.
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In the text, references are given in full only on first
citation and thereafter in shortened form. To facilitate
checking of references for the reader, divisions have been
kept to a minimum as follows:
Interviews
Documents
Reports and guidelines
Printed sources
Printed sources are frequently primary sources for history of
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under 'Printed sources'.
INTERVIEWS
I would like to thank again all the Informants who spared time
to talk to me about hepatitis B, and to emphasize that this in
no way represents an exhaustive list of possible informants.
Locations of interviews generally tally with workplace for
informants currently working. See list of abbreviations, p.6.
Those interviews that were taped are marked (T).
Dr June Almeida, electron microscopist, Bexhill-on-Sea, 29 Jan
1993 (T)
Anonoymous informant In contact with many hepatitis B
researchers, 12 July 1991
Dr John Barbara, blood transfusion centre virologist, NLBTC,
Colindale, 13 July 1992
Dr George Bath, public health physician, Northern General
Hospital, Edinburgh, 20 Aug 1991 (T)
Dr John Beale, public health laboratory and pharmaceutical
company virologist, Royal Society of Medicine, London, 26 Feb
1993 (T)
Sheila Brewer, nursing labour relations officer, RCN, London,
14 Dec 1992
Baruch Bluinberg, virologist/geneticist, Master of Balliol
College Oxford, 22 Nov 1990, 12 March 1991, 5 March 1992 (T),
25 March 1992 (T)
Brian Coxnbridge, technician, BPL Elstree, 19 June 199]. (T)
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Dr David Dane, virologist, Royal Society of Medicine, London,
6 Aug 1992, 9 Dec 1993
Dr Michael Farrell, drug policy adviser, D0H, 5 Oct 1992 (T)
Brian Gee, laboratory scientific officer & safety
representative, Coventry and Warwickshire Hospital, 21 June
1991 (T)
Dr Richard Gilson, genito-urinary medicine specialist,
Middlesex Hospital Medical School/James Pringle House, London,
25 Feb 1991
Group B, voluntary group of hepatitis B carriers, London, 12
Nay 1991
Dr Andy Hall, epidemiologist, LSHTM London, 21 Nov 1990
Dr Graham Hart, medical sociologist, Middlesex Hospital
Medical School/James Pringle House, London, 6 Feb 1991
Dr Julia Heptonstall, epidemiologist, CDSC, Central PHLS,
Colindale, 17 April 1991
Dr Judith Hilton, medical civil servant dealing with
communicable diseases, D0H, 30 Sept 1992
Prof Cohn Howard, virologist, Royal Veterinary College, 25
Nov 1992 CT)
Dr 3. B. Kurtz, public health laboratory virologist, John
Radcliffe Hospital Oxford, 20 Feb 1992
Dr Fred MacCallum, virologist, Goring-on-Thames, 29 April 1992
Charles Medawar, freelance researcher on medical issues,
London, 28 June 1991
Dr Sheila Polakoff, epidemiologist, Royal Society of Medicine,
London, 14 Oct 1992
Dr Christopher Tibbs, liver specialist, Institute of Liver
Studies, King's College Hospital Medical School, London, 11
Nov 1992
Dr Ehise Vandervelde, virologist, Virus Reference Laboratory,
Central PHLS Colindale, 1 AprIl 1992
Prof Roger Williams, Director of Institute of Liver Studies,
King's College Hospital Medical School, London, 14 Dec 1992
(T)
Mr X, surgeon who had been hepatitis B carrier, 9 Feb 1993
Prof Arie Zuckerman, virologist, Dean of Royal Free Hospital
Medical School, London, 8 June 1992 CT)
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DOCUMENTS
NRC files listed below date from 1942-1946. Particulars of
individual documents cited in the text are given in footnotes
and are not repeated here.
NRC MB39, Jaundice Committee Minutes
MRC 2181/lOa, Blood transfusion - Research problems - General
NRC 2181/lOg/2, Jaundice following transfusion
NRC 3144/21, Cases of jaundice through bein g in contact with
T.N.T.
MRC 3164/1, Incidence of post-arsenical jaundice in the army
NRC 3217/1, Jaundice, increase in the incidence. Committee,
constitution & members
NRC 3217/4, Jaundice in Industry
NRC 3217/5, Jaundice unit - Staff
NRC 3217/6, Jaundice, research on, C. H. Gray
MRC 3217/7, Research on jaundice - J. B. Rennie
NRC 3217/8, Jaundice - Transmission to volunteers
Kurtz papers: misc. papers 1972-1990, including correspondence
on hepatitis B questions and minutes of PHLS Hepatitis Sub-
committee meetings. On loan. Treated as confidential.
Zuckerman files: a limited number of files from Zuckerman's
period of work at LSHTM are retained in the School, including
one file of enquiries about hepatitis B, and an account by a
patient with carrier status. Treated as confidential.
'Report of the Internal inquiry into the hepatitis B
incident', typescript, 1990.
P. Jones, Personal record (re haemophilia services), c.1990.
Draft, strictly confidential.
D. S. Dane, corr. with author, 15 letters, & enclosures.
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REPORTS AND GUIDELINES
A. Official reports and guidelines
These are listed in chronological order, to give an outline of
official policy over time.
The Ministry of Health, subsumed into the Department of Health
and Social Security in 1968, separated out again in 1988 to
become the Department of Health: hence the change in 'author'
of these documents at that date.
Only WHO reports referred to in the text are listed here.
Medical Research Council, Annual Re ports, various dates
WHO, Viral Hepatitis, Report of a European Symposium convened
by the World Health Organization, Prague, 29 Sept - 3 Oct 1964
(Copenhagen: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 1965)
DHSS, Hepatitis and the treatment of chronic renal failure,
Report of the Advisory Group, 1970-1972; Chairman: Lord
Rosenheim (Department of Health and Social Security, Scottish
Home and Health Department, Welsh Office, 1972)
DHSS, Australia (he patitis-associated) anti gen, Revised report
of the Advisory Group on testing for the presence of Australia
(hepatitis-associated) antigen and its antibody. Chairman: W.
d'A Maycock (Department of Health and Social Security, Welsh
Office, 1972)
DHSS, Viral Hepatitis, Report by Industrial Injuries Advisory
Council in accordance with Section 141 of the Social Security
Act 1975 on the question whether viral hepatitis should be
prescribed under the Act (London: HMSO, 1975)
DHSS, Second report of the advisory group on testin g for the
presence of hepatitis B surface antigen and its antibody
(London: HMSO, 1975)
WHO, Viral Hepatitis, Report on a Working Group, Bucharest 25-
29 Aug 1975 (Copenhagen: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 1976)
DHSS, Code of Practice for the Prevention of Infection in
Clinical Laboratories and Post-mortem Rooms, Department of
Health and Social Security, Scottish Home and Health
Department, Department of Health and Social Services Northern
Ireland, and Welsh Office (London, HMSO, 1978) ('Howie Code']
DHSS, Report of Expert Group on Hepatitis in Dentistry
Department of Health and Social Security, Scottish Home and
Health Department, Welsh Office (London: HMSO, 1979)
DHSS, Third report of the advisory group on testin g for the
presence of hepatitis B surface anti gen and its antibody,
1981. (Typescript)
DHSS circular letter CNO (81) 11, from H. Yellowlees, Chief
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Medical Officer to Regional Medical Officers and Area Health
Medical Officers &c, 31 December 1981, 'Hepatitis B and NHS
Staff', with attached 2-page memo, 'Guidance on hepatitis B
surface antigen carriers among NHS staff'.
DHSS circular CMO(82)13/CNO(82)l1, from Henry Yellowlees,
Chief Medical Officer and Mrs A. A. B. Poole, Chief Nursing
Officer, to General Medical Practitioners, District Medical
Officers and District Nursing Officers, 15 October 1982, on
'Hepatitis B vaccine: guidance on use', letter with 2pp.
attachment.
DHSS EL(88)P/l25, from R. L. Cunningham of Child, Maternity
and Prevention Branch to Regional and District General
Managers, etc., on 'Immunisation', July 1988.
Department of Health, Guidance for clinical health care
workers: protection against infection with HIV and hepatitis
viruses (London: HMSO, 1990)
UK Health Departments, Protectin g health care workers and
patients from hepatitis B, Recommendations of the Advisory
Group on Hepatitis, August 1993 [l7pp booklet, no publisher,
printed for HMSO]
DHSS/Department of Health, Immunisation a gainst infectious
disease (London: HMSO I various dates)
B. Other reports and guidelines
Stated case for downgrading hepatitis B virus specimens (B2)
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